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Abstract 
In recent years, rating and ranking practices have proliferated, from 
Uber to Airbnb, from PISA to dating apps, guiding consumer opinions 
and preferences in a landscape of supposed choices. This thesis is 
centred on one such rating and ranking practice: the UK National Stu-
dent Survey (NSS) which, purportedly, ascertains student voice by 
gathering final year student satisfaction with university courses. The 
NSS has had a profound impact on UK academia through its influence 
on university rankings and government certifications of “teaching ex-
cellence”. By pitching universities against one another, so the story 
goes, courses will surely improve their “quality” and offer better “value 
for money”. Drawing on data from interviews, unstructured 
observations and insider narrative accounts, this thesis investigates 
the effects of the National Student Survey (NSS) on university lectur-
ers, departments and universities. First, the NSS is shown to be a dis-
ciplinary technology through exposing lecturers to panoptical observa-
tions and perpetual judgements. Moreover, the NSS embodies what 
Foucault called neo-liberal governmentality by creating an environ-
ment in which competition becomes the predominant mode of social 
relation. As a result, lecturers, departments and institutions are recast 
into disciplined and competitive subjects who are “free” to find innova-
tive ways to raise student satisfaction scores. Simultaneously, the 
NSS governs academia by drawing powerful boundaries. This process 
of boundary formation is explored through Laclau’s work on antago-
nism where lecturer identities emerge through their rejection of “the 
demanding and dissatisfied student”. This amalgam of disciplinary, 
neo-liberal and antagonistic logics then results in an increasing atom-
isation of lecturers. Last, DeLanda’s “assemblage theory” and Barad’s 
agential realism seek to provide a distinctly realist take on the NSS. 
Notably, Laclau’s and Barad’s works do not only open possibilities of 
analysing antagonistic relations between students and lecturers, but 
could also be read as a manual on how to create connectivities be-
tween stakeholders.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
“Charlie Brooker’s ‘Nosedive’ begins with protagonist Lacie who is on 
her early morning jog in what appears to be a shiny, spotless neigh-
bourhood. Whilst being fully immersed into her mobile phone, Lacie 
only looks up when another group of joggers passes by. What happens 
now is crucial for this episode. Upon greeting each other, both Lacie 
and the joggers swipe their thumbs over their mobile phones: Lacie and 
the joggers just rated each other on a scale between 1 and 5 stars.  
This rating activity builds the backbone of the episode since each rating 
adds to an overall score for each person. The score, in return, materi-
alises next to people’s heads whenever they are gazed at (which is 
made possible through special augmented-reality contact lenses that 
almost everyone within this fictitious world seems to be wearing).  
This aggregate score has wide-ranging implications, an issue which be-
comes increasingly clear as the episode progresses: low scores will 
deny (whilst high scores will enable) people entry to workplaces, attrac-
tive housing, high-quality rental cars, and flights. A particularly low 
score even results in incarceration.  
When Lacie, with a current score of 4.2, is searching for a new rented 
flat, she is informed that she qualifies for a rent discount if she manages 
to attain a score of 4.5. However, Lacie is informed that the only way 
she can attain this score quickly enough is if she manages to secure 
five-star ratings from other high-ranking people. On the other hand, 
rankings from her inner circle of friends, as she is told, are simply not 
powerful enough as these friends would be ‘largely, pardon the term, 
mid – to low-range folks’ (Brooker, 12:50). In other words, people with 
high scores have more power to affect the ratings of others than people 
with low scores.  
Suddenly, an opportunity arises for Lacie to multiply her score when a 
former classmate asks her to be her maid of honour: Lacie’s friend has 
an increasingly high score and so do most of the people who are invited 
to the wedding.  However, when Lacie arrives at the airport to fly to the 
wedding venue, she is informed that her flight is cancelled and briefly 
loses her temper and starts to swear. Immediately, a security guard ap-
pears and deducts one whole point from her overall score which auto-
matically bans Lacie from flying and restricts her to low-quality car rent-
als. From here onwards, things spiral out of control as Lacie desperately 
tries to travel to the wedding venue by whichever means possible …” 
(My plot description) 
Charlie Brooker’s science fiction short film Nosedive (2016) takes what 
is a common practice today – to rate the satisfaction with products and 
services - to the next level. In this dystopian vision of the future, we 
are confronted with a society in which humans perpetually rate and 
rank one another on their mobile phones. These ratings then accrue 
to an average which is visible everywhere: on social media accounts, 
at airports or simply when looking at other people through one’s oblig-
atory augmented-reality contact lenses. Whereas the technology in 
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Nosedive currently only exists in prototypical experimental designs - 
for example, there are patents pertaining to augmented reality contact 
lenses (Bolton, 2016) – reciprocal rating and ranking practices are al-
ready ubiquitous in today’s society. For example, when purchasing a 
taxi ride with the company Uber, both customers and taxi drivers rate 
each other on the experience of their shared car journey, with anxiety-
inducing effects on both clients and drivers (Hunt, 2016). In addition, 
on the hospitality website “Airbnb”, guests rate their hosts on whether 
they were satisfied with their accommodation whilst the same hosts 
retaliate by rating their guests on whether they, for example, abided by 
the house rules and left the apartment tidy (Porges, 2016). Similarly, 
the accumulative rating scores in Nosedive are already embodied in 
“Amazon ratings”, “Facebook Likes” and “YouTube hits” with a range 
of third-party companies offering advice on how to increase ratings 
(e.g. Social Pressence, 2018). 
This thesis explores another example of such rating and ranking 
practice; the National Student Survey (NSS), a UK wide Likert-type 
satisfaction questionnaire (Cocksedge and Taylor, 2013) which seeks 
to ascertain “student course satisfaction”. Akin to the reciprocal rank-
ing in Nosedive, lecturers continue to “rate” their students’ academic 
performance in assignments whilst students now rate their courses us-
ing the National Student Survey (NSS). These ratings accrue to an 
overall mean score, which, in return, informs where universities are 
placed in national rankings (Turnbull, 2018).  
The impact of the NSS has been profound. Not only has the NSS 
had a powerful impact on Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) (Agnew 
et al., 2016), but also on lecturers (Jones et al., 2014). This impact has 
been exacerbated by the 2016 introduction of the UK Teaching Excel-
lence Framework (TEF) which utilises NSS data to then allocate a 
‘gold, silver or bronze award’ to ‘participating higher education provid-
ers’ (Higher Education Funding Council for England, 2017:online). 
These TEF ratings, in return, may allow English universities to raise 
their tuition fees in lines with inflation (ibid.). Beyond the TEF, the NSS 
also influences higher education rankings, such as the Times/Sunday 
12 
Times “Good University Guide”, the Complete University Guide 
(Jobbins et al., 2008) and the Guardian University Guide (Friedberg, 
2016). Whilst the impact of these rankings on student university choice 
is unclear (Locke, 2011, 2014), university senior leadership increas-
ingly pays close attention to trends in student satisfaction (Agnew et 
al., 2016). As this thesis will show, vice chancellors - eager to boost 
their universities’ ranking position - now dedicate increasing energy 
(and funds) to the attainment of high student satisfaction ratings. As a 
result, many universities have implemented a range of smaller-scale 
intra-institutional Student Evaluations of Teaching (SETs) (Canning, 
2017b) which put departments, courses and lecturers under pressure 
to attain student satisfaction which either exceeds or at least matches 
institutional averages. Hence, many lecturers have prioritised the at-
tainment of positive student feedback with detrimental emotional ef-
fects if feedback is negative. In one of my research diary entries (see 
page 86) I remark:    
“I feel like I’m continuously thinking about student satisfaction. This 
really is at the heart of what I do. I’m worried that I might attain negative 
student feedback, downhearted when I receive negative feedback and 
thrilled when I receive positive feedback. Feedback has strong cur-
rency; it is an attractive social good and sought after commodity. I shape 
my teaching on the basis of what I and my department think produces 
positive feedback and discard every aspect that the students might not 
like. I feel like I permanently dance to the hymn sheet of student voice.” 
(My research diary)     
This thesis argues that the philosophy which underpins the NSS 
could be described as distinctly “neoliberal” because of its embracing 
of “competitive markets”. By creating competition between universities 
over “customers” (i.e. students), so the neoliberal story goes, the qual-
ity of commodities (i.e. courses) is enhanced because customers pur-
portedly always chose the “best”, most suitable “commodity” with the 
lowest price (cf. Brown, 2015). The NSS seeks to create such a com-
petitive market by forcing universities to compete with one another 
over ranking positions in league tables (Jobbins et al., 2008). Since 
these positions supposedly attract higher student numbers and better 
“talent” (cf. Locke, 2014), universities improve their “services” on offer 
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with the intention of raising satisfaction ratings. More students, in re-
turn, mean more revenue. Whether this artificial competition really 
raises standards remains doubtful, with some studies suggesting that 
the NSS contributes to grade inflation whilst decreasing the quality of 
education and transforming students into passive consumers of edu-
cation who “deserve a degree because they paid for it”. Nevertheless, 
due to competitive pressures to raise student satisfaction, university 
management force courses and ultimately lecturers to raise student 
satisfaction.  
How can these processes be explored further? In this thesis, I pro-
pose four theoretical frameworks to shed further light on these issues: 
(i) Foucault’s work on disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977) and neo-
liberal governmentality (Foucault, 2008); (ii) Laclau’s notion of “antag-
onism” (Laclau, 2005); (iii) Manuel DeLanda’s “assemblage theory” 
(DeLanda, 2006); and (iv) Karen Barad’s “agential realism” (Barad, 
2007). First, I argue that the NSS could be understood as a “discipli-
nary technology” which subjects universities, departments and lectur-
ers to what Foucault (1977) described as “panopticism” and “normal-
ising judgements”. “Panopticism” refers to the phenomenon that peo-
ple are more likely to be compliant if they think they might be watched 
whereas “normalising judgment” specifies that this compliance can be 
achieved when people are ranked against one another. Accordingly, 
NSS results are clearly visible online for everyone to see (i.e. panopti-
cism) and universities are ranked against one another (i.e. normalising 
judgement).  
In addition, I suggest that the NSS also utilises what Foucault re-
ferred to as ‘neo-liberal governmentality’ (Foucault, 2008:117). That is, 
the NSS governs by “competitising” the academic sector through pitch-
ing universities against universities, departments against departments 
and lecturers against lecturers over comparatively “better” student 
feedback ratings. As a result, and put bluntly, university lecturers are 
less likely to step out of line because they are busy competing with 
other lecturers over student feedback.  
14 
As both disciplinary and neo-liberal governmentality appear to op-
erate within the NSS, I suggest that the NSS constitutes a “hybrid” in 
which discipline and neo-liberalism have “amalgamated”. This “neo-
liberal-disciplinary governmentality” is not only inherent in the NSS but 
also symptomatic of a wider societal trend of increasingly prevalent 
rating and ranking practices. 
In addition, I hypothesise that a third governmentality operates 
through the NSS which I termed “antagonistic governmentality”. The 
notion of antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014) suggests that strong 
group identities emerge when the group’s members commonly oppose 
something else. This opposition creates an “antagonistic frontier” (a 
boundary separating the people from the opposing force). For exam-
ple, through their shared opposition to my teaching style, students may 
find common ground to construct their own group identity. At a larger 
level, lecturers may resent their students for their perceived power with 
an antagonistic frontier separating the former from the latter. I argue 
that this resentment is fostered by the NSS since it pitches university 
lecturers against students in that students are increasingly seen as the 
“enemy”, i.e. as the “demanding and never satisfied customer”. Since 
“antagonisms” govern people – just like “discipline” and “neo-liberal-
ism” do - I propose the neologism “antagonistic governmentality” as 
inspired by Foucault’s notion of governmentality. Because lecturers 
are at some level too busy resenting their students, they do not notice 
any larger forces at play (e.g. the NSS) and are hence “governed”. 
This type of governmentality is captured in the Roman saying “Dīvide 
et īmpera” (Divide and rule).  
Importantly, antagonisms usually create connections. That is, 
through their common opposition (i.e. antagonism) of students, lectur-
ers should feel “more connected” to their colleagues. However, pre-
cisely because in the NSS “antagonism” operates alongside those 
other logics of “competition” and “discipline”, lecturers fail to form 
strong bonds between one another. Put more precisely, student feed-
back makes antagonism emerge, but solidary connectivity between 
lecturers is prevented through their competition with their peers. As a 
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result, lecturers become isolated. The NSS could hence be described 
as a “disciplinary-neo-liberal-antagonistic” amalgam, a new type of hy-
brid governmentality which exceeds the sum of its parts.   
A useful theory to systematise this novel amalgam is DeLanda’s 
(2006) “assemblage theory”. DeLanda argues that assemblages may 
exist at varying levels of scale (from the microscopic to the macro-
scopic), may be ephemeral or long-lasting, and may span social and 
natural phenomena. All assemblages have in common that they con-
sist of component parts which interact with one another. In this respect, 
the NSS could be understood as a national (i.e. macro) assemblage 
which consists of various (meso) “component parts”, such as universi-
ties, student populations and rankings. These component parts now 
interact in specific ways with one another. More specifically, the inter-
actions are more competitive between universities and disciplinary be-
tween students and universities. The strongest feature of assemblage 
theory is that it explains how universities have reconfigured internally 
through the NSS. For example, many universities have now imple-
mented internal surveys which did not exist before the NSS was 
established. These Internal Surveys, in return, enforce certain rela-
tions between their respective component parts (e.g. modules, stu-
dents, managers) which are, yet again, competitive (between mod-
ules) and disciplinary (between students and modules). This, in return, 
reconfigures modules internally: for instance, module leaders now put 
lecturers under scrutiny to raise better student feedback and lecturers 
start to compete with one another over student feedback. Lecturers – 
themselves “assemblages” - are at the receiving end of this process 
and become disciplined, competitised and resentful (towards stu-
dents).  
As already implied, this NSS induced subject formation (i.e. the 
emergence of a disciplined, competitive and antagonistic university 
lecturer) also goes alongside the drawing of powerful boundaries. This 
process – i.e. this simultaneous subject and boundary formation - can 
be alternatively understood through Karen Barad’s agential realism. 
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Karen Barad’s work argues that all boundaries and matter (in the uni-
verse) “co-emerge” through what Barad describes as “intra-action” (in 
lieu of the more common notion of interaction). That is, entities (such 
as lecturers and students) ontologically do not pre-exist their encoun-
ters, but rather emerge through these encounters. Since these en-
counters are, yet again, parts of a “competitised” higher education 
landscape and of hierarchical university management structures, I 
suggest that not only lecturers, but also courses and universities in-
creasingly “materialise” as anxious “subjects”. This materialisation im-
portantly goes alongside a boundary embodied in the increasing re-
sentment of students due to their perceived (rating) power. Barad’s 
framework makes it possible to explore this coexistence of identity and 
boundary which exists in a “double-state” of rejection and contingency; 
lecturers reject students because they have so much power, yet they 
are also increasingly contingent on students’ ratings for these ratings 
may, in fact, make or break their professional careers.  
1.1 Research Questions 
As captured in this brief introduction, this thesis seeks to explore the 
following research question: “What are the effects of the National Stu-
dent Survey (NSS) on university lecturers, departments and universi-
ties?” Based on this research question, this thesis aims 
1. to explore and theorise the workings of the National Student 
Survey (NSS) at two UK universities which includes the aim of 
understanding how these accountability structures affect uni-
versity lecturers’ experience of their practice; 
2. to explore some of the ways in which lecturer agency can be 
theorised and promoted, and how student evaluations of teach-
ing are symptomatic of larger societal and global developments; 
and  
3. to explore the workings of the NSS through a range of disparate 
theoretical frameworks (i.e. Foucault’s “Governmentality”, 
Laclau’s “Postmarxism”, DeLanda’s “Assemblage Theory” and 
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Barad’s “Agential Realism”) including the possibility of combin-
ing these frameworks into one larger theoretical framework.  
1.2 Overview of Chapters 
To address both research question and aims, this thesis will be 
structured as follows. Whilst Chapter 1 hitherto introduced the thesis, 
Chapter 2 will provide a brief literature review of the NSS in particular 
and of Student Evaluations of Teaching more generally. This will also 
entail the compilation of various themes which permeate the critical 
literature on the NSS. Based on the literature, it will be suggested that 
(i) the NSS may not actually measure student satisfaction accurately, 
(ii) quantitative comparisons between universities are inherently 
flawed, (iii) the NSS has detrimental effects on students’ education, 
(iv) the NSS may maintain gender inequality, and (v) the NSS may 
foster problematic pedagogical techniques.   
 
Chapter 3 then outlines the methodological considerations of this the-
sis. This includes an overview of the paradigmatic “realist” considera-
tions which underpin this thesis, including the role of language in this. 
Next, an overview of the research methods is provided whilst data col-
lection methods (i.e. the “free association narrative interviews”, re-
search diaries and observations) will be discussed first, followed by a 
discussion of how data analysis was approached. This data analysis 
section also includes a description of how the theme of student voice 
first emerged. Last, important research notions such as reflexivity and 
ethics are discussed.   
 
Chapter 4 considers the National Student Survey in the context of Fou-
cault’s work on discipline (Foucault, 1977) and neo-liberal governmen-
tality (Foucault, 2008, 2009). First, it will be argued that the NSS oper-
ates as a “discipline”, a notion which Foucault developed in his work 
on the history of penal practices (Foucault, 1977). Disciplines com-
18 
prise “hierarchical observation” (panopticism) and “normalising judge-
ment”. More specifically, “hierarchical observation” describes a unidi-
rectional process of observation, famously embodied in Jeremy Ben-
tham’s prison design of the “Panopticon” in which prison guards can 
see their prisoners but the prisoners are not able to see these prison 
guards. Due to this “panoptical gaze”, prisoners assume that they are 
constantly being watched which makes them conform to the behav-
ioural expectations of the prison. “Normalising judgement” describes 
how people become more compliant when they are ranked against 
one another on a scale. Both techniques have the effect that humans 
become “compliant” and simultaneously “productive”. Based on this, 
this chapter suggests that the NSS (and associated student feedback 
systems) use (i) hierarchical panoptic observation in that they put lec-
turers under continuous perceived student observation and (ii) normal-
ising judgement because student feedback systems allow for the rank-
ing of universities, departments and lecturers. Importantly, this utilisa-
tion of students’ panoptical gaze is complex and facilitated by the py-
ramidal power structure comprising government bodies and university 
management. That is, akin to Foucault’s idea of the prison director hi-
erarchically observing the prison guards who, in return, observe the 
prisoners, the NSS contains various smaller enfolded accountability 
mechanisms such as Internal Surveys and Student Representative 
Meetings (SRMs) which allow university management to rank facul-
ties, for deans to rank programmes and for module leaders to rank 
lecturers. Thus, lecturers, departments and universities can never be 
quite sure who will be gazing at their position within these rankings 
and, hence, must assume that someone gazes at them continuously. 
As a result, lecturers, departments and universities become compliant 
in trying to improve their student ratings.  
The second section of this chapter then utilises Foucault’s later 
work by suggesting that the NSS also functions as a neo-liberal gov-
ernmentality (Foucault, 2008). To understand Foucault’s work on neo-
liberalism (hyphen use intended), this section firstly begins with a short 
detour to introduce the notion of neoliberalism more generally. Next 
19 
Foucault’s work on liberal (Foucault, 2009) and neo-liberal govern-
mentality (Foucault, 2008) is introduced and subsequently utilised to 
analyse the workings of the NSS. It will be suggested that the NSS 
exhibits both liberal logics (in its espousing of a contrived understand-
ing of freedom) and neo-liberal logics (i.e. in its valorisation of compet-
itive markets). It is suggested that this may cause the emergence of 
subjects which must compete with one another in all realms of social 
practice (and not just in monetary ones). Importantly, this “creation of 
desire” and “competitisation” governs the (academic) population. Put 
crudely, if people are busy competing with other people, they are less 
likely to constitute a threat against those in power. This section is then 
followed by a theorisation of competitions in popular culture, including 
a discussion of situations of “ultimate competition”, most starkly em-
bodied in Kinji Fukasaku’s film “Battle Royale” where competition is 
enforced over nothing less than mere survival. This ultimate competi-
tive situation will then be compared to people’s situation under neolib-
eralism. It will be highlighted that both share similarities in their artificial 
and enforced creation of competition and their utilisation of the logic of 
survival. That is, both in Battle Royale and in neoliberalism, people 
who refuse to stay competitive are cast into precarious and potentially 
life-threatening situations (cf. Brown, 2015). 
Lastly, this chapter suggests that the NSS and its associated rank-
ings could be best understood when figuring Foucault’s disciplines and 
neoliberal governmentality in their entanglement. Returning to Charlie 
Brooker’s Nosedive as presented in the beginning of this thesis, rank-
ing and rating practices will be displayed as an increasingly ubiquitous 
technology which amalgamates discipline and neoliberal forms of gov-
ernmentality. Poignantly, a new governmental technology akin to 
Nosedive is currently being trialled in China in which citizens gain so-
cial credit points awarded by other citizens (Hvistendahl, 2017).  
 
Chapter 5 will then shift the theoretical focus from Foucault’s discus-
sion towards Laclau’s “Postmarxist” framework. In particular, Laclau’s 
notion of “antagonism” is utilised. Antagonism describes the process 
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by which a group finds its own identity based on its shared rejection of 
another person or group. Laclau’s work, importantly, opens the possi-
bility to hypothesise that the NSS functions as what I will call an “an-
tagonistic technology” in which students may develop their group iden-
tity by rejecting their lecturer and lecturers may develop a group iden-
tity by rejecting students. In short, the NSS generates antagonisms 
between various university stakeholders. For example, it will be 
argued that through the NSS, lecturers begin to see their students as 
antagonistic forces. This, in return, creates a boundary (which Laclau 
calls an “antagonistic frontier”) separating lecturers from students. It 
will be argued that lecturers, departments and universities are not only 
disciplined and competitised, but are also put into a position in which 
they see students as the “enemy”. It will be suggested that the most 
crucial “side-effect” of this process is that those in power become in-
creasingly “unintelligible” as the root of the problem. That is, akin to 
the logic of neo-liberal governmentality which makes lecturers less 
likely to challenge the status quo because they are too busy competing 
with one another, “antagonisms” make lecturers less likely to chal-
lenge the status quo because they are too busy resenting students for 
their perceived power. In short, not only does the NSS utilise discipli-
nary and neo-liberal governmentalities, but also an “antagonistic gov-
ernmentality” which governs the academic population through the ar-
tificial creation of antagonisms. Importantly, it is precisely through the 
analogous working of competition and antagonism that a curious form 
of antagonism emerges: whilst antagonisms usually create connec-
tions through their common opposition of another entity – i.e. lecturers 
should feel “more connected” to their colleagues because they reject 
students – this connection is prevented because lecturers are simulta-
neously in “competition” with one another. This technology, hence, 
systematically undermines attempts of solidarity between students 
and lecturers, and also makes it less likely that those in power (such 
as policymakers or the “ruling elite”) are constructed as the “culprits” 
behind certain unmet demands. The NSS in this sense operates akin 
to the Roman saying, “Divide and Rule”. 
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Chapter 6 is a more experimental chapter and seeks to view the NSS 
through two “new materialist” frameworks (Iris van der Tuin & Rick 
Dolphijn et al., 2010). To begin with, it further systematises the 
preceding theorisation of the NSS as a disciplinary, neo-liberal and 
antagonistic governmentality through Manuel DeLanda’s (2006) “as-
semblage theory”. It is argued that the NSS may be understood as an 
“assemblage”. All assemblages consist of certain component parts 
(e.g. the NSS comprises universities, student populations, an infra-
structure) whilst these component part interact with one another in 
specific ways. For example, interactions between universities are 
more competitive (they are guided by neo-liberal governmentality) and 
those between students and universities more disciplinary (they are 
guided by disciplinary governmentality). It is then shown how 
DeLanda’s framework is useful when exploring how the NSS affects 
its component parts (such as universities or students). That is, through 
the NSS, universities (as assemblages themselves) reconfigure inter-
nally. This again has a knock-on effect on how even smaller assem-
blages (courses, modules, and lecturers) change their respective iden-
tities. One advantage of assemblage theory is that enables a concep-
tualisation of, for example, universities, countries, groups, or persons 
as fully fledged material entities whose properties are not reducible to 
the properties of their parts. That is, a university could be understood 
as an actor (with a certain capacity for decision-making) as much as 
an individual person could. Yet, assemblage theory is simultaneously 
able to acknowledge some of the profound complexities which may 
exist inside entities. For instance, both a university and a person may 
have complex internal mechanisms and are simultaneously part of 
complex external ones.  
Next, Karen Barad’s groundbreaking framework of “agential real-
ism” is utilised to build a more general perspective on how the NSS 
makes boundaries between stakeholders emerge. Pivotal to Barad’s 
understanding of boundary formation is her notion of “intra-action” and 
the “agential cut”. Intra-action postulates that no entity in the universe 
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pre-exists its encounter with other entities but rather (ontologically) 
emerges as part of this encounter. In short, entities “matter” (used in 
the dual sense of “materialising” and being of “significance”). Just as 
two atoms may “matter" (materialise) through their intra-action, two hu-
mans “matter (materialise) through theirs. Before their intra-actions, 
these atoms and humans quite literally did not have any “shape”. That 
is, rather this “shape” was produced through what Barad calls the 
“agential cut”. Put differently, when two entities emerge through their 
intra-action, the agential cut is that which separates them from one 
another. Importantly, this agential cut is a strange type of cut - not a 
cut with scissors (which cuts a pre-existing object into half), but a con-
stitutive cut which separates objects from subjects by making them 
emerge in the first place. (Barad uses the expression “cutting together-
apart”.) Without this cut, again, there would be no matter. In addition, 
when intra-actions become iterative (repetitive), their associated agen-
tial cuts can materialise into powerful boundaries. On this basis, it will 
then be suggested that the NSS does not only govern the academic 
population through discipline, competition and antagonism, but that 
Barad’s framework opens an alternative view on how identities and 
boundaries always emerge simultaneously. Similar to DeLanda (and 
going beyond Butler), these identities, however, do not necessarily 
have to be individual humans (such as lecturers), but could comprise 
departments, universities or lecturer populations. Alongside this, the 
NSS promotes iterative processes of “worrying” inside lecturers’ minds 
which are then enfolded into larger-scale “intra-actions” such as en-
counters with students, Student Representative Meetings (SRMs), In-
ternal Surveys and ultimately the NSS. Barad’s notion of intra-action 
is then discussed in the context of “shared agency” and solidarity. In 
short, if it is true that there are no inherent boundaries in the universe, 
but that all boundaries (and their associated bodies) emerge as part of 
intra-action (Barad, 2007), an individual human body is as much of a 
possibility as a “body of the people” (e.g. a body of demonstrators, a 
lecturer body, a country body).  
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Last, this chapter will discuss some resonances between 
DeLanda’s (2006) and Barad’s (2007) frameworks whilst arguing for a 
combined version of both. This version takes DeLanda’s 
understanding of issues of “scale” (e.g. that a nation-state is bigger 
than an organisation) and combines it with Barad’s understanding of 
“topology” which, for her, revolves around the question where entities 
form connections and boundaries with each other. For instance, a 
topological phenomenon is captured in that an organisation may be 
competing (i.e. it may form connectivity and a simultaneous boundary 
with) another organisation in a different country, thereby traversing 
national boundaries.   
After this “new materialist” analysis of the NSS, a “paradigmatic 
interlude” will first discuss the implications of Barad’s theoretical work 
on methodological issues. Subsequently, certain limitations in Barad’s 
work are outlined.   
 
Chapter 7 attempts to bring the three main theoretical frameworks of 
this thesis into conversation with one another by attempting to read 
these ‘through one another’ (Barad, 2007:142). This theorisation will 
look at the ways in which Laclau’s, Barad’s and Foucault’s frameworks 
resonate with one another whilst also paying attention to their differ-
ences. First, Barad and Foucault’s work are compared. It will be 
suggested that Barad failed to acknowledge Foucault’s lecture series 
on governmentality (Foucault, 2008, 2009) and it is, therefore, argued 
that governmentality could be conceptualised as one specific “type” of 
intra-action. Next, Foucault and Laclau’s works are discussed where I 
deepen my proposition that antagonism does not only comprise a dis-
tinct social operational principle, but rather could be instrumentalised 
towards governing a population. In short, as already suggested in 
Chapter 5, the NSS could be described as an “antagonistic govern-
mentality”. Lastly, some striking parallels between Laclau’s and 
Barad’s work are elucidated. In summary, it will be argued that intra-
action is a theoretical concept that can accommodate and subsume 
other concepts such as Foucault’s notion of governmentality, which in 
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turn then comprises four governmentalities: sovereign governmental-
ity, disciplinary governmentality (Foucault, 1977), neo-liberal govern-
mentality (Foucault, 2008) and, as a novel contribution, antagonistic 
governmentality (Laclau, 2005). The NSS could therefore be 
understood as an “antagonistic (Laclau), disciplinary (Foucault), neo-
liberal (Foucault) assemblage (DeLanda) of bodily production 
(Barad)”. It will be argued that it is through intra-action of these distinct 
governmentalities that lecturers (i) become increasingly resentful 
towards students whilst (ii) simultaneously being less likely to discern 
larger scale issues, such as the NSS, as the source of their unmet 
demands (cf. antagonism); (iii) compete with other lecturers over 
student feedback (neo-liberalism); and, if this competition fails to raise 
positive student feedback, lecturers (iv) may be subjected to more fine-
grained disciplinary practices (cf. discipline).  
 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion of this thesis. Here, a summary of the the-
sis is provided. Next, a short section focusses on the future of student 
feedback. After, broader national and global trends are considered 
since these largest-scale developments influence (or will influence) 
humanity globally (including university lecturers). To sketch out these 
global developments, Thomas Piketty’s seminal work on the dynamics 
of capital accumulation is utilised. This will then build the backdrop 
against which I will discuss some of the difficulties of subverting ne-
oliberal national technologies such as the NSS. It will be argued that 
any local instances of resistance are severely limited (Srnicek and 
Williams, 2016). For example, if one university decided not to play the 
neoliberal game of student satisfaction, the market pressures of hav-
ing to attract students would nevertheless remain intact. Likewise, if a 
country refused to play the neoliberal game of “investor satisfaction”, 
the market pressures of attracting capital would still remain opera-
tional. Hence, according to Srnicek and Williams (2006), the only fea-
sible option may be the implementation of a strategic econology of 
institutions which seeks to repurpose exacerbating automation so as 
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to provide an alternative to some worrying contemporary political 
trends.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review: The National Student Survey  
This chapter provides a literature review of the NSS. First, the NSS is 
outlined; second, the academic literature will be reviewed; and last 
some existing academic lines of critique will be synthesised into cate-
gories.  
Whilst more generally the NSS could be described as a ‘national 
feedback survey’ (Ashby et al., 2011:5) or even more broadly as a type 
of Student Evaluation of Teaching (SET) (Cheng and Marsh, 2010), 
the NSS’s official website advertises it as a UK ‘high-profile census’ 
directed at undergraduate students in their final year of study (Ipsos 
MORI, 2006, online). In the NSS, students are encouraged to ‘provide 
honest feedback on what it has been like to study on their course at 
their institution’ (Ipsos MORI, 2018a:online). In other words, the NSS 
gathers ‘feedback from final-year university students about their satis-
faction with their course’ (Cheng and Marsh, 2010). Importantly, the 
NSS has equivalents in other countries, such as ‘the Australian course 
evaluation questionnaire (CEQ)’ (Kane et al., 2008:136); the US Na-
tional Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE) (Kuh, 2009); or the Cen-
ter for Higher Education (CHE) University Ranking in Germany (Center 
for Higher Education, 2017). 
The NSS was first implemented in 2005 (Ipsos MORI, 2018b) and 
‘all publicly funded higher education institutions (HEIs) in England, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are mandated to participate an-
nually’ (Cheng and Marsh, 2010:694). Whilst in 2018 the NSS was 
open for 16 weeks and running from ‘8th January to 30th April 2018’, in 
2017, ‘out of 357 institutions’ almost three million students (i.e. 70% of 
students) completed it  (Ipsos MORI, 2018a:online). Ipsos MORI, the 
multinational corporation paid by the UK Government to run the sur-
vey, claims that all responses in the survey ‘remain strictly anonymous’ 
(Ipsos MORI, 2018b:online).   
Regarding the actual questionnaire, 27 questions form part of a 
‘Likert-style (1 good, 5 poor) questionnaire’ and enquire into ‘eight as-
pects of the student experience’ (Cocksedge and Taylor, 20 
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13:e1638). These comprise (i) ‘teaching’, (ii) ‘learning opportunities’, 
(iii) ‘assessment and feedback’, (iv) ‘academic support’, (v) ‘organisa-
tion and management’, (vi) ‘learning resources’, (vii) ‘learning commu-
nity’, (viii) ‘student voice’ and ‘overall satisfaction’ (Ipsos Mori, 
2017:online). In addition, a qualitative element is added by allowing 
students to ‘make positive and/or negative comments in an open-
ended question’ (Ipsos MORI, 2018a).  Table 1 displays an example 
of the questions asked in the 2018 NSS.  
 
Table 1: The National Student Survey 2018 
‘National Student Survey 2017 - Core Questionnaire 
Scale: 
Definitely agree 
Mostly agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Mostly disagree 
Definitely disagree 
Not applicable 
Questions: 
The teaching on my course 
1. Staff are good at explaining things. 
2. Staff have made the subject interesting. 
3. The course is intellectually stimulating. 
4. My course has challenged me to achieve my best work. 
Learning opportunities 
5. My course has provided me with opportunities to explore ideas or 
concepts in depth. 
6. My course has provided me with opportunities to bring infor-
mation and ideas together from different topics. 
7. My course has provided me with opportunities to apply what I 
have learnt. 
Assessment and feedback 
8. The criteria used in marking have been clear in advance. 
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9. Marking and assessment has been fair. 
10. Feedback on my work has been timely. 
11. I have received helpful comments on my work. 
Academic support 
12. I have been able to contact staff when I needed to. 
13. I have received sufficient advice and guidance in relation to my 
course. 
14. Good advice was available when I needed to make study choices 
on my course. 
Organisation and management 
15. The course is well organised and running smoothly. 
16. The timetable works efficiently for me. 
17. Any changes in the course or teaching have been communicated 
effectively. 
Learning resources 
18. The IT resources and facilities provided have supported my 
learning well. 
19. The library resources (e.g. books, online services and learning 
spaces) have supported my learning well. 
20. I have been able to access course-specific resources (e.g. equip-
ment, facilities, software, collections) when I needed to. 
Learning community 
21. I feel part of a community of staff and students. 
22. I have had the right opportunities to work with other students as 
part of my course. 
Student voice 
23. I have had the right opportunities to provide feedback on my 
course. 
24. Staff value students’ views and opinions about the course. 
25. It is clear how students’ feedback on the course has been acted 
on. 
26. The students’ union (association or guild) effectively represents 
students’ academic interests. 
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Overall satisfaction 
27. Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of the course.’ 
(Ipsos Mori, 2017:online) 
 
2.1 A Map of the Academic Literature on the National Student 
Survey  
Turning to the academic literature published on the NSS, a Scopus 
(Scopus, 2018) search yielded N=88 results1. Whilst those contribu-
tions which take a more critical stance towards the NSS (N=18) will be 
presented in section 2.6, it is striking that the majority of articles not 
only are uncritical towards the NSS, but have in common that they 
investigate how to improve student feedback (N=70). Within this 
branch, the largest subsection explores the question of how to improve 
student satisfaction (N=23) with the NSS section of “Assessment and 
Feedback”, an area where universities persistently fail to achieve high 
scores (Pokorny and Pickford, 2010; Wong, 2010; Barker, 2011; 
Mendes et al., 2011; Handley and Williams, 2011; Appleton, 2012; 
Marriott and Teoh, 2012; Wong and Beaumont, 2012; Wong et al., 
2012; Crook et al., 2012; Blair et al., 2013; Laryea, 2013; Munro and 
Hollingworth, 2014; Voelkel and Mello, 2014; Maggs, 2014; 
O’Donovan et al., 2016; Pitt and Norton, 2017; Stannard and Mann, 
2017; Tuck, 2017). In this literature, it is, for example, suggested that 
an appropriate strategy to improve assessment feedback is to give 
audio-recorded feedback instead of written feedback (Chew, 2014); 
that emotional reactions to assignment feedback are responsible for 
                                                 
1 This Scopus search comprised the phrase “National Student Survey”, 
searched only within “titles, keywords and abstracts” and was conducted on the 13 
March 2018 which resulted in 101 document results. After deleting duplicates, this 
number reduced to 95. A range of papers utilised a ‘National Student Survey’ differ-
ent from the UK National Student Survey and therefore needed to be excluded from 
consideration (Eckhardt, 1971a, 1971b; Ge et al., 2001; Nuño-Gutiérrez et al., 2005; 
Jenkins et al., 2016; Shapiro et al., 2017). This reduced the literature to be reviewed 
to 88 results.  
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students refusing to act upon formative feedback (Pitt and Norton, 
2017); or that “sugar-coated” feedback may result in worse end-of-
year test scores and, therefore, a lower satisfaction with assessment 
(To, 2016). Other examples of this branch of the literature centre on 
questions such as how to improve library services to gain better stu-
dent feedback (Atkinson, 2016; Lewis and Little, 2016), which aspects 
of courses produce the best NSS results (Bell and Brooks, 2018), or 
what students “really want” from a degree (Hiles, 2016).  
In addition, certain literature is particularly pertinent to the re-
search aims of this thesis (see section 1.1) since it uses language 
which could be described as distinctly “neoliberal”. That is, these arti-
cles appear to espouse neoliberal concepts (see section 4.2.1), such 
as “competition” or “customer satisfaction” and investigate how stu-
dent loyalty could be predicted by student feedback so as to retain 
students in a “competitive environment” (Fernandes et al., 2013). They 
explore how Erasmus students fail to get a voice despite being the 
main “customers” of the university (Bogain, 2012), and how to more 
effectively rank and compare courses (Barefoot et al., 2016). Another 
(library specific) selection of articles advocates “service standards” for 
libraries to improve student feedback (Stanley and Knowles, 2016) or 
explore how to make libraries more effective in order to improve “cus-
tomer satisfaction” (Atkinson, 2016). Adding to this, two papers appear 
to follow what could be described as a distinctly “managerialist” 
agenda (Deem, 1998; cf. Ball, 2003). For example, these articles ad-
vocate “spot checks” of formative assignment feedback to students so 
that the quality of feedback can be monitored (Horner, 2010) or argue 
that alternative student feedback technologies should be explored to 
enhance “performance management” (Appleton, 2012).  
2.2 Intra-institutional Feedback Systems  
Due to the pressures emanating from the NSS, many universities have 
implemented further internal student feedback systems which allow for 
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a more frequent assessment of student satisfaction at the level of in-
dividual component parts of courses (such as modules). Canning 
(2017a:522) suggests that universities implemented these internal 
systems to ‘pre-empt issues which may impact in their NSS scores’. 
For example, since 2015, the University of Bristol has been carrying 
out the ‘annual internal University survey’ for all non-final year under-
graduate students (University of Bristol, 2017:online); at University 
College London (UCL), ‘second year undergraduate students com-
plete the UCL Student Experience Survey, an Internal Survey with Na-
tional Student Survey-style questions’ (University College London, 
2018:online). Lastly, at Newcastle University (2018:online) students 
complete two surveys: (i) ‘module evaluations’ in which students 
should evaluate each module through an externally sourced system 
“EvaSys” (Achievability, 2018) and (ii) ‘stage evaluations’ in which all 
schools are mandated to evaluate their undergraduate programmes. 
Similarly, the universities described in this thesis implemented varia-
tions of Internal Surveys which were closely modelled on the NSS and 
allowed courses to be assessed biannually in each year group: my 
institution implemented the “Internal Student Survey” (ISS) whereas 
for Reddish University (in order to guarantee confidentiality) I will 
simply use the terminology “Internal Survey”. In addition, both my in-
stitution and Reddish University prescribed frequent meetings with stu-
dent representatives of cohort groups to gauge more personalised and 
detailed student feedback. In other words, whilst internal question-
naires explored the feedback for modules, SRMs could ascertain stu-
dent satisfaction more frequently and at an even smaller level of scale 
(i.e. with individual lecturers).  
2.3 The NSS as a Student Evaluation of Teaching (SET)  
SRMs, Internal Surveys and the NSS fall under the umbrella term of 
Student Evaluations of Teaching (SETs) (Cheng and Marsh, 2010). 
More specifically, the NSS could be understood as a “national SET” 
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which allows for both universities and courses to be compared. Simi-
larly, Internal Surveys could be understood as intra-institutional SETs 
which allow for a comparison of “modules” (Reddish University) or 
“units” (my university), courses and faculties. Likewise, SRMs are in-
tra-institutional SETs which allow for the assessment of individual lec-
turers. This thesis uses the following terminology: Internal Surveys re-
fer to any university-wide surveys (which are often modelled on the 
NSS). Any departmental student feedback systems will be referred to 
SRMs. Utilising the sociological distinction between “macro”, “meso” 
and “micro” (e.g. Ritzer, 2018), it could be suggested that the NSS is 
a macro SET, Internal Surveys are meso SETs and Student Repre-
sentative Meetings (SRMs) are micro SETs. (Figure 1 provides a vis-
ualisation of these variously scaled SETs.)  
 
 
Figure 1: Student Evaluations of Teaching at varying levels of scale 
 
Whilst an insightful overview of the peer-reviewed literature on 
SETs is provided by Spooren et al. (2013), to arrive at an independent 
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survey of the academic literature on SETs, a Scopus search2 was 
conducted which yielded too many results to be meaningfully 
evaluated. Hence, in what follows, all 2018 results are presented to 
get an idea of research tendencies and the scope of areas of interest. 
Interestingly, as with the research on the NSS, a large proportion of 
articles share that they either implicitly or explicitly focus on how to 
avoid low and foster high SET results. For instance, studies discuss 
which aspects of degrees make students recommend courses (Ang et 
al., 2018); highlight the positive impact of play pedagogies on SET 
outcomes (Absi et al., 2018); suggest that students are more likely to 
complete SETs when they are given a specific time and place to for 
their completion (Young et al., 2018); argue that both “swapping from 
paper to online evaluations” and “changing the label of the 
evaluations” have a negative effect on SET scores (Zipser and 
Mincieli, 2018); assert that faculty training has a positive effect on 
“teaching effectiveness”  (Brinkley-Etzkorn, 2018). Further studies 
question whether ‘synchronous online administration’ increases SET 
response rates (Standish et al., 2018:812); assert that students who 
perceive their marking to be fair rate their lecturers highly (Tripp et al., 
2018); or argue that student attendance predicts positive student feed-
back (Nasser-Abu Alhija and Fresko, 2018).  
Further studies focus on student characteristics and SET out-
comes. These studies discuss that certain student characteristics pro-
mote excellent SET scores in nursing degrees (Cho et al., 2018); and 
that students who fail to respond to online surveys share distinctive 
underlying characteristics (Thielsch et al., 2018). Yet another section 
of studies investigates the validity and reliability of new prototypes of 
SETs (e.g. Nemec et al., 2018). A further study explores which type of 
lecturer trusts or rejects the validity of SETs (Hammer et al., 
2018:online).  
                                                 
2 More specifically, this Scopus search contained the keywords “Student 
Evaluation* of Teaching” and was conducted on 14/06/2018, searching within “titles, 
keywords and abstracts”. This search yielded 607 results. 
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The remainder of studies focuses on somewhat idiosyncratic is-
sues, such as the discrepancies between student and staff percep-
tions of teaching quality (Cain et al., 2018); which aspects of student 
feedback are accepted or rejected by staff (Mariano et al., 2018); or 
the operation of SETs in the context of online learning (Gómez-Rey et 
al., 2018). Further slightly more critical studies argue that qualitative 
course evaluation tools ought to complement the quantitative main-
stream (Steyn et al., 2018) or explore the proportion of dental school 
leaders using student evaluations of teaching for annual reviews 
(Reinke et al., 2018). 
2.4 The Impact of the NSS on UK Rankings  
Crucial for this thesis, NSS scores find their expression in a range of 
UK rankings published in the popular press, such as the ‘The Times & 
Sunday Times Good University Guide, the Guardian University Guide 
and the Complete University Guide’ (Turnbull, 2018:7). Importantly, all 
three rankings have in common that ‘the weighting given to National 
Student Survey data is higher than for other metrics’ (p. 20). For ex-
ample, the Guardian University Guide utilises NSS results alongside 
other sources, such as value-added measures; student-staff ratios; ex-
penditure per student; entry scores or career prospects (Hiely-Rayner, 
2016). After standardisation of each score, the weighting of the NSS 
is 25%. Similarly, “The Times and Sunday Times Good University 
Guide” utilises NSS scores (but only the categories “student experi-
ence” and “teaching quality”) alongside ‘entry qualifications; student : 
staff ratio; completion; degree classifications; graduate careers; re-
search quality; services and facilities spend per student’ (Turnbull, 
2018:20; converted from table into text). Lastly, the “Complete Univer-
sity Guide” incorporates ‘the average score for all questions in the 
[NSS], except those relating to “learning resources”’ (p. 20). This is 
used alongside ‘entry qualifications; student satisfaction; student : staff 
ratio; completion; degree classifications; graduate careers; research 
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quality; research intensity; academic services spend per student; [and] 
facilities spend per student’ (p. 20).  
2.5 The Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) 
In addition, the NSS is given further prominence through the Teaching 
Excellence Framework (TEF). Introduced in 2016, there are currently 
295 providers who hold a TEF award with associated ratings being 
‘judged by an independent panel of students, academics and other ex-
perts’ (Office for Students, 2018, OfS, online). Whilst the TEF only 
judges undergraduate provision, according to the OfS3, the TEF is im-
portant because, ‘students invest significant amounts of time and 
money in higher education, and should expect a high-quality academic 
experience’ (for a critical exploration of this see section 4.2.3). The OfS 
(2018:online) furthermore asserts that the TEF intends to help ‘pro-
spective students to choose where to study’ and to encourage ‘provid-
ers to work with their students to identify, pursue and maintain excel-
lence’. Awards stay valid for a maximum of three years, unless provid-
ers choose to reapply on a yearly basis (ibid.). Whilst Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales can participate on a voluntary basis, in England 
participation is only voluntary for universities with fewer than 500 stu-
dents (ibid.).  
The OfS (2018:online) suggests that universities must ‘meet rig-
orous national quality requirements for higher education’ to take part 
in the TEF whilst the TEF supposedly ‘measures excellence in addition 
to these requirements’. TEF ratings are classified as follows. Universi-
ties are awarded ‘gold for delivering consistently outstanding teaching, 
learning and outcomes for its students’ which is the ‘highest quality 
found in the UK’ (ibid). Silver is awarded to universities ‘for delivering 
high quality teaching, learning and outcomes’ which ‘consistently ex-
                                                 
3  The OfS replaced the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE) in 2018.   
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ceeds [sic] rigorous national quality requirements for UK higher edu-
cation’ (ibid.). Bronze ratings are awarded for ‘delivering teaching, 
learning and outcomes for its students that meet rigorous national 
quality requirements for UK higher education’ (ibid.). Lastly, ‘provi-
sional awards are given to participating providers that meet national 
quality requirements, but do not yet have sufficient data to be fully as-
sessed’ (ibid.).  
The TEF awards are judged against ‘ten criteria that cover teach-
ing quality, learning environment and student outcomes’ (Office for 
Students, 2018, online). The data utilised covers ‘evidence from na-
tional data as well as written evidence submitted by the provider’, such 
as (i) ‘continuation rates’; (ii) student satisfaction and (iii) employment 
and further study outcomes (ibid; emphasis added). Supposedly, ‘the 
context of each provider and differences in students’ backgrounds, en-
try qualifications and subjects studied’ are taken into account when 
determining the TEF classification (ibid.). Importantly, the TEF affects 
the capacity of English (but not Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh) 
universities to set tuition fees. That is, ‘providers in England with a TEF 
award may increase tuition fees in line with inflation for 2018-19, 
capped at £9,250 per year’ (ibid.).  
2.6 Lines of Critique on the NSS, SETs and Rankings  
This section seeks to provide an overview of the academic literature 
which takes a critical stance on the NSS, in particular, and SETs, more 
generally. Overall, the literature on the NSS was least critical, with a 
slightly higher percentage of journal articles critically exploring SETs. 
In what follows, the critical literature has been coded into themes, 
based on broad similarities.  
2.6.1 Grade Inflation and Course Deflation.  
A good selection of the literature has focussed on the lack of validity 
of national SETs by critically interrogating the correlation between 
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higher grades and higher SET results (Brockx et al., 2011). That is, 
since SETs occupy a prominent status on the agenda of universities, 
they may lead to more lenient grading, and, in return, grade inflation 
(Redding, 1998; Eiszler, 2002; Ellis et al., 2003; Campbell et al., 2005; 
Langbein, 2008; Oleinik, 2009; Crumbley et al., 2010; Ewing, 2012; 
Spooren et al., 2013) as well as course quality deflation (Bok, 2009). 
More specifically, Crumbley et al. (2010:187) suggest that (i) lecturers 
tend to give better grades in the hope that they achieve better student 
feedback and (ii) lecturers tend to make courses easier so that they 
become more “enjoyable”, thus making them less academically rigor-
ous. This, in return, produces teaching methods akin to ‘the unethical 
practices of executives “cooking their books”’ (p. 187). That is,  
‘whether consciously or not, many faculty do pander to students in 
terms of rigor and grades in order to influence SET results.’ (Zimmer-
man, 2002, cited in Crumbley et al., 2010:188) 
Importantly, Shapiro (2002, cited in Crumbley et al., 2010:187) 
suggests, 
‘students often use the threat of giving their professors low SET 
scores and will complain about the professor’s teaching effectiveness 
in an to [sic] attempt to intimidate the professor to accept late assign-
ments, sloppy work, and all forms of excuses and laziness’ (Shapiro, 
2002, cited in Crumbley et al., 2010:187) 
This resonates with the following data excerpt:  
“I just had to give one of my students a really bad mark. It was, indeed, 
a disastrous essay. I now hope that the student won’t give me negative 
student feedback in the student rep meetings or internal surveys just to 
sort of take “revenge” on those bad marks.” [Excerpt 1. My research 
Journal]  
Turning to the NSS, grade inflation and course deflation become par-
ticularly problematic in professional degrees with high stakes. For ex-
ample, in nursing degrees, standards may be compromised by the 
NSS rather than improved (Higginson, 2016). The article suggests that 
rather than producing satisfied nursing students, degrees ought to fo-
cus on how to educate competent nurses who offer excellent patient 
care with profound relevant technical knowledge (ibid.). For example, 
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a ‘student nurse [may] be entirely happy with, for example, their 
course, their university building, personal tutor, [but] not be clinically 
competent’ (p. 562). Thus, ‘the NSS tells us more about a university’s 
ability to perform well in satisfaction surveys than it does about the 
quality about what happens within them’ (Higginson, 2016:562). 
2.6.2 Issues of Interpretation and Validity 
A number of studies have also explored issues with the interpretation 
of NSS questions as well as the overall validity of the NSS. For exam-
ple, Mendes et al. (2011) interrogate student interpretations of the 
NSS question, “Feedback on my work has been prompt”, and suggest 
that students may have a rather ambiguous understanding of what 
“prompt” may mean. The question, therefore, is whether student feed-
back may truly capture the actual promptness of the feedback. Unfor-
tunately, in what could be considered a slightly defeatist position, 
Mendes et al. (2011:42) conclude that ‘it may be timely to revisit, re-
think and re-imagine pedagogy’ because  
‘due to higher tuition fees, students may expect a clearer articulation 
of what the teaching and learning offer is and, by extension, value for 
money. They may expect to be taught in a more explicit way than that 
experienced in the traditional art and design studio.’  
Similarly, Bates et al. (2017) question whether the NSS can truly 
capture the ‘holistic perspective of the student experience’ (p. 2) with 
one interviewed student complaining about the fact that the NSS 
questions were rather ‘ambiguous’ (p. 10). It is suggested that an al-
ternative conceptualisation of student feedback is warranted in which 
‘student satisfaction is best conceptualised as simply being the out-
come of complex and multi-dimensional experiences’ rather than a 
straightforward “satisfaction” (Bates et al., 2017:2). However, despite 
this vaguely critical tone regarding the shortcomings of the NSS, the 
article concludes by advocating more ‘effective institutional marketing’ 
(p. 10).  
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In addition, Ashby et al. (2011:22) focus on another hermeneutical 
issue. In (Open University) courses, a significant number of students 
chose ‘”Neither agree nor disagree” [when they] should strictly have 
chosen “Not applicable” on certain questions’ (ibid.). Since the cate-
gory of ‘neither agree nor disagree’ is counted as an item of dissatis-
faction, this misunderstanding may have a distorting impact on where 
(Open University) courses are placed within rankings (ibid.). Similarly, 
Orr et al. (2014) discuss how Art and Design students give comparably 
negative feedback on their courses which could be attributed to ques-
tions being too generic and not applicable to the distinct style of learn-
ing on Art and Design courses. One interviewed student argues, for 
example, that lecturers ‘don’t spit it out for you but they get you to think’ 
which can sometimes ‘be frustrating because when they’re not telling 
you the answer because there is no answer’ (p. 34). Even though this 
article, again, finishes with an increasingly conformist demand for a 
more “objective” approach to Art and Design studio education, the ar-
gument that NSS questions may simply fail to capture the specific ped-
agogy on certain degrees is pertinent. This opens up questions of 
whether the NSS may embody a more general bias against the social 
sciences and humanities whilst favouring university disciplines in 
which testable knowledge is at the forefront. More specifically, it could 
be suggested that it is a pedagogical tendency of the “critical social 
sciences” to favour student-led sense-making and critical exploration 
through debate over what could be termed a “transmission model of 
education” which operates through “teacher-led teaching styles” aimed 
at “testable student outcomes”. The critical social sciences may there-
fore be disadvantaged by the NSS. 
Another category of the critical literature investigates the validity 
of student opinions in Student Evaluations of Teaching (SETs). For 
example, it is argued that SETs are problematic without a ‘clear theory 
of effective teaching’ (Spooren et al., 2013:603). Various SETs cur-
rently in use consequentially may ‘lack any evidence of “content valid-
ity”’ and thus may ‘fail to measure what they claim to measure’ 
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(Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009, cited in Spooren et al., 2013:603). There-
fore, ‘a clear understanding of effective teaching is a pre-requisite for 
the construction of SET instruments’ (Spooren et al. 2013:603). Other 
research suggests that lecturers’ physical appearance and perceived 
attractiveness have an impact on the outcome of student evaluations 
of teaching (Campbell et al., 2005): if students think the lecturer is 
“good-looking”, student evaluations of teaching will be better and vice 
versa (also see  Hamermesh and Parker, 2005; Riniolo et al., 2006). 
Further characteristics may also influence student evaluations of 
teaching such as ‘academic ranks, and the use of humour’ (Constand 
et al., 2018:166) or gender (Boring, 2017).  
In conclusion, seminal research by Cheng and Marsh (2010) could 
be mobilised to argue that the NSS is only a mildly reliable assessment 
tool because minimal differences in results between universities may 
have a big influence on university rankings. Therefore, the NSS as an 
appropriate assessment tool to inform student choice is questionable 
(Cheng and Marsh, 2010). 
2.6.3 Marketisation, Managerialisation and the Student as Cus-
tomer 
A significant body of work has critiqued SETS in the context of the 
ongoing “marketisation of higher education” (Jones-Devitt and Samiei, 
2011; Molesworth et al., 2011; Tuck, 2017) which will more broadly be 
theorised in section 4.2 in the context of neoliberalism (cf. Grimmett et 
al., 2009; McGettigan, 2013; Giroux, 2014). For example, McGettigan 
(2013:55) suggests that the NSS, and resultant rankings, intend to put 
‘consumer pressures’ on universities to improve quality and offer 
‘value for money’, whilst value could refer to ‘both “cheap and cheerful” 
and “expensive but worth it” (p. 55). Likewise, a further study outlines 
the competitive pressures which are created by the NSS, such as the 
need of universities to focus on scores to attain a favourable position 
in the “higher education market” (Jurkowitsch et al., 2006; Bates et al., 
2017). Likewise, Naidoo and Williams (2014b:1) suggest that the NSS 
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recasts students into consumers which erodes the idea that universi-
ties are a public good. This reconfiguration leads to a range of effects, 
such as a reduction of the quality of course provision (by, for example, 
learners becoming ‘…passive and instrumental…’ (p.12)) as well as 
teaching becoming less innovative (also see Naidoo and Williams, 
2014a). Another study critiques that SETs treat ‘the student as a cus-
tomer’ as well as measuring ‘the satisfaction of the student with his or 
her professor, and not learning’ (Crumbley et al., 2010:188). Similarly, 
Furedi (2011:2) focusses on this transformation of students into con-
sumers by arguing that neoliberalism ‘recast[s] the relationship be-
tween academics and students along the model of a service provider 
and customer’ where ‘the customer is always right [and] the university 
had better listen to the student’ (p. 3). This recasting of students forces 
‘institutions to compete against one another for resources and funding’ 
(ibid.). In this context, Parker (2014:236) argues that the NSS pro-
motes competition amongst staff with particular pressures being put 
on (female) middle management. Managers are now obliged to re-
spond to NSS results (and expect their staff to) whilst being aware of 
those results’ limitations.  
Moreover, SETs could also be situated in the context of what has 
been described as ‘new managerialism’. New managerialism refers to 
a leadership type which utilises certain techniques that are more typi-
cal for ‘medium and large “for profit” businesses’ and transfers these 
‘onto public sector and voluntary organisations’ (Deem, 1998). Intra-
institutionally, new managerialism may comprise the  
‘use of internal cost centres, the fostering of competition between em-
ployees, the marketisation of public sector services and the monitoring 
of efficiency and effectiveness through measurement of outcomes and 
individual staff performances.’ (p. 50) 
Consequentially, SETs are experienced as a ‘tyranny of the eval-
uation form’ (Spooren et al., 2013:600) since ‘such evaluations are 
used for performance reviews and promotion and tenure decisions’ 
despite ‘the inherent shortcomings of ratings’ (Constand et al., 2018; 
also see Simpson and Siguaw, 2000).  
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Before finishing, Robinson’s (2013) critique of rankings shall be 
considered. Robinson cautions against the corrosive effects of higher 
education rankings on university quality. Whilst likening university 
rankings to the effects of biological determinism on human intelli-
gence, Robinson (2013:65) asserts that  
‘university rankings serve to reduce the complexity of an institution’s 
achievements and practices to a simple ordinal scale that cannot in 
any real sense claim to be a valid indicator of quality.’  
In other words, what ‘makes a good university simply cannot be 
accurately captured statistically’ (p. 65). Moreover, rankings do not de-
termine the quality of an institution, but how wealthy a university is. For 
example, wealthy universities are able to attract the best staff, can af-
ford lower staff-student ratios. Therefore, rankings may simply recycle 
existing perceptions of the quality of universities instead of measuring 
the quality of education. Based on this, Robinson asserts that it is an 
illusion that universities can be meaningfully compared to one another 
quantitatively:  
‘The quality of the education and free inquiry that takes place within 
an institution cannot be easily or accurately parsed, quantified, or-
dered and compared. Quality higher education is not a singular prod-
uct or outcome subject to one simple definition or numerical score. It 
has to do with a diverse range of activities and processes. Rankings 
require that these complex aspects of a university be reduced to a 
number no matter how absurd the exercise becomes.’ (p. 65; empha-
sis added)  
 
Whilst these lines of critique will be revisited in the chapters to come 
(for example, the issue of marketisation of education will be explored 
in section 4.2), the following conclusions can be drawn based on the 
critical literature explored:  
1. The NSS may not actually measure student satisfaction accu-
rately and may be no valid indicator of the quality of education.  
2. Universities cannot meaningfully be compared quantitatively. 
3. The NSS and resultant rankings may have detrimental effects 
on the quality of education for students (e.g. in the shape of 
course deflation) 
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4. The NSS may have other pernicious effects, such as maintain-
ing gender biases.  
5. The NSS may promote pedagogies which favour rote memori-
sation and testable outcomes over fostering student criticality 
and dialogic abilities.  
Against this backdrop, the legitimate question emerges why the Na-
tional Student Survey enjoys such high prestige on the agenda of the 
UK Government and why universities allocate significant energy and 
funds to attain high student satisfaction.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
This study is broadly situated within qualitative enquiry. It can, hence, 
be delineated from positivist research paradigms which attempt to sta-
tistically or experimentally control variables (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995) to arrive at statistical causations or correlations. In-
stead, my research resonates more closely with Davies’s (2008:5) 
broad take on ethnography 
‘as a research process based on fieldwork using a variety of mainly 
(but not exclusively) qualitative research techniques but including en-
gagement in the lives of those being studied over an extended period 
of time.’  
For example, my research only used ‘qualitative research tech-
niques’ and engaged ‘in the lives’ of researchers at Reddish University 
(p. 5) and my university. In addition, I engaged in the analysis of policy 
(e.g. Chapter 4) as well as the academic literature (e.g. Chapter 2). 
Yet, this study decidedly is not grounded in what could be described 
as an interpretivist paradigm (Cohen et al., 2007), but instead tenta-
tively follows a realist ontology (see sections 3.1and 6.3) This ontology 
suggests the existence of social mechanisms which operate some-
what independently of the conceptions we have of them (even though 
conceptions may dramatically influence these social mechanisms). In 
this sense, the thesis could be broadly situated in current post-qualita-
tive research developments which tend to be influenced by what has 
come to be known as the New Materialisms (Dolphijn and Tuin, 2012).  
Importantly, the methodological grounding of this study has 
evolved as it has passed through successive stages of my investiga-
tion. Hence, this chapter constitutes a retroactive assessment of how 
themes and arguments emerged from an unpredictable path through 
successive professional encounters, policy initiatives and alternative 
theoretical avenues. This iterative (Crabtree and Miller, 1999) and of-
tentimes messy (Cook, 2009) research process was characterised by 
change, including the transition of an outsider research position (when 
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I started my PhD studentship in 2014) towards that of an insider when 
I became a senior-lecturer in 2016 (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995).  
The following structural choices guide this chapter. Firstly, the par-
adigmatic realist orientation of this thesis is discussed, including a brief 
introduction to DeLanda’s (2006) “social ontology” as well as Gee’s 
(2005) take on language.  Next, an overview of the research methods 
is provided which is separated into a discussion of data collection 
methods and a discussion of how data analysis was approached. This 
section also includes a description of how the theme of “student voice” 
first emerged.  Last, important research notions such as reflexivity and 
ethics are discussed.  
3.1 Paradigmatic Considerations: DeLanda’s Social Ontology  
First, I seek to outline my research paradigm since ontology (what re-
searchers think being is like) influences epistemology (what research-
ers think they can understand about this “being”) which, in return, in-
fluences methodology (cf. Lewin and Somekh, 2011). This thesis takes 
a tentative realist position which is inspired by Manuel DeLanda’s re-
alist social ontology (DeLanda, 2006, 2012) and, later in this thesis, 
Karen Barad’s “Agential Realism” (see sections 6.2.1 6.4.1) (Barad, 
2007). The qualifier “tentative” was chosen because any definite 
grounding in a specific paradigm would have made this thesis too con-
tingent on an understanding of the respective philosophical frame-
work.  Moreover, my relationship with DeLanda’s and Barad’s work is 
not one of sole admiration, but plagued with reservations and tensions; 
hence, the use of “tentative” seeks to capture this ambivalence.  
DeLanda’s (2012) realist “social ontology” is part of his larger re-
alist ontology. This ontology, in return, needs to be understood within 
his framework of “assemblage theory”, heavily inspired by Deleuze 
and Guattari’s (1988) work. It proposes one material “reality” which 
humans are part of, but which also goes beyond humans. Importantly, 
DeLanda (2006) argues that whilst this reality exists independently of 
human minds, in the case of a “social ontology” an addition needs to 
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be made: a “social reality” exists only independently of the ‘contents of 
…[human] minds’ (2 mins 27; emphasis in original video). “Social re-
ality” is fundamentally contingent on human minds because, in con-
trast to a “natural reality”, “social” reality is built on those minds. In 
other words, if human minds ceased to exist, this would also destroy 
the basis of all social mechanisms operational in society, leaving be-
hind only the specific physical infrastructure. This also relates to 
DeLanda’s clear distinction between how social processes really op-
erate (ontology) and how people understand and interpret these (epis-
temology). For example, the contents of peoples’ minds may be 
“wrong” or non-existent regarding the social processes which govern 
their lives (i.e. people may have the wrong epistemology). This may, 
nevertheless, leave the actual social processes untouched (i.e. the on-
tology of these social processes is unaffected). In short, DeLanda as-
serts an ‘autonomy of social entities from conceptions we have of 
them’ (DeLanda, 2006:7). In the context of this thesis, it could, for ex-
ample, be argued that lecturers’ practice is shaped by student feed-
back in specific ways regardless of whether lecturers understand the 
distinct operational mechanisms of that feedback. Put differently, even 
though this thesis’s analysis may be “flawed”, it does not influence the 
fact that student feedback functions in specific ways and has certain 
effects. In other words, there are real ‘causal interactions’ which guide 
the operation of the NSS. (These causal interactions are, of course, 
seldom linear but rather complex, non-linear, reciprocal and may in-
volve the presence of ‘catalysts’ (DeLanda, 2006:20))  
This assertion of an independence of a social ontology of the “con-
tents of human minds”, however, needs to be further clarified in the 
context of this thesis. That is, under no circumstances must the im-
pression arise that lecturers’ interpretations of the NSS and student 
feedback are insignificant. To the contrary, it needs to be asserted that 
a certain understanding of student feedback is not only important, but 
lies at the crux of student feedback systems. For example, vice chan-
cellors need to act in accordance with the belief that the NSS signifi-
cantly influences the scale and composition of student intake so that 
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universities put student feedback high on their agenda. Yet again, this 
belief operates, more or less, independently of whether student intake 
is actually affected by rankings and student feedback (cf. Locke, 
2014). This means that if, on the other hand, lecturers and manage-
ment did not believe in the impact of student feedback, this would also 
significantly reduce the effect of this very feedback inside the institu-
tion, leaving only the inter-university market pressures of the NSS 
rankings intact. Hence, this thesis treats the narratives of university 
lecturers as a crucial component part of the operation of student feed-
back systems. Similarly, it could be suggested that since I analysed 
the NSS as part of my own work environment, my emerging knowledge 
of the NSS affected my own behaviour when dealing with student feed-
back. For example, my research diary entries suggested that through 
my analysis of student appraisal systems, I increasingly developed an 
awareness of the workings of those systems. This awareness some-
times exacerbated my own compliance with student feedback (purely 
because of my emerging knowledge of the significance attributed to 
student feedback).  
This is where Foucault’s conception of ontology can be fruitfully 
included into my realist position. Whilst some authors have suggested 
that there is a certain fuzziness in Foucault’s ontological convictions - 
particularly regarding whether what exists is real (i.e. somewhat inde-
pendent of people’s conceptions of the world) or postmodernist (Jo-
seph, 2004) – this thesis suggests a realist reading of Foucault’s (later 
genealogical) work. This reality is ‘the result of social practices and 
struggles over truth and objectivity’ (Oksala, 2010:445). Student feed-
back systems and lecturers, hence, are understood as entities which 
are part of these struggles. Building on the previous paragraph, the 
role which knowledge plays in these struggles is crucial in that 
‘knowledge does not represent reality, but has instead a productive 
role in shaping and configuring reality’ (Olsson and Petersson, 
2008:61). For example, knowledge of lecturers’ performance in stu-
dent feedback systems, as will be argued in Chapter 4, has an im-
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portant effect on how lecturers can subsequently be governed and dis-
ciplined. Knowledge also plays an important role in that an under-
standing of the importance of student feedback systems influences 
lecturers’ compliance with student demands: again, university manag-
ers must believe that the NSS significantly influences student intake 
so that the NSS develops its effects on universities. Hence, this paper 
treats the narratives of university lecturers as a crucial component part 
of the operation of student feedback systems.  
Language. I suggest that any paradigm (and particularly a realist 
paradigm) needs to ask the question which ontological status lan-
guage is given. DeLanda, for example, theorises language as just one, 
but by no means the only expressive force in social reality. He thereby 
rejects a reality which is entirely linguistically framed. This resonates 
in interesting ways with James Paul Gee’s “Discourse Analysis”. Gee 
(2005:10) argues that, on the one hand language describes things we 
see, but at the same time it creates these things:  
‘We continually and actively build and rebuild our worlds not just 
through language but through language used in tandem with actions, 
interactions, non-linguistic symbol systems, objects, tools, technolo-
gies, and distinctive ways of thinking, valuing, feeling, and believing. 
Sometimes what we build is quite similar to what we have built before; 
sometimes it is not. But language-in-action is always and everywhere 
an active building process.’ 
 
That is, like DeLanda, Gee attributes importance to language, but 
argues that this language functions in ‘tandem with’ non-linguistic ele-
ments. Gee, therefore, distinguishes between discourses (with a lower 
case d) and Discourses (with an capital d): discourses refer to ‘lan-
guage-in-use’ whilst Discourses refer to language in combination with 
other aspects such as ‘body, clothes, gestures, actions, interactions, 
symbols, tools, technologies … , values, attitudes, beliefs, and emo-
tions’ (Gee, 2005:7). Put differently, “Discourse” refers to how lower 
case “discourses” are fundamentally entangled with non-linguistic 
‘“stuff” to enact specific identities and activities’ (p. 7). The productive 
aspects of language are captured in what Gee (2005) calls the ‘seven 
49 
building tasks of language’, i.e. the seven areas of reality which lan-
guage helps to build (ibid.). These comprise (i) “significance” (it makes 
certain things significant, while making other things insignificant); (ii) 
“activities” (language helps to be recognised as engaging in a certain 
activity and not another); and (iii) ‘identities’ (language is used by peo-
ple to build a ‘certain identity or role’ (p. 11)). In addition, language 
builds (iv) ‘relationships’ (language is used to build relationships with 
listeners and readers and with the entities we speak about); and (v) 
politics (in that language builds a perspective on ‘social goods’ under-
stood as ‘anything that a group of people believes to be a source of 
power, status, value, or worth’ (Gee, 2005:2)). Last, language builds 
(vi) ‘connections’ (certain aspects of reality are not inherently con-
nected, and we need to use language to create these connections); 
and ‘sign systems and knowledge’ (language can privilege one partic-
ular sign system, such as the language of lawyers) or one specific way 
of ‘knowing and believing’ (Gee, 2005:13).  
 
3.2 Data Collection and Data Analysis  
The research question for this thesis – i.e. “What are the effects of the 
National Student Survey (NSS) on university lecturers, departments 
and universities?” – emerged from an iterative process of (NVivo) cod-
ing of qualitative data (Cohen et al., 2007), engagement with the aca-
demic (and non-academic) literature as well as insider lived experi-
ence at a post 92 UK university. The data for this study is derived from 
12 interviews with university lecturers, the majority of which were em-
ployed in education departments; observations (cf. Jones & Somekh 
2004) of three university lecturers’ teaching sessions in education; and 
two research diaries (one of which is autobiographical). To begin with, 
Table 2 gives an overview of the research participants for this thesis. 
As can be seen, the depth and types of data collected with these par-
ticipants varied. Most of the data was collected at Reddish University 
in Yorkshire. More specifically, the observations of and interviews with 
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Max, Emily and Andrea took place predominantly in 2015/16. Max was 
observed three times and interviewed once; Andrea was observed five 
times and interviewed three times; and Emily was only observed twice 
and interviewed once. In addition to these combined observations and 
interviews, an additional series of stand-alone interviews were 
conducted with Stacey, Melissa, Barbara and Martin.  
 
 
Table 2: Overview of participants4 
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1. Barbara  68  Reddish University  TE SL 1 - - 
2. Martin  32  Reddish University  TE SL 1  - - 
3. Melissa  44  Reddish University  TE SL 1 - - 
4. Stacey  39 Reddish University  TE AL 1 - - 
5. Max  30 Reddish University not 
TE 
SL 1  3 - 
6. Lisa  32 Reddish University TE AL 
/ 
SL   
3 1 Yes 
                                                 
4 SL=Senior Lecturer; L=Lecturer; TE=Teacher Education 
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7. Emily  37 Reddish University TE SL 1  2 - 
8. Andrea  30 Reddish University  Not 
TE 
SL  3 5 - 
9. Jonas 
(author) 
33 A university in the 
North West 
TE AL 
/ 
SL 
  Yes 
10. Karl 44 Reddish University  TE SL 1  a
- 
- 
11. Michael 42 Southhawk Univer-
sity  
Nurse 
Edu-
cator 
SL 1 - - 
12. Matt 35 Reddish University  TE SL 1 - - 
13. Dimitra 42 Kings University  Phi-
loso-
phy  
L 1 - - 
 
The following section will outline some of the data collection meth-
ods utilised for this thesis. First, the use of “research diaries” is out-
lined. Next, Hollway and Jefferson’s (2000) concept of the “free asso-
ciation narrative interview” is discussed. Last, some remarks on “ob-
servations” are presented.  
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3.2.1 Data Collection 
Research diaries. The majority of this thesis’s data stems from Lisa’s 
(see page 60) and my research diaries. In my research diary, I vari-
ously documented thoughts; observations; reflective comments on 
events; notes taken whilst teaching groups of students; reflections af-
ter teaching; and critical reflections of wider institutional, local, national 
or global problems. In short, my research diary contained elements of 
what Morrison (1995a, cited in Cohen et al., 2007)) describes as ‘re-
flection-in-action, reflection-on-action, or critical reflection’. Mostly 
these reflections were research related, but sometimes included ob-
servations beyond the university. The use of a research diary helped 
me to express preliminary ‘thoughts / feelings /assumptions in the ter-
ritory’ (Goldbart and Hustler, 2005:18).  
Particularly the reflective writing in my research diary was 
important for this thesis because it did not only document my research 
process, but also helped my analysis. It supported my ongoing practi-
tioner research by, for example, critiquing my ‘practice and some of 
the habitual patterns inherent within it’ (Brown and Jones, 2001:175). 
For instance, my research diary made me aware that I felt anxious 
about negative student feedback after I “told off” a student who demon-
strated sexist behaviour (see page 178). In addition, reflective writing 
also provided ‘an instrument through which successive and alternative 
conceptions of practice [were] marked and preserved for scrutiny’ 
(Brown and Jones, 2001:181). This made it possible to track change 
by comparing earlier and later versions of writing. For example, my 
first ever diary entry captured my strong desire to provide students with 
“lots of tips and tricks to become an effective teacher”. Critically inter-
rogating this excerpt two years after made me realise that I presented 
the terminology “effective” as an absolute term without asking the (re-
lational) question, “Effective for whom and in relation to what?”. Im-
portantly, reflective writing may not only describe what is (or was) 
happening, but may be productive of how certain situations are seen. 
Therefore, reflective writing may ‘provide a way of seeing practice in a 
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fresh way which in turn can lead to different ways of acting’ (Brown 
and Jones, 2001).  
Research diaries also provided me with insights into structural el-
ements guiding institutional practice. In particular, Lisa’s research di-
ary presented itself as an invaluable glimpse into practice at an insti-
tution different from mine. This enabled me to compare practice envi-
ronments. In addition, this allowed me to talk about certain aspects of 
practice which were also prevalent at my institution without running the 
risk of breaking potential confidentiality requirements. In this way, it 
was sometimes possible to indirectly talk about my work environment 
through Lisa’s experience at hers.  
 
Free association narrative interviews. In addition to research diaries, 
this thesis utilises interview transcripts from interviews inspired by the 
‘free association narrative interview method’ as suggested by Hollway 
and Jefferson (2000:4). Characteristic of this method is that interviews 
should start with open questions that enable the interviewee to engage 
in narratives about certain past events. These narratives may well di-
verge from the interviewer’s original questions because the aim of free 
association narrative interviews is to put the interviewee in a position 
of “simply being able to talk”. This narrative approach can be 
delineated from other interview methods, such as ‘closed quantitative 
interviews’ or ‘standardized open-ended interviews’ (Patton, 
1980:206). These two methods employ what could be described as an 
“imposition” strategy (by using a list of pre-prepared questions with the 
intention of ensuring reliability) and figure the interviewer as the person 
who is researching from the outside and from a position of power (Bar-
bour and Schostak, 2005). Conversely, a narrative interview approach 
is akin to other interview styles, such as the ‘informal conversational 
interview’, the ‘interview guide approach’ (Patton, 1980:206) or ‘dia-
logic approach[es]’ in which ‘people may express their views to each 
other and to themselves’ (Barbour and Schostak, 2005:42). Often, my 
narrative approach functioned as a platform for a reflective and critical 
dialogue (ibid.). For example, my interviews usually started “open” 
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(and avoided overtly closed and leading questions) to elicit narratives, 
then attained more focus towards the end, followed by me talking 
about my own experiences as a lecturer in which I attempted to create 
critical dialogue.   
Importantly, to elicit narratives, the “free association narrative in-
terview method” suggests that both overtly specific as well as broad 
questions should be avoided (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). Whilst a 
specific question may put interviewees under excessive pressure to 
give answers they think the interviewer wants to hear, a generic ques-
tion could make interviewees feel intimidated by the multiplicity of po-
tential answers whilst also restricting the flow of the narrative. Instead 
of asking ‘what do you most fear?’, a better question would be ‘”Tell 
me about your experiences of fear” or, better (because more specific), 
“Tell me about a time when you were fearful”’ (Hollway and Jefferson, 
2000:35). If it transpires that not enough information has been given 
as the interview progresses, the interviewer can refer back to previous 
points of the interview, asking to “elaborate a little further on” these 
points. Applied to my work, when Martin, for example, talked about the 
pressures deriving from Ofsted, a follow-up question was, “You were 
talking about Ofsted earlier. Could you tell me about a time when you 
had any direct negative experiences, if you ever had any bad experi-
ences?”  
This captures that interviews are never straightforward but rather 
messy and complex encounters with potential ethical issues, such as 
participant vulnerability (Barbour and Schostak, 2005). This vulnera-
bility is present in all types of interview situations, but particularly prev-
alent in, for example, investigative journalism where leaked infor-
mation about key informants may constitute a matter of life and death 
(ibid.). Therefore, certain precautions were taken regarding the safe-
guarding of interview material. The actual recordings were kept on de-
vices without access to the internet and in locked storage facilities. 
Transcripts were either anonymised or kept protected by passwords 
whilst only opened when internet access was disabled.  
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Importantly, free association narrative interviews take into consid-
eration (and try to ease the effects of) a crucial phenomenon: in inter-
view situations, participants often act as ‘defended subjects’ (Hollway 
and Jefferson, 2000:23). “Defended subjects” usually refuse to tell an-
other person how they “genuinely” feel or think right from the beginning 
of the interview. Rather, they attempt to hide key aspects of their think-
ing which they deem potentially harmful to their own identity. Im-
portantly, this rarely is a conscious process, but may be largely uncon-
scious. Therefore, a narrative approach to data collection not only has 
the advantage of making the data richer (for example by potentially 
bringing previously unanticipated themes to the forefront), it also in-
corporates a psychoanalytical dimension to what participants say. For 
example, there may be instances in participants’ accounts which are 
indicative of repressed experiences (ibid.). 
On this basis, each of my interviews started with a “narrative ena-
bling” general question, with the intention of easing potential tensions 
and setting a vague frame for discussion for both interviewer and in-
terviewee. This initial question would usually aim at eliciting how my 
participants first became university lecturers, such as “Could you tell 
me how you got into being a university lecturer in education?”.  In my 
earlier interviews (i.e. with Barbara, Martin, Melissa, Stacey, Max, 
Lisa, Emily, and Andrea), these initial questions were usually followed 
by questions which attempted to address the general themes of (i) “re-
straints in practice” (e.g. “Tell me what you are struggling with most in 
your job at uni”) and (ii) “agency in practice” (e.g. “Have you ever had 
the feeling that you could really make a difference?”). Since one of my 
original (and since discarded) research aims was to enquire into “uto-
pian accounts of practice”, one set of questions also tried to explore 
what my participants would change in the general system of teacher 
education if they were in charge of policy. Questions therefore in-
cluded, “Imagine that you were the prime minister of this country and 
had a vast pot of money to spend on university teacher education. 
What would you change?”  
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Importantly, I approached my interview transcripts under the as-
sumption that ‘until absolutely proven otherwise, … everyone has 
“good reasons’ and makes “deep sense” in terms of their own soci-
oculturally specific ways of talking’ (Gee, 2005:93). Sometimes this 
necessitated a “back-grounding” (but not elimination) of Hollway and 
Jefferson’s (2000) suggestions to utilise psychoanalytical theory in or-
der to make sense of defended subjects.  Concerning my interview 
transcription, I followed Gee’s advice to transcribe data in such a way 
that it enabled points to be most eloquently made. Crucially, the pro-
cess of transcription was often non-linear (Gee, 2005) with the detail 
of transcription depending on the purpose of the interview. Moreover, 
transcriptions come with a reduction of complexity (ibid.). Thus, I 
mainly transcribed the interviews into continuous text with the 
exception of some segments where a more detailed reading seemed 
beneficial. In this reading, I then used stanzas, lines and pitch glides 
(2005:127).  
 
Observations. My observations could largely be categorised as “un-
structured observations” in which I behaved like an “Observer Partici-
pant” (Jones and Somekh, 2004:140) who sat ‘at the side or back of 
the room and [made] detailed notes’. Hereby, it is crucial to consider 
the role my ‘prior knowledge and experience’ played whilst engaging 
in these observations. For example, my perception of students behav-
ing rudely or unprofessionally in seminars cannot be understood out-
side of my own value judgement of what “rude” and “unprofessional” 
may mean in certain contexts. Within my observations, I attempted to 
record key utterances verbatim (Jones and Somekh, 2004) which I af-
terwards anonymised, but refrained from (audio or video) recording 
these observations because this was not captured in my institutional 
ethics application. Whilst a passive intervening probably occurred due 
to my presence in the classroom, I did not actively intervene in these 
observations, with the exception of moments when I tried to listen to 
group conversations in which case I occasionally engaged in conver-
sations with the students.  
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3.2.2 Data Analysis 
This thesis conceptualises data analysis as “resonance”. For example, 
data may resonate with a researcher (e.g.  Barbara’s data about stu-
dent feedback somehow resonated with “me”). I suggest that data may 
also resonate with other data. For example, Barbara’s negative per-
ception of student feedback systems (page 60) resonated with 
Melissa’s traumatic experience with student voice (page 62). 
Moreover, data may resonate with a theory or theoretical framework. 
For instance, the discussion of the NSS in the context of Foucault’s 
work on governmentality (see 4.2) may ask how Foucault’s ideas res-
onate with the data collected as part of this thesis. Theoretical frame-
works may also resonate with other theoretical frameworks. For exam-
ple, in Chapter 7, I will explore how Barad’s (2007) work resonates 
with Laclau’s (2005) work on populism.  
This view of “analysis as resonance” is not without foundation. It 
itself “resonates” with a theory – that of “diffraction” as presented by 
Karen Barad (2007) which will be thoroughly introduced in section 6.2. 
Diffraction happens whenever waves immerse through one another, 
such as two ripples on a pond. For example, when waves travel 
through a “grating” (i.e. a barrier with two holes), the waves assume 
the shapes of two concentric circles, variously intersecting one an-
other. This process of intersecting is called diffraction. Importantly, 
when waves overlap, their amplitudes (e.g. their height) may rise which 
Barad calls ‘constructive interference’ (p. 77). 'Destructive interfer-
ence’ (p. 77), on the other hand, describes how amplitudes may sub-
tract from one another, with the possibility of completely cancelling one 
another out. It is paramount that Barad suggests that diffraction is not 
restricted to the domain of physics, but happens in all realms of reality, 
including those described as natural and those described as social. 
This is why she refuses to see diffraction as yet another optical meta-
phor - such as that of reflexivity - but as a real ongoing ‘performance 
of the world’ (p. 149). Diffraction may also be used as a methodological 
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tool which is capable of reading ‘insights through one another’ and re-
sponding ‘to the details and specificities of relations of difference and 
how they matter’ (p. 71). Therefore, diffraction can make it possible to 
read theoretical frameworks and data through one another so as to 
arrive at points of constructive and destructive interferences.  
Moving away from the notion of resonance (or diffraction), I pro-
pose that the line between data collection and data analysis is some-
what blurry. This became particularly apparent in my research diary in 
which I sometimes captured rather complex analytical points. Simi-
larly, when interviewing, I ask whether I did not already analyse my 
data when I found certain contributions significant or interesting. It 
could be suggested that the sheer act of “finding something interest-
ing” clearly involves the researcher (i.e. in this case myself) and his or 
her experiences. Similarly, when listening to recordings, the mere act 
“understanding” what participants were saying may already constitute 
“analysis” because this understanding happened through the lens of 
my specific knowledge (my theory) of the meanings of the words spo-
ken (cf. Gallagher, 1992). After all, what is the difference between un-
derstanding someone’s language through the theory which already re-
sides in my mind and, on the other hand, viewing it through a specific 
“acknowledged” theory. I argue both involve analysis.  
Similarly, the process of how the theme of the National Student 
Survey emerged from the data was not straightforward. Building on the 
notion of “resonance” above, I suggest that this theme emerged 
through a complex interplay of my own biography which “resonated" 
with the processes of data collection and the reading of (academic) 
texts, including literature, online videos, keynotes, conferences and 
conversations with friends and colleagues. Whilst a more thorough ex-
ploration of how these “resonances” could be conceptualised will be 
provided in my agential realist discussion in section 6.3, I will now try 
to retrospectively trace and re-construct the “genesis” of my thesis. 
This reconstruction is realised by the mobilisation of data excerpts, 
such as research diary entries and interview data which I attempted to 
provide in chronological order.  
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The first piece of data stems from my research diary and depicts 
an experience in which I first became aware of the existence of student 
appraisal systems within my then role as an associate lecturer (AL):  
“It was approximately two months after I started to teach at university 
as an associate lecturer (AL), when I first became aware of student 
feedback systems. After one of my taught English sessions, a colleague 
approached and informed me that he had just had a meeting with stu-
dent representatives and that they were “really happy” with my teach-
ing. I remember feeling somewhat uplifted by this experience because 
I had been uncertain whether the students liked my teaching or not. 
This means that with regard to my own practice, I started on a positive 
note when it came to student voice […] [As a result of this feedback,] I 
also asked myself the question, “What can I do in the future to attain 
the same good student feedback. I believe this was the moment when 
I also started feeling a little trapped in my practice. That is, I wanted to 
continue teaching in a similar fashion so that my students would con-
tinue to experience my teaching as positive, but felt that I wouldn’t want 
to deviate from the teaching style which affected the positive student 
feedback.” (Excerpt 2.My Research Diary) 
A subsequent “free association narrative interview” with Barbara 
in January 2015, displays a noteworthy contrasting take on student 
voice. Barbara was a retired but still research-active Reader at Red-
dish University with an extensive teaching, managing and research 
career. Before the interview, I informed her about my research interest, 
such as “how the global neoliberal agenda impacts on university lec-
turers who are active in education”. Due to Barbara’s longstanding ex-
perience in HEIs, I also asked her how her institution had changed 
during her academic career (which spanned the period from the 1970s 
towards the present). In addition, towards the end of interview, I en-
quired what she thought to be the “control mechanism” that university 
lecturers “suffered most under”.  
Barbara replied that this had to be “student voice” in that lecturers 
were “now constantly subjected to student appraisals” with the inten-
tion of getting the university into the "top fifty of the best-regarded uni-
versities". Barbara continued:  
“[…] the most pernicious thing from my point of view, from where I sit - 
relatively calm these days - um, um, is the instruments … which depro-
fessionalise staff or [which] assume a lack of professionalism … [of] 
staff […]” (Excerpt 3. Interview with Barbara)  
60 
In the past, “managers [could] try and address [issues] with … staff, as 
individuals”: “there’s never been a period in all these forty years when 
I worked when [student appraisals have] not been significant”. Barbara 
continued that  
“[…] the idea that [student voice] would create … league tables, you 
know, declaration that we’ve got to get in the top fifty of the best-
regarded Universities in the country I find absolutely, as I say, perni-
cious because … [these ideas] marginalise the real conversations be-
tween staff; they make them less significant and as well as closing down 
the space … you alluded to earlier … in which [real conversations] can 
happen. So, your actual ambition to do something what you call paper-
work and this other stuff and actually you have less time to have con-
versations. But you know in one sense there’s … less interest or com-
mitment in having a conversation around genuine philosophy, genuine 
pedagogy. That gets replaced by pseudo, or quasi concerns about ped-
agogy […]’(Excerpt 4. Interview with Barbara, 2015) 
At around the same time in early 2015, I interviewed Lisa, a lec-
turer in education who at the time also engaged in doctoral studies in 
the shape of a Doctorate in Education (EdD). After the interview, due 
to the similarity of our research we decided to share research diary 
entries on an ongoing basis. To safeguard anonymity, we decided to 
anonymise the data so that all actors involved could, under no circum-
stances, be identified. The data excerpts which Lisa was willing to 
share with me in the three years of contact will constitute a substantial 
part of the following analysis. For now, one of Lisa’s research diaries 
produced in May 2015 was significant in shaping my research interest 
in the NSS: 
“Recently in one of my staff meetings, the course leader suggested that 
if the course was unable to gain better feedback in internal surveys that 
the course might be shut down.” (Excerpt 5. Lisa’s research diary, May 
2015)  
Moving on, a subsequent interview with Melissa, a thirty-nine-year-old 
senior lecturer working in education, resonated with Barbara’s and 
Lisa’s accounts of practice. Not only did Melissa perceive student 
voice as a negative category, but reported on an outright traumatic 
experience which consisted of a student complaining “on behalf of the 
entire course”:  
61 
“I:  
If you think back at your five-year career – what’s the most negative thing? 
[…] 
LOT’S OF LITTLE THINGS 
Stanza 1 
1a I don’t know really, um, ..  
1b I don’t know, I, I ..  
2 There’s lots of little things that been hard .. 
 
 
RESEARCH IS HARD 
Stanza 2 
3  Research is really, really hard.  
4a  Really hard to kind of take …  
4b  Constantly sort of trying to get involved in research  
5a  Well you know something about that yourself ..  
5b  How pressurised that time becomes, um  
 
 
ACADEMIC DISAPPOINTMENTS (IN RESEARCH) 
Stanza 3 
6a And then, the usual sort of academic,  
6b Um sort of disappointments, rejections and all that.  
7a That’s, um ..  
7b You get used to that.  
 
 
FEELING HELPLESS 
Stanza 4 
8a I think the really low moments are  
8b when you feel under great pressure to resolve a situation  
8c that you can’t really affect [I: hum, hum] 
 
RELATIONSHIPS BEING BAD  
Stanza 5 
9a  So when, um ..  
9b  When relations are really seriously bad in a school  
10a  Or when um ..  
10b A student is really struggling um ..  
 
NEGATIVELY EXPERIENCED ACCOUNTABILITY  
Stanza 6 
11a And I get that there’s always a feeling  
11b There’s a lot of scrutiny of what you do [I: alright]  
 
Stanza 7 
12a  Yeah and, um,  
12b You have to constantly, sort of,  
12c  Be producing sort of outcomes from situations.” 
(Excerpt 6. Interview with Melissa; Spring, 2015)5 
                                                 
5 This excerpt utilises underlined ‘pitch glides’ (Gee, 2005:123) and ‘lines 
and stanzas’ (p.85) because in an earlier attempt to make sense of the data I wanted 
to take a closer look at the characteristics of this language transcript. 
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Referring back to her most negative experience, Melissa then contin-
ued:  
“… the problem with the lowest moment, now I think of it, was in my first 
term when a student complained about me on behalf of the entire group.  
J: Oh really?  
M: Yes 
J: That must have really been quite difficult.  
M: The … term was really difficult because you make so much .. so 
many mistakes because I come from .. really a school situation where 
it’s completely different .. you have no idea how everything works and 
to work through that was really quite difficult and it turned out that [the] 
student had taken it upon himself to speak for the group and they hadn’t 
said .. you know the rest of the group didn’t share that .. it was very, 
very hard. I think you can feel very isolated at university per se, that 
kind of thing, you’re left, there is more thinking time, but there’s also 
more time to kind of become self-critical I think. [yeah, I think] to sort of 
compound your sense of error to make sense of mistakes, systems are 
now nowhere near of, you’re very accountable, but ways of proceeding 
aren’t very clear cut…” (Excerpt 7. Interview with Melissa)  
In short, Melissa’s “lowest moment” was in her “first term when a 
student complained about [her] on behalf of the entire group”. Even 
though “it turned out that the student had taken it upon herself to speak 
for the group” and “the rest of the group didn’t share [the student’s 
opinion, this was still] very, very hard”.  
This interview, at the time, resonated strongly with my own emerg-
ing relationship with student appraisal systems. In my research diary, 
I wrote that student feedback 
“compounds my own feeling of precariousness as an associate lecturer 
where I feel particularly vulnerable towards negative student feedback. 
I reasoned that if students decided to give me negative feedback, this 
would increase the probability that my temporary contract as an asso-
ciate lecturer would not be renewed … That is, rather than my research 
serving as an emancipatory tool, I felt that my emerging awareness of 
these student appraisal systems exacerbated the constraints of my 
practice.” (Excerpt 8. My research diary) 
Whilst engaging in the iterative cycle of data collection, another distinct 
theme emerged: that of “problematic student behaviour”. This issue of 
student behaviour became particularly prominent when observing An-
drea and Max. Max was a senior lecturer at Reddish University and 
worked on education studies courses both at undergraduate and post-
graduate level which were not part of teacher education courses. I also 
conducted interviews after my observations, using a strategy which 
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was guided by the “free association narrative interview method” de-
scribed above (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). Andrea also worked at 
Reddish University within the field of secondary education as well as 
school-independent courses both at undergraduate and postgraduate 
level. As with Max, I only observed taught sessions which were school 
independent but this time only at undergraduate level.  
Within my observations of Andrea’s and Max’s seminars, I in-
creasingly perceived the behaviour of students as problematic. For ex-
ample, students frequently failed to show up for tutorials; chatted 
loudly in seminars; and left seminars halfway through sessions without 
informing lecturers of the reasons for their early departure. At the time, 
I asked whether there could be a  
“relationship between student voice and the increasingly problematic 
behaviour of students? That is, does the relative power which is 
bestowed upon students through student feedback systems lead to an 
stronger sense of students’ entitlement.” (Excerpt 9. Earlier Discarded 
version of Thesis)  
This also resonates with Furedi’s (2011:3) claim that SETs produce a 
situation in which ‘the university had better listen to the student’ be-
cause ‘the customer is always right’. This issue of “problematic student 
behaviour” was also captured in an informal conversation with Andrea:   
“I spoke to Andrea today. Two of her colleagues were reprimanded by 
student feedback because students found the texts which they had to 
engage with too hard which they then reported in the feedback sys-
tems.” (Excerpt 10. My research diary)  
I began to wonder whether there was a relationship between student 
feedback systems and problematic student behaviour. These interac-
tions between feedback systems and student behaviour were also 
captured in my research diary:  
“This confrontation with one of my students is still going through my 
mind. I remember he was talking loudly to his neighbour, showing her 
pictures on his mobile and attempting to tease her. […] After a few un-
successful attempts to pause and wait for the student to stop talking, I 
raised my voice said, “Either be QUIET or leave this seminar. This is 
really distracting.” I remember that I felt genuinely angry with the stu-
dent and could feel that my heart was beating and that I perceived my 
body language as quite authoritarian, even macho like. The student 
apologised and was, indeed, a little quieter from [then] on. After the 
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session I started worrying, however, whether he might now give me 
negative student feedback in the future and that, as a result, my con-
tract as an associate lecturer would not be renewed.” (Excerpt 11. My 
research diary, 2015) 
This excerpt shows that my “telling-off” of problematic student behav-
iour made me worry that the student might now give me negative stu-
dent feedback in the future which (again as in Excerpt 8.), I was afraid, 
would impact on my then temporary employment situation.  
Moving on, in late 2015, I was introduced to Emily whose sessions 
I observed twice and whom I interviewed once. In this interview, Emily 
acknowledged that she was still “getting to grips with the amount of 
creativity and freedom” she had in “determining the content of the 
course” while acknowledging that her work was largely determined by 
certain professional bodies such as the NCTL, UCET and Ofsted, as 
well as student voice. Emily was given management responsibilities 
despite having made the conscious decision to apply for jobs without 
these. When asked to identify the hardest aspect of her work, Emily 
mentioned:  
“I didn’t particularly anticipate ... at all … having any … responsibility in 
addition to having students in [my]… care and be responsible for their 
outcomes on the course.” (Excerpt 12. Interview with Emily) 
She admitted that she consciously decided, “not to be a manager any 
more” and that she didn’t “want responsibility … for managing things”. 
This was a conscious move “to shed management and leadership re-
sponsibilities” and a “very conscious, very self-aware decision”. It was 
“a big surprise for” her when she was then given leadership responsi-
bilities, and not necessarily an unwelcome or “unpleasant one at all”. 
In fact, she “really enjoy[ed] it”. Subsequently, Emily suggested, “It’s 
all about the student voice.”  
A further interview with Stacey captured some of the issues which 
I will return to in Chapter 8 when discussing the effects of ‘precarity’ 
(Lopes and Dewan, 2014:28). That is, in this interview, Stacey high-
lighted how she was “effectively on a zero-hours contract” at Reddish 
University. That is, each summer she would not be paid and then be 
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reemployed (if there was demand) in the following autumn term. 
Stacey found this continuous uncertainty to be “quite draining”. It also 
made her “feel quite underappreciated” since she could just be “dis-
carded when they [the university] don’t need any more staff”. As I 
shared a similar situation at my institution on my then associate lec-
turer contract, Stacey’s account made me empathise with her.  
As I became increasingly interested in the question of how student 
feedback affected lecturer identity, my own experiential data also ac-
cumulated in my research diary. Moreover, Lisa’s research diary al-
lowed me to explore this theme further. It also is significant that along-
side this process I engaged in extensive reading of various philosoph-
ical, sociological and methodological texts. For example, in 2014, I en-
gaged with Discourse Analysis (Gee, 2005); Hermeneutics (Gallagher, 
1992); Critical Theory (Bronner, 2011), in particular Habermas 
(1991[1962]); and Utopia (Adorno and Bloch, 1964) - whereas from 
2015 onwards I started to read Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977) 
and Meeting the Universe Halfway (Barad, 2007) as well as engaging 
with a range of academic journal articles. I deem this significant be-
cause I argue that these texts either consciously or unconsciously in-
fluenced my research interest in the NSS. For example, Foucault’s 
work made me wonder whether those aspects of practice which lec-
turers experienced as impositions may function as disciplinary tech-
nologies. Engaging with Critical Theory made me more aware of its 
intellectual tensions with poststructuralist theories and, up to this date, 
makes me wonder where I situate my own thinking.  In the summer of 
2018, I then decided to collect more data from further four participants 
to complement mine and Lisa’s impressions in our research diaries. 
Karl (Reddish University); Matt (Reddish University); Michael 
(Southhawk University6); and Dimitra (King’s University7). This now 
                                                 
6 Southhawk University is a “Post 92” university. For more information on clusters of 
universities in the UK, see  
7 King’s University is a Russel Group university.  
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closes this rough outline of how data and “data resonances” could be 
reconstructed.  
3.3 Reflexivity and Ethics 
Reflexivity. The type of qualitative research underpinning this thesis 
demands an acknowledgement of what is commonly referred to as “re-
flexivity”, especially since I was researching my own professional en-
vironment. This section will first present various takes on reflexivity to 
then elaborate on two versions which have influenced my own thinking 
and research. As a starting point, Nightingale and Crowby’s sugges-
tion is considered:   
‘Reflexivity requires an awareness of the researcher’s contribution to 
the construction of meanings throughout the research process, and an 
acknowledgement of the impossibility of remaining ‘outside of’ one’s 
subject matter while conducting research.’ (Nightingale and Cromby, 
1999:228) 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) similarly suggest that research-
ers cannot take themselves out of the research process because they 
are always already part of the social world that they are studying. Their 
definitions have an even stronger focus on the importance of the inter-
rogation of self:  
‘Reflexivity is the near-impossible adventure of making aspects of the 
self strange: attempting to stand back from belief and value systems 
and observe habitual ways of thinking and relating to others, 
structures of understanding ourselves, our relationship to the world, 
and the way we are experienced and perceived by others and their 
assumptions about the way that the world impinges upon them.’ 
(Bolton, 2014:8) 
 
‘Reflexivity does … involve finding out about ourselves but primarily in 
the sense of our immersion in the historical and the social …   .’ (Scott 
and Usher, 1996:39) 
 
Both quotations acknowledge the iterative nature between the ef-
fects of the self on the outside world and the effects of the world on 
the researcher. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, cited in Cohen et al., 
2007:310) similarly argue for the fundamental importance of reflexivity 
since (action) researchers are ‘part of the social world that they are 
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studying’. In summary, reflexivity expects (i) a direct acknowledgement 
of how the researcher influences the research process and (ii) a 
questioning of the researcher’s assumptions.  
Hence, it could be suggested that it is impossible for me to “objec-
tively” research from the outside as I am always already actively impli-
cated in the research process and construction of my research find-
ings. For instance, my initial research interest in how “university lec-
turers experience their own practice” influenced my perception of in-
terviews, observations of practice and my own reflective comments. 
More specifically, since I was interested in those aspects of practice 
which lecturers experienced negatively, the answers given by partici-
pants somehow reinforced my own convictions that, in fact, there are 
certain issues with lecturers’ professional lives. Similarly, (as sug-
gested above) when interviewing Barbara, student voice became sig-
nificant for me because it somehow resonated with my own positive or 
negative experiences with student feedback. These, in return, led to 
identifications with my participants’ stories.  
 
Ethics. Beyond what could be described as “standard practice” in re-
search (in that all data has been anonymised and consent has been 
given by all participants for their data to be used), in this section, I 
would like to build on my ethical considerations so far. For example, in 
section 3.2, I discussed the necessity of anonymity which becomes 
particularly important in investigative journalism. My research situa-
tion, however, has presented itself as more complicated than this and 
has changed in the process of writing. I, for example, started as a full-
time PhD student and a part-time “Associate Lecturer” researching into 
my practice as well as researching the situation of university lecturers 
at Reddish University. In 2016, this changed towards a more profound 
insider experience because this was when I started my role as a “Sen-
ior Lecturer”. Therefore, my situation could be fittingly described as a 
hybrid of being an insider (at my institution) and an outsider (at Red-
dish University). Ethical problematics connected to this kind of re-
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search have been considered by Floyd and Arthur (2012) who distin-
guish between two types of ethical dimensions: an official dimension 
(the ethical procedures which are prescribed by the university) and a 
hidden dimension (a more personal and more complex variant of eth-
ics).  
Importantly, I now find myself in a position in which I am unable to 
communicate all ethical decisions that I made with complete honesty. 
The reason for this is that my very communication of these decisions 
may go to the detriment of participant anonymity, including my own. In 
other words, certain anonymisation techniques have been employed 
within this thesis which cannot be explicitly named, as they would put 
the anonymity of participants in danger. Connected to this are signifi-
cant ethical issues which are to do with my own insights as a re-
searcher into my practice, including its practice environment. In short, 
research diary entries about certain team meetings, conversations 
with colleagues, internal policy texts crystallised as highly relevant for 
the research of this thesis; nevertheless, I was often unable to include 
these, as it would have been ethically problematic to do so. For exam-
ple, there were moments when participant consent could not be 
obtained or when the inclusion of certain material (such as notes from 
team meetings) would have put me, as the practitioner researcher, into 
a vulnerable position because this inclusion would have violated my 
work contract.  
Therefore, the following heuristic was followed. The overriding 
principle comprised the safeguarding of the anonymity of my partici-
pants. Sometimes this necessitated to change certain details within 
narratives, such as interviews, research diaries or observations. The 
second ethical principle was to change only details as much as nec-
essary to maintain maximum validity. Examples, at this stage, cannot 
be given since these would contradict and make obsolete my attempts 
at safeguarding the anonymity of participants in the first place. In short, 
whenever I had to choose between “confidentiality” and “validity”, I 
chose confidentiality.  
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The following chapter will now start the analytical process by analysing 
student feedback systems through Foucault’s notions of “disciplinary 
techniques” as well as “liberal and neo-liberal governmentality”.  
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Chapter 4 The NSS as a Disciplinary and Neo-liberal Hy-
brid 
(Plagiarism note: Parts of this chapter have been submitted to the Brit-
ish Educational Research Journal)  
This chapter theorises the NSS through the notion of “governmental-
ity”, a neologism which Foucault first introduced in the context of his 
lecture series “security, territory, population” in 1978 (Foucault, 2009). 
Importantly, Foucault’s understanding of “governmentality” ‘shifted 
from a precise, historically determinate sense’ in the beginning of his 
lecture series ‘to a more general and abstract meaning’ towards the 
end (Foucault, 2009:387-388). Whilst the more ‘precise, historically 
determinate’ version of governmentality will be explored in section 4.2, 
its latter (more abstract) version can best be understood in its plural 
form, i.e. as governmentalities or ‘technologies of government’ 
(Lemke, 2002:53). Thus, Foucault’s notions of the Christian pastorate 
(Foucault, 2009), ‘sovereign power’ (Foucault, 1977:48), ‘disciplinary 
power’ (Foucault, 1977:187), ‘liberalism’ (Foucault, 2009:48) and ‘neo-
liberalism’ (Foucault, 2008:117) can all be understood as different gov-
ernmentalities, i.e. ‘different technologies of government’ (Lemke, 
2002:53). 
Building on this understanding of governmentality, this chapter 
theorises the NSS in the context of two governmentalities: (i) the “dis-
ciplines” (Foucault, 1977) and (ii) “(neo)liberal governmentality” 
(Foucault, 2008). Therefore, this chapter is structured as follows. First, 
Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power is introduced and then utilised 
as an analytical framework to make sense of the NSS. Next, Foucault’s 
concept of neoliberal governmentality is discussed and similarly ap-
plied. Last, the NSS will be discussed as a hybrid governmental tech-
nology which utilises both disciplinary and neo-liberal governmentali-
ties.    
Before beginning my analysis, the question may arise, “Why did I 
decide to use Foucault?” This question becomes even more pressing 
when considering that in the last four to five decades, Foucault has 
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been heavily utilised, both generally8 (e.g. Sztulman, 1971; Guédon, 
1977; Rose, 1993; Lemke, 2001; Holmes and Gastaldo, 2002; 
Reckwitz, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2005; Rose et al., 2006; Teo, 2018) 
and specifically in the field of education (e.g. Jones and Williamson, 
1979; Walkerdine, 1984; Ball, 1990;  Hunter, 1996; Fejes, 2011; 
Skourdoumbis and Gale, 2013; Roberts-Holmes and Bradbury, 2016; 
Mourad, 2018). In the education field itself, Foucauldian analyses are 
diverse, spanning fields such as education policy research (Olssen 
and Codd, 2004); inclusion (Graham and Slee, 2008); schooling 
(Youdell, 2010) (including its educational inequalities (Youdell, 2006) 
or gendering processes (Francis, 2006)); learning (Simons and 
Masschelein, 2008b); enterprise education (Peters, 2001); lifelong 
learning (Nicoll and Fejes, 2008) and assessment (Woolridge, 1995). 
In the context of higher education – as relevant for this thesis - works 
have explored areas such as disability (Gabel and Miskovic, 2014); 
government department discourses (Suspitsyna, 2012); international-
isation in UK universities (Guion Akdağ and Swanson, 2017), the “en-
trepreneurialisation” (Varman et al., 2011) and “responsibilisation” 
(Morrison, 2017) of student populations; the “Research Assessment 
Exercise” (later “Research Excellence Framework”) (Broadhead and 
Howard, 1998); the governing of academic subjects (Morrissey, 2013); 
employability (Frauley, 2012); student engagement (Wintrup, 2017) 
new public management (Brunskell-Evans, 2011); student exams 
(Raaper, 2016), including associated “exam-markets” (Jankowski and 
Provezis, 2014); and what it means to be an ethical researcher 
(Kanchan, 2018) or a “free inquirer” (Mourad, 2018). However, no re-
search has hitherto utilised Foucault to enquire into the National Stu-
dent Survey.  
                                                 
8 A title-abstract-key Scopus search on 12 February 2018 yielded 11,460 
results for the keyword “Foucault”. 
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4.1 The NSS as Disciplinary Governmentality 
‘Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hos-
pitals, which all resemble prisons?’ (Foucault, 1977:228) 
To begin with, the NSS could be understood as what will be 
referred to as a disciplinary “governmentality”, i.e. a disciplinary “tech-
nology of government”. It is important to note that Foucault only started 
to present discipline as a specific type of governmentality in his 1978 
lecture series “Security, Territory, Population” (Foucault, 2009) whilst 
originally – i.e. in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977) – he simply 
used the term “discipline”. This section introduces Foucault’s original 
understanding of discipline (or “disciplinary power”) as introduced in 
his Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977).  
4.1.1 Foucault’s Disciplines  
According to Foucault (1977) disciplinary power progressively re-
placed sovereign power in the 18th and 19th century. Sovereign power 
could typically be found in the absolutist states of the 17th century and 
was, for example, captured in gruesome public executions where sov-
ereigns sought to express their total authority over their subjects. Dis-
cipline and Punish, for instance, opens with the description of a 
torturous public execution for the attempted regicide of a French king 
in which the accused was publically tortured and killed in the most hor-
rific way possible. Foucault then moves on to describe disciplinary 
power by outlining the regimented daily routine of prisoners less than 
a century later. What effected this sudden shift of dominant ways of 
the punishment of transgressions?  
Importantly, according to Foucault, the reason for this shift was 
not that rulers suddenly started to see torture as “cruel” and “inhu-
mane” (even though this often was the official justification). Rather, 
sovereign power simply failed to produce the desired effect of intimi-
dating the public, and, instead, frequently produced riots and official 
challenges to monarchic power. Thus, the emerging bourgeoisie of the 
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18th and 19th century denounced sovereign power as cruel (and, inter-
estingly, as an outmoded concept characteristic of the undesirable 
concept of monarchy) and promulgated alternative modes of punish-
ment. Torture, hence, was replaced by public punishments from the 
middle of the 18th century onwards. In these types of punishments, 
each crime was allocated a more “measured” equivalent punishment 
whilst, again, the main intent was to show to the public that certain 
punishments were to be expected for specific crimes. Yet, these types 
of public punishments, again, produced unintended consequences, 
such as the public sympathising with the punished person. Thus, pub-
lic punishments were then finally replaced by disciplinary institutions, 
such as hospitals, army barracks, schools, and prisons in which a new 
type of power was prevalent: “disciplinary power” or simply “discipline”.  
Importantly, according to Foucault (1977), disciplinary power is 
characterised by three disciplinary instruments called the disciplines 
which comprise (i) hierarchical observation, (ii) normalising judgement 
and (iii) examinations (ibid.). Firstly, the notion of ‘hierarchical obser-
vation’ describes the effect that observation has on humans (p. 170; 
emphasis added): if humans think that they might be watched, they 
are more likely to be compliant. The principle of ‘eyes that must see 
without being seen’ (p. 171) is captured in Foucault’s description of 
Jeremy Bentham’s prison design of the Panopticon. In the Panopticon, 
a watchtower is situated in the centre of a circular prison building, a 
position from which prison guards have a clear view of the activities of 
the inmates. Crucially, ‘venetian blinds’ cover the windows of the 
watchtower and prevent the inmates from being able to see the activ-
ities of the prison guards (p. 201). Therefore, the prisoners can never 
be sure whether they are currently being watched, and, simply must 
assume that they are being permanently observed. This observational 
awareness is what Foucault calls panopticism, a gaze which puts the 
prisoners under perceived continuous surveillance and makes them 
comply with the behavioural expectations of the prison. As an effect, 
the prisoners are (1977:138) turned into ‘docile bodies’ that possess a 
certain ‘docility-utility’ (p. 138), i.e. human bodies that are both useful 
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(in that they can complete certain activities that are deemed worth-
while) and docile (in that they follow orders and do not step out of line). 
Importantly, the principle of hierarchical observation within the 
Panopticon can be extended in a pyramidal fashion, i.e. by ‘supervis-
ing its own mechanisms’ (p. 204). For example, in the  
‘central tower, the director may spy on all the employees that he has 
under his orders: … he will be able to judge them continuously, alter 
their behaviour, impose upon them the methods he thinks best; and it 
will even be possible to observe the director himself. An inspector ar-
riving unexpectedly at the centre of the Panopticon will be able to 
judge at a glance, without anything being concealed from him, how 
the entire establishment is functioning.’ (Foucault, 1977:204) 
Put differently, the prisoners are under hierarchical observation 
from the prison guards, whilst the prison guards, themselves, are un-
der similar observation from the prison director. Importantly, this py-
ramidal panoptical principle can be extended further towards the work-
ings of most institutions, with senior personnel observing “lower rank-
ing” colleagues.  
Moving on, normalising judgement describes the power of normal-
isation on the subject: people are judged ‘by where their actions place 
them on a ranked scale that compares them to everyone else’ (Gutting, 
2006:84). Foucault uses the example of the 18th century École Militaire 
to exemplify the operation of normalising judgement. This military 
school was separated into classes known as ‘the very good’, ‘the 
good’, the ‘médiocres’, ‘the “bad”’, and ‘the “shameful” class’ (p. 181), 
each being subject to certain kinds of punishments. It was through be-
ing able to compare these classes to and differentiate them from one 
another; through having the capacity to hierarchically order them (with 
a homogenising effect); and through excluding certain classes by mak-
ing them into the abnormal - as in the example of ‘the “shameful” class 
of the École Militaire’ (p. 183) – that normalising judgement unleashed 
its disciplinary effects. Importantly, only ‘merit and behaviour’ (p. 182) 
were to influence allocation to these classes. This created fluidity and 
allowed for discipline to emerge through punishment and rewards:  
75 
‘discipline rewards simply by the play of awards, thus making it possi-
ble to attain higher ranks and places; it punishes by reversing this pro-
cess.’ (p. 181). 
Lastly, Foucault suggests that the “examination” combines both 
hierarchical observation and normalising judgement. Examination is ‘a 
normalizing gaze’ (Foucault, 1977) and ‘it engages [individuals] in a 
whole mass of documents that capture and fix them’ (p. 189), such as 
the exact documentation of who died in the army, the levels of children 
at school, or, in our case, the extensive documentation of every stu-
dent and lecturer at Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). Characteris-
tic of the examination is (i) the principle of visibility: whilst sovereign 
power exercised its power through visibility of the monarch and relative 
invisibility of his or her subjects, disciplinary power ‘is exercised 
through its invisibility’ whilst demanding from its subjects ‘compulsory 
visibility’ (p. 187). Moreover, the examination (ii) individualises those it 
disciplines by documenting specific characteristics of each individual 
subject. For example, in ‘teaching establishments’ it was necessary to 
‘define the aptitude of each individual, situate his level and his abilities’ 
(p.189). This documentation was then used to turn an individual into 
(iii) a case that  
‘may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his 
very individuality and it is also the individual who has to be trained or 
corrected, classified, normalized, excluded.’ (p. 191)   
Docile bodies (i.e. compliant individualities) are now created by 
combining the disciplines outlined above with a meticulous 
specification of the time and the space in which certain bodily move-
ments should be undertaken. This necessitates ‘an uninterrupted, con-
stant [supervision of] the processes of the activity rather than its result’ 
(p.137). More specifically, Foucault (1977:167) suggests that docile 
bodies have (i) ‘cellular’, (ii) ‘organic’, (iii) ‘genetic’ and (iv) ‘combina-
tory’ characteristics. I will now delineate these characteristics more 
thoroughly.    
Firstly, the cellular characteristic of a disciplined individual (i.e. a 
docile body) is achieved by ‘distributing individuals in space’ (p. 141). 
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Importantly, these spaces are both real (i.e. they have real manifesta-
tions) and ideal (e.g. they specify how things should work, be done). 
Cellular characteristics operate by enclosing individuals in certain 
places (such as army barracks, schools, or factories); and by allocat-
ing each individual a specific partitioned space which is constantly 
supervised and analysed. Importantly, these spaces also need to be 
functional spaces which, for example, enable effective communication; 
shield and document things (e.g. medicines) and people (e.g. sick pa-
tients); or ensure the ‘division of the production process’ and ‘the frag-
mentation of labour power’ (p. 143). Moreover, rankings define the po-
sition of each individual in relation to others. Therefore, in disciplinary 
institutions, “tables” became increasingly important (e.g. timetables, 
league tables). This, for the first time, made it possible to rank the in-
dividual within a multiplicity of other individualised human beings. 
Secondly, the organic characteristic of docile bodies is achieved 
by specifying and supervising the activity of individuals. For example, 
timetables specify when certain activities should take place and which 
rules should be followed (e.g. no telling of jokes in the factory). In 
addition, gross bodily movements, the coordination of body and ges-
tures and the way objects ought to be manipulated must be specified. 
For example, a marching soldier is to move his body in a certain way, 
at a certain time and in a certain rhythm and a pupil who is learning to 
write is to orient his or her body to the arm in a specific way. Moreover, 
docile bodies must continuously consider how to optimise the use of 
time. Foucault argues that the more efficient this use of time becomes, 
the more subjected the body becomes.  
Thirdly, the genetic characteristic of docile bodies is achieved by 
implementing exercise regimes with the aim of training individuals to 
become increasingly docile and useful. In other words, there was the 
need to map out the “genesis” of one’s career to achieve a certain 
future target. For example, in the military, a soldier needed continuous 
exercise to then prove that he was fit and skilled enough to proceed to 
a higher rank. At school, children must pass certain tests to be allowed 
to move on to the next class. Importantly,  
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‘exercise is that technique by which one imposes on the body tasks 
that are both repetitive and different, but always graduated.’ (p. 161) 
Fourthly, docile bodies have a combinatory characteristic which is 
achieved by specifying how individuals are supposed to work together 
(Foucault, 1977). For example, troops with rifles needed to operate 
like a machine with each segment functioning in a specific way relative 
to other segments. Each soldier, for instance, needed to know what it 
felt like for his fellow soldiers to be in a certain battle position. Foucault 
(quoting Marx) suggests that in factories the workers’ bodies needed 
to be similarly “combined” ‘in order to obtain an efficient machine’ (p. 
164). For example, the chronological time of one worker needed to be 
adjusted to the chronological time of all the other workers. Likewise, 
schools  
‘became a machine for learning, in which each pupil, each level and 
each moment, if correctly combined, were permanently utilized in the 
general process of teaching’ (p. 165).  
This also included a specific command structure with certain bells 
or commands triggering a whole set of reactions.  
4.1.2 The NSS as Disciplinary Technology 
On this theoretical basis, it is now possible to explore the distinct ways 
in which the National Student Survey (NSS) functions as a disciplinary 
technology. Before beginning, it is important to reiterate that the NSS 
has spawned a range of further intra-institutional student feedback 
systems which often allow for a more frequent assessment of student 
satisfaction at the level of individual component parts of courses, such 
as modules. (Figure 1 on page 32 sought to visualise this). Canning 
(2017b) suggests that these internal systems have been implemented 
to ascertain feedback before the NSS is conducted so as to anticipate 
and act upon negative student feedback. For example, Lisa’s univer-
sity implemented variations of these Internal Surveys which were 
closely modelled on the NSS. In these Internal Surveys, courses could 
be assessed at two points in the year in each cohort of students. In 
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addition, Lisa’s university also prescribed regular meetings with stu-
dent representatives to ascertain detailed personalised student feed-
back. In other words, in these “Student Representative Meetings” 
(SRMs) staff could assess student feedback more frequently and at an 
even smaller level of scale than in Internal Surveys in that SRMs could 
assess individual lecturers. On the other hand, at Dimitra’s current uni-
versity (a Russell Group university), there were no SRMs, but only in-
dividual feedback systems which examined individual lecturers.   
To build a more sophisticated understanding of how student feed-
back operates at Reddish University, it is firstly necessary to consider 
student feedback systems at various scales in isolation.  
 
Student Representative Meetings. Lisa’s experiences with Student 
Representative Meetings (SRMs) shall be considered first:  
“I looked at the minutes from the previous [SRM] and realised that my 
feedback wasn’t as good as that of most other colleagues. I mean, I 
wasn’t given a grade, but by reading the meetings’ [notes] I could simply 
tell that my feedback didn’t sound as good as that of others. One other 
colleague received even worse feedback. What I found slightly strange 
was that these minutes seem to always be uploaded to [the virtual learn-
ing environment] platform in the shape of a word document. In this doc-
ument, you can see the overall satisfaction of each year group as 
judged by the student representatives on a scale from one to ten. In 
addition, this document also outlined for each individual group which 
parts of the course the students were really happy with and which parts 
they were not. Perhaps, I’m a little bit over-sensitive, but it stresses me 
out that these student rep meetings are also minuted in a document 
which is then freely available for download by the year groups’ students, 
by fellow lecturers who teach on this module and by the course leaders. 
In other words, any student, or even worse my boss, could then look at 
the document and find out: oh look at Lisa’s group. They really don’t like 
her.” (Excerpt 13. Lisa’s research diary)  
Firstly, SRMs utilise Foucault’s (1977:183) “normalising judgement” 
which, as mentioned above, ‘compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, 
homogenizes, [and] excludes’. That is, Lisa could compare her sup-
posed teaching quality to (and differentiate it from) the other lecturers 
who also taught on her module (who largely received better feedback). 
Moreover, Lisa could hierarchise ‘the level’ of individual lecturers’ stu-
dent feedback whilst situating her own feedback in the second last 
place (p. 183). Furthermore, SRMs had a homogenizing effect in that 
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they gave each lecturer an implicit level which dictated the ‘conformity’ 
(p. 183) to achieve positive student feedback. Fifthly, SRMs indirectly 
excluded Lisa from the rest, simply because her negative feedback 
could be seen by everyone, including her senior colleague who might 
decide to gaze at the document to conclude, “Look at Lisa’s group. 
They really don’t like her”.  
The “panoptic qualities” of SRMs (or Student Evaluations of 
Teaching more generally) transpire when considering that it is not so 
much about whether students actually observe lecturers. Rather, pan-
opticism is created by the continual indeterminacy whether these ob-
servations will somehow find their expression in SRM feedback (or In-
ternal Surveys and the NSS for that matter). Hence, it could be 
postulated that SRMs operate panoptically, but in a temporally shifted 
fashion: it is not a matter of whether lecturers are being observed, but 
whether students remember observing their lecturers when giving their 
feedback. Due to this indeterminacy, lecturers must assume that all of 
their teaching may be remembered by students, and, as a result, lec-
turers become compliant with whatever they believe students want. In 
addition, SRM feedback is panoptic because of the way it is docu-
mented and subsequently exposed to a later panoptical gaze. For ex-
ample, Lisa’s research diary extract suggests that the minutes of 
SRMs are generally uploaded to a “virtual learning platform” and are, 
thus, there for students, colleagues and managers to “gaze at”. That 
is, like the prisoners in the Panopticon who never know whether they 
are being observed at any specific time, lecturers never know if stu-
dents, colleagues or senior colleagues will consult the documentation 
at a later point in time. This temporal dimension shifts the panoptical 
gaze from being one of simultaneity (in the case of the prisoners) to-
wards being “stretched out” to a panoptical time-window in which there 
is always a theoretical chance that others might exercise their gaze.  
 
Internal Surveys. Moving on, Internal Surveys exhibit partly similar, 
partly distinct disciplinary characteristics to SRMs. Lisa explains in her 
research diary that  
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“In the internal survey, students also judge the modules. This puts quite 
a lot of pressure on module leaders who are, in a way, made responsi-
ble if the score for the module dips below 80%. This happened the other 
day. It all started when the module leader told us in a meeting that the 
module dropped below 80%. He seemed agitated and identified a few 
lecturers who he [the module leader] thought would be responsible for 
this negative student feedback. Apparently, students mentioned individ-
ual lecturers in their internal surveys – even though they are directed 
not to. The module leader also said that in student rep meetings, stu-
dents complained about the same lecturers. [The module leader] said 
that, as a result of the feedback, the degree leader gave them [the un-
derperforming lecturers] a stern talking to. Another outcome of this 
meeting was that they arranged weekly tutorials with the module leader 
which they [i.e. the underperforming lecturers] had to attend.” (Excerpt 
14. Lisa’s research diary) 
The Internal Surveys at Lisa’s institution exhibit similar disciplinary 
characteristics to the SRMs discussed previously. For example, “nor-
malising judgement” operated in the sense that the Internal Surveys 
captured student feedback at the level of individual modules which 
then placed them ‘on a ranked scale that compare[d] them to’ the other 
modules (Gutting, 2006:84). Interestingly, when this module rating 
dropped below 80%, the module leader was situated ‘in a network of 
writing’ (Foucault, 1977:189) in that he had to produce an action plan 
which outlined how he planned to attain positive student feedback in 
the future. More specifically, Internal Surveys differentiated individual 
modules ‘from one another’ (p. 182) by establishing ‘a minimal thresh-
old’ (80%) which had to be attained. When the specific module in Lisa’s 
research diary failed to attain this threshold, it was branded ‘abnormal’ 
(p. 183), in analogy to Foucault’s description of ‘the “shameful” class’ 
in 18th-century military schools (p. 182). This “shameful module”, inter-
estingly, ‘only exist[ed] to disappear’ (p. 182): an action plan had to be 
designed to outline how the “shortcomings” of the module will be 
addressed in the future. In other words, the module leader became 
disciplined through what Foucauldian scholar Ball (1990:4) refers to as 
‘dividing practices’.  
Importantly, Lisa’s description of Internal Surveys also exhibits the 
characteristics of Foucault’s (1977) pyramidal functioning of hierar-
chical observation. As discussed above, this pyramidal structure works 
in that prison guards could themselves become subject to observation 
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by the ‘prison director’ (p. 204). Likewise, Lisa suggested that module 
leaders are under pressure to attain positive feedback for their mod-
ules in the Internal Surveys. When modules at her institution failed to 
achieve the threshold of 80 per cent student satisfaction, the module 
leader had to produce an action plan. This action plan included ad-
dressing those lecturers who the module leader judged to be respon-
sible for the apparent reduction in student satisfaction. That is, whilst 
the prison director observes the ‘employees that he has under his or-
ders’ (p. 204), the university module leader uses student feedback to 
observe the performance of individual lecturers. In comparison to the 
hierarchy in the Panopticon prison design, however, it could be postu-
lated that lecturers are positioned at the bottom on the hierarchical 
structure of this process whilst students fulfil the panoptical gaze on 
behalf of university management. When satisfaction then fell below 
80% in Lisa’s example, the module leader was under pressure from 
his course leader to identify those individuals purportedly responsible 
for the student feedback by inspecting comments within Internal Sur-
veys and SRMs. The “underperforming” lecturers were individualised 
– i.e. the module leader tried to discern these lecturers in the feedback 
documentation - and they were made into cases that ‘may be de-
scribed, judged, measured, compared with others’ (Foucault, 
1977:191). Interestingly, these “underperforming lecturers” also had to 
be ‘trained or corrected, classified, normalised, excluded, etc.’ in that 
a timetable was drawn up which outlined “weekly tutorials with the 
module leader” (ibid.). This timetable specified the specific times to 
discuss how precisely those lecturers ought to move their bodies in 
their seminars (e.g. how to speak, which exercises to engage the stu-
dents in) to attain better feedback in the future.  
The pyramidal functioning of power within Internal Surveys did 
not, however, stop at the level of module leaders. Instead, module 
leaders were under pressure from course leaders who, yet again, ap-
peared to be under scrutiny from the university’s senior leadership 
team to attain a favourable rating: 
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“Recently in one of my staff meetings, the course leader suggested that 
if the course was unable to gain better feedback in internal surveys that 
the course might be shut down.” (Reprint of Excerpt 5. Lisa’s research 
diary)  
 
The National Student Survey, Popular Rankings and the TEF. Having 
focussed on SRMs and Internal Surveys, we will now move on to the-
orise the workings of the National Student Survey (NSS) through Fou-
cault’s disciplines. Firstly, the NSS utilises (1977:184) ‘normalising 
judgement’: current final year students judge their courses on a Likert 
scale from one to five. This, in return, influences the standing of each 
university in (i) national rankings as well as (ii) whether universities are 
awarded gold, silver or bronze ratings in the Teaching Excellence 
Framework (TEF). That is, (i) national rankings compare and differen-
tiate university courses and universities; and they measure ‘in quanti-
tative terms and hierarchize […]’ (Foucault, 1977:183) the student sat-
isfaction of universities. This hierarchy homogenises universities in 
that they increasingly make student feedback one of their priorities 
(Brown and Carasso, 2013). Furthermore, national rankings exclude 
those universities which are situated towards the bottom of the rank-
ings (for example, by students not selecting these universities to study 
at).  
Similarly, (ii) the TEF awards universities with bronze, silver or 
gold ratings whilst only those universities with a favourable rating are 
allowed to raise their tuition fees in line with inflation.  The OfS (2018: 
online; emphasis added) classifies TEF ratings as follows: Universities 
are awarded ‘gold for delivering consistently outstanding teaching, 
learning and outcomes for its students’ which is the ‘highest quality 
found in the UK’. Silver is awarded to universities ‘for delivering high 
quality teaching, learning and outcomes’ which ‘consistently exceeds 
[sic] rigorous national quality requirements for UK higher education’ 
(ibid.). Bronze ratings are awarded for ‘delivering teaching, learning 
and outcomes for its students that meet rigorous national quality re-
quirements for UK higher education’ (ibid.). Lastly, ‘provisional awards 
are given to participating providers that meet national quality 
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requirements, but do not yet have sufficient data to be fully assessed’ 
(ibid.). Again, the TEF, firstly, compares the “action” (i.e. the teaching) 
of individual universities  
‘to a whole [i.e. all universities] that is at once a field of comparison, a 
space of differentiation and the principle of a rule to be followed.’ 
(Foucault, 1977:182) 
Secondly, the TEF differentiates individual universities ‘from one 
another in terms of the overall rule’ (p. 183) “to attain positive feed-
back” (Lisa). That is, this rule ‘function[s] as a minimal threshold’ 
(which is the case in the bronze rating) ‘as an average to be respected’ 
(in the case of the silver rating) ‘or as an optimum towards which one 
must move’ (i.e. the gold rating) (p. 183). Thirdly, the TEF hierarchises 
the ‘level’ of individual universities and, fourthly, ‘introduces, through 
this ‘value-giving’ measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be 
achieved’ (e.g. universities must achieve the conformity of satisfied 
and employable students) (p. 183). Fifthly, it excludes those universi-
ties who only attained a Bronze rating (or, even worse, failed to attain 
any rating).  
Returning to what had been mentioned as the ‘shameful class’ 
which only ‘exists to disappear’ (Foucault, 1977:182), the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (2016) for instance write that  
‘There is no compelling reason for incumbents to be protected from 
high quality competition. We want a globally competitive market that 
supports diversity, where anyone who demonstrates they have the po-
tential to offer excellent teaching and clears our high quality bar can 
compete on a level playing field. If we place too much emphasis on 
whether a provider has a long established track record, this by defini-
tion will favour incumbents, and risks shutting out high quality and 
credible new institutions.’ (p. 8)  
That is, the constant threat of potentially becoming one of the 
lower ranking institutions could be understood to lie at the heart of the 
operation of the TEF. 
Turning to Foucault’s (1977) hierarchical observation and the pan-
optical gaze, the NSS shares similarities with Internal Surveys and 
SRMs. For instance, there is an increased temporal dimension of stu-
dents’ panoptical gazes since students observe their courses over the 
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duration of three years and then judge them in their final year. In 
addition, university rankings are panoptic because an anonymous 
mass of people, such as parents, prospective students and other 
stakeholders can consult these online. That is, even though universi-
ties do not know how many prospective students will eventually base 
their university choice on the NSS informed rankings (students’ activi-
ties, like those of the prison guards in the Panopticon, are shielded 
from universities), there is the continuous possibility that students 
might consult these rankings. Hence, as with the prisoners never 
knowing whether they are being observed, universities never know 
whether students will “observe” the NSS results at a certain point in 
time. Both simply must assume that they are being constantly 
observed. As a result, university senior management become disci-
plined in that they put significant energy into attaining positive student 
feedback and become docile by acting in accordance with whatever 
they think might produce positive student satisfaction. A decrease in 
student satisfaction instantly puts additional scrutiny on departments, 
as captured in Lisa’s journal entry:  
Today the vice-chancellor sent an email to all staff about that the 2016 
NSS results have decreased by a few percentage points from 2015. 
Whilst praising those courses which managed to increase their scores, 
he also said that the courses that attained negative student feedback 
must make it their absolute priority to scrutinise their courses in order 
to attain better student feedback in the future. (Excerpt 15. Lisa’s re-
search diary) 
 
The combined disciplinary force of the NSS, Internal Surveys and 
SRMs. When these separate student feedback mechanisms are 
viewed in combination, universities, courses and lecturers are ex-
posed to a continuous panoptical gaze. That is, whilst SRMs predom-
inantly observe lectures in a panoptical mode, Internal Surveys ob-
serve modules and courses and the NSS observes courses and uni-
versities. Moreover, whilst current students could be considered the 
main source of the panoptical gaze, additional stakeholders also pan-
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optically observe student satisfaction, such as lecturers, fellow lectur-
ers, module leaders, course leaders, senior management and pro-
spective students. That is, surveillance functions not only ‘top to bot-
tom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally’ (Fou-
cault, 1977:176).  
 Importantly, whilst panoptical gazes are exercised from a multi-
tude of different origins, these gazes are, nevertheless, still channelled 
in a certain direction. Firstly, prospective students panoptically ob-
serve courses (for example, in rankings) whilst current students, in 
addition, “normalisingly judge” these courses. This pressures univer-
sities to improve their student satisfaction ratings. From here onwards 
disciplinary power predominantly functions in a pyramidal fashion 
which channels all the way from the top of the institutional hierarchical 
structure to the bottom. That is, by instrumentalising student feedback 
results, vice chancellors and senior leadership teams may use disci-
plinary power, by “hierarchically observing” and “normalisingly judging” 
course leaders. These, in return, do the same to module leaders who 
do the same to individual lecturers. In other words, if a university fails 
to attain a ‘minimal threshold’ (Foucault, 1977:183) - i.e. achieves a 
poor student feedback rating - vice chancellors examine the ranking of 
courses in the NSS and internal feedback systems. Such grading 
forces course leaders – particularly those who attained the worst feed-
back – to examine whether any modules can be identified to be made 
into ‘a case’ (p. 191; emphasis added) to be ‘corrected’ using internal 
feedback systems.  Consequently, module leaders are pressured into 
individualising those colleagues who attain student feedback below 
the norm, using a combination of Internal Survey data and Student 
Representative Meetings (SRMs). Hence, it could be argued that 
these combined ranking processes at various levels of scale in combi-
nation with hierarchical management structures facilitate the disciplin-
ing of module leaders, courses, departments and universities.  
The effect of this continuous panoptical gaze is captured in my 
following research diary entry:   
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“I feel like I’m continuously thinking about student satisfaction. This 
really is at the heart of what I do. I’m worried that I might attain negative 
student feedback, downhearted when I receive negative feedback and 
thrilled when I receive positive feedback. Feedback has strong cur-
rency; it is an attractive social good and sought-after commodity. I 
shape my teaching on the basis of what I and my department think pro-
duces positive feedback and get rid of every aspect that the students 
might not like. I feel like I permanently dance to the hymn sheet of 
student voice.” (Excerpt 16. My research diary) 
 
Interestingly, the operation of disciplinary power cannot only be found 
in my data excerpts, but also in recommendations of some of the aca-
demic literature. For example, Horner (2010) suggests that the 
implementation of “spot checks” can improve tutor feedback to 
students. These spot checks, of course, operate panoptically in that 
lecturers never quite know whether their marking practices may be 
monitored. Therefore, lecturers must simply assume continuous sur-
veillance and hence comply.  
In summary, the NSS could be understood as a disciplinary “tech-
nology of government”, or as what Foucault referred to as a “govern-
mentality” (Foucault, 2009). The following section now seeks to show 
how the NSS could not only be understood as a “disciplinary”, but also 
as a “neo-liberal” governmentality which governs by implementing 
economic “freedom” and “competition” as the predominant modes of 
interaction between stakeholders. This neo-liberal governmentality 
should be understood as an addition to the disciplinary character of 
the NSS (Foucault, 2009).  
4.2 The NSS as Neo-liberal Governmentality  
‘Economics … are the method. The object is to change the heart and 
soul.’ (Margaret Thatcher9) 
 
‘Neoliberalism is most commonly understood as enacting an ensem-
ble of economic policies in accord with its root principle of affirming 
free markets.’  (Brown, 2015:28).  
 
                                                 
9 This quote is taken from Marquand (2009). 
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This section suggests why and how the NSS could be considered 
“neoliberal”. It asserts that neoliberalism – as an ideology which seeks 
to implement competitive markets in all realms of human life (cf. 
Brown, 2015) – remains a useful term despite recent critiques which, 
for example, caricature the term neoliberalism as a ‘conceptual Swiss-
Army knife which can unpick and cut through almost any argument 
concerning the modern world’ (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016:xiii). This sec-
tion firstly introduces neoliberalism more generally whilst then moving 
on to Foucault’s distinct take on the concept. It will then be shown how 
the NSS could be understood as a neo-liberal technology which gov-
erns the academic population. To differentiate between “neoliberal-
ism”, more generally, and Foucault’s specific understanding of “neo-
liberalism”, I have added a hyphen whenever I intended to refer to 
Foucault’s specific use of the term. This is also consistent with the 
spelling in Foucault’s lecture series of 1978/79 (Foucault, 2008, 2009).  
4.2.1 A General Introduction to Neoliberalism  
At its root, this thesis utilises the following definition of neoliberalism: 
“Neoliberalism is an ideology and policy package that seeks to foster 
competitive markets in all realms of social life”. This resonates with 
various definitions of neoliberalism, which conceptualise it as ‘a pro-
gramme of resolving problems of, and developing, human society by 
means of competitive markets’ (Patomäki, 2009:432–433); as ‘enact-
ing an ensemble of economic policies in accord with its root principle 
of affirming free markets’ (Brown, 2015) or as  
‘a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human 
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneur-
ial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 
by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.’  
(Harvey, 2005:2; emphasis added) 
To gain a better understanding of neoliberalism, its predecessor - 
classical economic liberalism – is considered first. Whilst Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo are often considered to be the founding fathers of 
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economic liberalism (Brown, 2015), early conceptions of economic lib-
eralism trace back to the French physiocrats and what was, at the time, 
understood as “political economy10” (Vardi, 2012). Crucial to political 
economy – and particularly to Adam Smith’s account thereof - is the 
postulation of the self-interested individual who creates the best out-
come for society by acting in his or her own interest (Smith, 1776). In 
other words, the “greater good” for society, counterintuitively, is not 
produced by the benevolence of people, but precisely by people fol-
lowing their own interests. Smith referred to this as the ‘invisible hand’ 
(p. 349).  For the invisible hand to take effect, the state should not 
intervene in how people trade and conduct business but instead “step 
back” and restrain its efforts to protecting private property.  
Importantly, however, this “invisible hand” can only operate if the 
drive for self-interest is combined with a crucial operating principle: that 
of competition (Smith, 1776). It is through this competition that the self-
interest of one person is pitted against that of another. An effect of this 
competition is that prices for goods and services tend to return to what 
Smith calls the ‘natural price’ (p. 48), i.e. the price it costs the person 
to make the product and to continue his or her business. If there is 
competition between stakeholders, the natural price is determined by 
supply and demand. If competition fails to exist, monopolies arise 
where ‘an individual or […] a trading company’ are the sole suppliers 
of a product and can charge however much they want (p. 52).   
Another seminal figure in the propagation of classical economic 
liberalism and associated markets was David Ricardo who ‘preached 
the virtues of the ‘free-market’ and ‘laissez-faire’ economics’ (Steger, 
2010:loc 403). In Ricardo’s account, markets should not be interfered 
with and open economic exchange between individuals and countries 
should be enabled (Ricardo, 1817). More specifically, Ricardo’s ‘com-
parative advantage’ postulates that each country should exploit and 
                                                 
10 This is the reason why Karl Marx’s (2014 [1867]) Kapital had the title, 
“Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Okonomie” (“Capital: Critique of Political 
Economy”). 
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concentrate on their natural advantages (Steger, 2010:loc 410). Each 
country would then profit from trade because it can ‘specialize in the 
production of those commodities for which it had a comparative ad-
vantage’ (ibid.). For example, Italy has a comparative advantage to 
England because it can ‘produce wine more cheaply than England’ 
(ibid.).  
These free market values persisted – and were further refined in 
the context the neoclassical economic movement (Harvey, 2005:20) - 
as mainstream policy until after the Great Depression when two econ-
omists began to gain influence: John Maynard Keynes and Karl Po-
lanyi. These ‘egalitarian liberals’ challenged the idea of the govern-
ment as ‘night watchman’ (p. 433) and its associated credos of minimal 
state intervention. Whilst strongly disagreeing with Marxist accounts of 
capitalism, which tended to frame the Great Depression as the end of 
capitalism, Keynes argued that capitalism ‘had to be subjected to reg-
ulations and controls by a strong secular state’ (ibid.). Governments 
should increase spending in times of economic crisis to create jobs 
(and therefore increase the spending habits of people) and withdraw 
spending in times of economic prosperity. Importantly, in this Keynes-
ian doctrine, markets do not always self-regulate – as was argued by 
classical economic liberalism - but instead sometimes fail due to bad 
investments (ibid.).  
This Keynesian philosophy was set in stone at the 1944 Bretton 
Woods Conference, which also saw the implementation of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (which was later rebranded into the “World 
Bank”) to give loans to Europe for its post-war reconstruction and to 
fund projects in other countries. Foremost, this new economic order 
sought to ‘prevent a return to the catastrophic conditions that had so 
threatened the capitalist order in the great slump of the 1930s’ as well 
as preventing ‘the re-emergence of inter-state geopolitical rivalries that 
had led to the war’ (Harvey, 2005:10).   
This Keynesian ‘golden age of controlled capitalism’ (Steger, 
2010:loc 453) lasted approximately from 1945 – 1975 and was highly 
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popular at the time and because it saw ‘high wages, low inflation, and 
unprecedented levels of material wellbeing and social security’. This 
“golden age” – also known as ‘embedded liberalism’ (Harvey, 2005:11) 
– was termed ‘welfarism’ in the UK and the ‘New Deal’ in the United 
States. During this time, governments regulated the flow of money ‘in 
and out of their territories’ (Steger, 2010:loc 459) by, for example, im-
plementing ‘capital controls’ (Harvey, 2005:11); rich individuals and 
corporations had to pay high taxes and a large proportion of the work-
ing class were enabled to ascend into the middle class (Steger, 2010). 
Even, ‘working-class trade union power’ was somewhat integrated into 
political processes and the state sometimes actively intervened in the 
economy (Harvey, 2005:11).  Famously, due to the popularity of 
Keynesian politics even Republican president Nixon announced that 
‘we are all Keynesians now’ (Steger, 2010:loc 471).  
This “Golden Age” started to crumble with the oil crises in 1973: 
oil prices ‘quadrupled … overnight’, there was stagflation (i.e. high in-
flation combined with increasing unemployment), and decreasing prof-
its of corporations (Steger, 2010:loc 484). According to Harvey 
(Harvey, 2005, 2010), there were two options to counter this economic 
stagflation: Western democracies had to either become more socialist 
or more neoliberal. In Harvey’s (2005) take, the socialist option consti-
tuted a significant threat to the ‘ruling classes’ (ibid.) because, firstly, 
‘as asset values (stocks, property, savings) collapsed’ (p. 15), their 
wealth also decreased. Secondly, another threat came from worker-
owner programmes. For example, in Sweden, the ‘Rehn-Meidner plan’ 
sought to enable workers to buy out their companies to make these 
worker-owned (Harvey, 2005:15).  
The second potential response to the crisis of Keynesianism was 
neoliberalism. In short, neoliberal ideology argued that it was precisely 
the Keynesian policies of tariffs in ‘international trade’ which led to 
‘high inflation and poor economic growth’ (Steger, 2010:loc 491). Ne-
oliberalism found its first consistent formulation in the Mont Pelerin So-
ciety founded by Friedrich August von Hayek in 1947 in Geneva (Har-
vey, 2005; Steger, 2010). The purpose of this conference was to revive 
91 
neoclassical theories11 whilst being ardently opposed to Keynesian 
state intervention (Steger, 2010). One of the guests invited was Milton 
Friedman who rose to prominence in the 1970s when Friedman’s fol-
lowers (the “Chicago boys”) found their first neoliberal test subject in 
fascist Chile under the rule of Pinochet in 1973 (ibid.). Neoliberals then 
succeeded in implementing their ideas in the shape of policies in the 
early 1980s under Margaret Thatcher (in the UK) and Ronald Reagan 
(in the US). In the 1990s, the “third way politics” of Tony Blair and Bill 
Clinton attempted to further implement marketisation whilst simultane-
ously establishing programmes to improve the conditions of those 
struggling with poverty under neoliberal economic policies (ibid.).  
It is only very recently that the neoliberal doctrine of free markets 
has been subjected to widespread popular criticism in the wake of the 
global financial and economic crisis of 2008-9. Yet, neoliberal policies 
are kept afloat, perhaps combined with some neo-mercantilist under-
tones as embodied in the most recent state interventionist rhetoric of 
Donald Trump (Drezner, 2016) 
 
Whilst neoliberalism’s underlying ideology is characterised by its belief 
in free markets (Brown, 2015:28), it, importantly, can be delineated 
from classical economic liberalism in that  
‘Whereas classical liberalism represents a negative conception of 
state power in that the individual was taken as an object to be freed 
from the interventions of the state, neoliberalism has come to repre-
sent a positive conception of the state’s role in creating the appropri-
ate market by providing the conditions, laws and institutions necessary 
for its operation.’ (Olssen and Peters, 2005:315) 
In short, under neoliberalism, the state is indispensable in ensur-
ing the operation of competitive markets. In addition, neoliberalism 
goes alongside a range of characteristic policy and commercial devel-
opments. Firstly, neoliberalism includes the ‘deregulation of industries 
                                                 
11 Towards the end of the 19th century neoclassical ideas increasingly re-
placed Adam Smith’s, David Ricardo’s and, of course, Karl Marx’s theories (Harvey, 
2005) and, contributed to the immense rise of capital and income inequality before 
the First World War (Piketty, 2015).  
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and capital flows’ (Brown, 2015:28) including the deregulation of em-
ployee’s rights regarding hiring and firing (Esping-Andersen and 
Regini, 2000) as well as a ‘radical reduction in welfare state provisions 
and protections for the vulnerable’ (Brown, 2015:28). Public goods, in 
the meantime, are increasingly privatised or outsourced, ‘ranging from 
education, parks, postal services, roads, and social welfare to prisons 
and militaries’ (ibid.). In addition, we find that progressive taxation is 
discarded in favour of regressive taxation (ibid.). This goes alongside 
‘an end of wealth redistributions’ (ibid.). Moreover, we find that no hu-
man desire or need is safeguarded from being transformed into being 
used for profit, ‘from college admissions preparation to human organ 
transplants, from baby adoptions to pollution rights, from avoiding lines 
to securing legroom on an airplane’ (ibid.). Lastly, one of the most re-
cent developments of neoliberalism includes the ‘financialization of 
everything and the increasing dominance of finance capital in the dy-
namics of the economy and everyday life’ (Brown, 2015:28). 
Based on this outline of typical neoliberal policy effects, Brown 
(2015) argues that popular critiques have been directed at four broad 
themes: (i) rising inequality, (ii) ‘unethical commercialization’ (p. 29), 
(iii) ‘intimacy of corporate and finance capital with the state’ and (iv) 
the ‘economic havoc’ (p. 30) caused by financial crises. Firstly, 
critiques centring on rising inequality denounce that the richest stratum 
in society becomes wealthier whilst the middle classes work ‘more 
hours for less pay, fewer benefits, less security, and less promise of 
retirement or upward mobility than at any time in the past half century’ 
(p. 28). Simultaneously, the poorest become homeless or are deported 
‘into the growing urban and suburban slums of the world’ (p. 29). This 
rising inequality, according to Piketty (2014), is promoted by the cur-
rent system’s failure to implement sufficient taxation to avoid a drifting 
apart of economic productivity and return on capital (e.g. through in-
terest). Importantly, this increasing concentration of wealth in the 
hands of a tiny elite becomes ‘socially destabilising’ (p. 13).  
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Secondly, the theme of ‘unethical commercialisation’ describes 
the fact that marketisation promotes ‘human exploitation or degrada-
tion’ (Brown, 2015:29), such as surrogate mothers from poorer coun-
tries catering for rich couples in richer countries. That is, neoliberalism 
limits what should be open to everyone (wilderness, education, infra-
structure) or promotes horrific practices, such as ‘organ trafficking, pol-
lution rights, clear-cutting [or] fracking’. In other words, this line of cri-
tique laments that markets are not always inherently good because 
there are, for example, ‘toxic waste’ markets, weapon markets (Satz, 
2010:91), ‘human organ markets’ (p. 197) and ‘child labour’ markets 
(p. 155).  
According to Brown (2015) another set of critiques centres around 
the ‘intimacy of corporation and finance capital with the state’ (p. 29; 
emphasis added) including the influence of private institutions on po-
litical decision making. For example, Wolin (2017) argues that political 
and economic elites are virtually indistinguishable in America and that 
the private sector increasingly fails to answer to democratically elected 
governments. In relation to the NSS, this intimacy can be delineated 
in that “Ipsos” is a global corporation with a total revenue of 1.73 billion 
Euros (Financial Times, 2018) and is remunerated by the state to as-
sess a segment of the tertiary education sector.  
Lastly, some critiques centre on the ‘economic havoc’ caused by 
financial crises, such as the crisis of 2008 (Brown, 2015). These cri-
tiques share a concern for the fact that the financial crisis was caused 
by Wall Street. Yet, financial capitalism very quickly returned to its pre-
crisis exuberances whilst the rest of the world still suffers from the cri-
sis’s consequences (p. 29).  For example, Duménil and Lévy (2011) 
posit that there is a remarkable similarity between the time leading up 
to the Great Depression and our current times and suggest that in or-
der to avoid another Great Depression, a major change is needed in 
the way the economy is structured.  
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Whilst these critiques are valid and important for this thesis, there is 
one further pertinent analysis of neoliberalism which can be found in 
Foucault’s (2008) concept of “neo-liberal governmentality”. That is, in 
comparison to the above critiques of neoliberalism ‘as a set of state 
policies, a phase of capitalism, or an ideology that set loose the market 
to restore profitability for a capitalist class’ (Brown, 2015:30), “neo-lib-
eral governmentality” is a useful notion because it describes what hap-
pens to subjects when a certain neoliberal rationality is instilled in their 
minds. Neo-liberal governmentality, as this thesis argues, is also im-
portant as a concept because it explains how neo-liberalism can be 
used to govern a population, thereby preventing this population from 
rebelling against the ruling elite. Brown (2015:30) writes that neo-lib-
eral governmentality frames neoliberalism  
‘as an order of normative reason, that, when it becomes ascendant, 
takes shape as a governing rationality extending a specific formulation 
of economic values, practices, and metrics to every dimension of hu-
man life.’  
The following section provides an in-depth discussion of Fou-
cault’s take on liberalism and neo-liberalism.  
4.2.2 Foucault’s Conception of Neo-Liberalism 
Foucault first mentions ‘liberal governmentality’ in his lecture series 
“Security, Territory, Population” (Foucault, 2009:370) and neo-liberal 
governmentality in the second half of “The Birth of Biopolitics” 
(Foucault, 2008). Liberal governmentality, as a concept, is first implied 
when Foucault elaborates on “apparatuses of security” (Foucault, 
2009) (or “dispositifs de sécurité” in the original French text (Foucault, 
2004)). Liberal governmentality denotes  
‘the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflec-
tions, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very spe-
cific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of 
security as its essential technical instrument.’ (Foucault, 2009:108; 
emphasis added) 
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Importantly, “apparatuses of security”- and their connected no-
tions of “political economy” and “population” - must be delineated from 
“sovereign power” (in which an autocratic ruler seeks to rule over a 
certain territory) or “disciplinary power” as expounded in section 4.1. 
That is, in comparison to disciplinary power - and its large-scale equiv-
alent of mercantilist grain price regulation - apparatuses of security en-
ter a certain amount of freedom (cf. “political economy”) into the art of 
governing by letting ‘things happen’ (p. 45).  
More specifically, mercantilist policies of the 17th and 18th century 
enforced a policing of the price of grain to its lowest possible price, so 
that farmers produced cheap grain which could then be sold on the 
international market to, in return, attract gold into the country. To 
achieve this “lowest price”, regulation was necessary, embodied in 
price controls through ‘disciplinary mechanisms’ (p. 62). Foucault ar-
gues this was why the ‘police’ state (p. 318) enjoyed popularity at the 
time. Whilst the primary objective of the police state was to make the 
population of the country into a productive force so that the state could 
protect its own interest (cf. raison d’état) in its competitive relationship 
with its European rivals, a side-product of these mercantilist practices 
of policing grain prices was frequent famines. These famines, in return, 
posed significant risks to the ruling elites both externally (through de-
creasing economic productivity and military power) and internally (due 
to the dangers of civil unrest). This civil unrest from famines– which 
Foucault describes as a ‘scarcity scourge’ - can be described as fol-
lows: ‘people suffered hunger, so entire populations and the nation 
suffered hunger’ (p. 41). Foucault argues that ‘it was precisely this kind 
of immediate solidarity, the massiveness of the event [of large-scale 
civil unrests]’ which the elites were eager to prevent (p. 41; emphasis 
added).  
Thus, after various failed mercantilist policies, the “physiocrats” 
(as mentioned in section 4.2.1) introduced a new economic model 
which sought both to prevent famines and to govern the population 
more effectively. This was to be achieved by introducing ‘laissez-faire’ 
into the art of governing (p. 41). This model suggested that instead of 
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regulating grain prices to the lowest possible price, they should be al-
lowed to rise and then settle at the ‘just level’ (p. 343) based on supply 
and demand. Moreover, (ii) ‘free trade between countries’ was to be 
encouraged (p. 345). Consequently, in periods of grain shortages, 
France would, for example, be able to import grain and in times of 
abundance, people would be able to export (ibid.). Crucially, the aim 
of trade liberalisation was not to prevent people from dying of hunger 
in toto. Rather, a statistical assessment of the danger of a large-scale 
famine and ensuing political instability was to be applied. Whilst fam-
ines were to be avoided, the fact that certain individuals would starve 
was to be understood as an indispensable element of “apparatuses of 
security” (i.e. “liberal governmentality”):  
‘the scarcity-scourge disappears … [the] scarcity that causes the 
death of individuals not only does not disappear, it must not disap-
pear.’ (p. 42; emphasis added) 
 
Turning now to Foucault’s explication of neo-liberal governmentality, 
this notion constitutes a partial continuation of, but also a partial devi-
ation from liberal governmentality (Brown, 2015). In this sense, it sig-
nificantly strays from Marxist accounts where neoliberalism is framed 
as the result of ‘crises of capitalist accumulation’ (cf. Brown, 2015:59). 
More specifically, Foucault’s understanding of his (liberal) “apparat-
uses of security” (Foucault’s, 2009:388) resonates with that of “neo-
liberal governmentality” in that both try to safeguard the ‘security of the 
natural phenomena of economic processes…’ (p. 353). In other words, 
under liberalism, the state’s responsibility had shifted towards making 
‘natural regulations’ (that is, the regulations of the market) to ‘work’ 
instead of the former micro-managerial regulations of mercantilism (p. 
353). However, whilst under liberalism this was mainly confined to the 
state protecting private property, under neo-liberalism the role of the 
state is much more active in that markets are no longer natural and it 
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is the state’s responsibility to perpetually create conditions for the op-
eration of competitive markets (cf. Harvey, 2005; Olssen and Peters, 
2005; Brown, 2015).  
Foucault’s understanding of neo-liberalism (in delineation from lib-
eralism) operates under the following tenets:  First, competition be-
comes ‘non-natural’ (whilst under liberalism it was conceived as “nat-
ural”) and must therefore continuously be produced by the state 
(Brown, 2015:62). Second, economic growth becomes the state’s only 
reason for existence and its sole ‘social policy’ (p. 63). Third, ‘compe-
tition replaces exchange’ in that humans are no longer primarily 
viewed as bartering goods and service but are, instead, in perpetual 
competition with one another (p. 64). This goes alongside the effect 
that ‘inequality replaces equality’ (p. 64): goods are not exchanged for 
an equal value of money (i.e. equality); rather, competition rests on 
inequality by necessarily producing winners and losers. Fourth, ‘hu-
man capital replaces labor’ (p. 65) in that all people (even the most 
impoverished factory workers) are framed as “human capital” that of-
fers its services, instead of “wage labourers” who sell their labour 
power. This reframing is also more effective than liberalism in obscur-
ing “class” because everyone, and not only the working class, be-
comes framed as “human capital”. Fifth, following on from the idea of 
human capital, ‘entrepreneurship replaces production’ (p. 65). Sixth, 
law becomes a support for competition instead of a limiting force for 
the operation of capital. In other words, law becomes the juridical 
framework which produces competition. Seventh, the market is con-
structed as the ‘truth’ so that anyone who adheres by its principles is 
considered realistic and anyone who refuses to as naïve (p. 67).  
The central notions of competition, homo œconomicus and human 
capital shall now be explored more deeply. In the 1979 lecture series, 
“The Birth of Biopolitics”, Foucault (2008) begins by exploring German 
Ordo-liberalism, which he considers as the origins of neo-liberalism. 
Importantly, ordo-liberals, breaking with classical economic theory, 
had a ‘radical anti-naturalistic conception of the market and of the prin-
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ciple of competition’ (Lemke, 2001:193). That is, ordo-liberals sug-
gested that markets must continuously be maintained by the state and, 
thus, rejected laissez-faire (Foucault, 2008). Whilst laissez-faire pro-
duced monopolisation,  
‘pure competition, which is the essence of the market, can only appear 
if it is produced, and if it is produced by an active governmentality.’ 
(Foucault, 2008:121) 
This means that the economy is no longer natural (liberalism), but 
institutional (neo-liberalism) (Lemke, 2001:195). Similarly, an “entre-
preneurial self” is not the primordial state of human identity, but rather 
needs to be actively constructed by refiguring all social relations as 
economic relations of ‘competition’ (p. 195). This rejection of the natu-
ralness of competition in human relations was also captured in the 
ordo-liberal concept of “Vitalpolitik” which sought to oppose any moral 
rejection of entrepreneurialism (p. 195). In short, under the technology 
of neo-liberal governmentality, there is no ‘diminishment or reduction 
of state sovereignty and planning capacities but a displacement from 
formal to informal techniques of government’ (Lemke, 2002:58), i.e. 
those of competition.   
As in Ordo-liberalism, the Chicago school under Milton Friedman 
(see section 4.2.1) rejected any type of socialist politics and supported 
‘economic liberty’. However, in addition, the Chicago school aimed at 
restructuring hitherto non-economic spheres along economic princi-
ples (Foucault, 2008). Moreover, in contrast to Ordo-liberalism, the 
Chicago school rejected social policy intervention, such as ‘assistance 
to the unemployed, health care cover, [and] housing policy’ (p. 323). 
Thus, government was refigured as an enterprise in itself and was 
given the task to (i) ‘universalize competition’ into all human relations 
and (ii) ‘invent market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups 
and institutions’ (Lemke, 2001:197). In comparison to classical eco-
nomic liberalism, the economy was now supposed to embrace ‘the en-
tirety of human action’ to be guided by competition (p. 197):  
99 
‘The society regulated by reference to the market that the neo-liberals 
are thinking about is a society in which the regulatory principle should 
not be so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanisms of 
competition. It is these mechanisms that should have the greatest 
possible surface and depth and should also occupy the greatest pos-
sible volume in society. This means that what is sought is not a soci-
ety subject to the commodity-effect, but a society subject to the dy-
namic of competition. Not a super- market society, but an enterprise 
society. The homo œconomicus sought after is not the man of ex-
change or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and produc-
tion.’ 
(Foucault, 2008:147;emphasis added) 
This homo œconomicus - a notion which, according to Foucault 
(2008), is interestingly almost entirely absent in classical liberalism in 
its verbatim form - is the self-interested, rational, autonomous, entre-
preneurial self who is in constant pursuit of her best interest (Foucault, 
2008; Brown, 2015; Lemke, 2016). In other words, homo œconomicus 
is eager to enhance her or his human capital (Brown, 2015). As sug-
gested by ordo-liberals, human capital is a mixture of ‘inborn physical 
genetic predisposition[s]’ on the one hand and skills deriving from ‘“in-
vestments” … in nutrition, education, training and also love [and] af-
fection’ (Lemke, 2001:199). (It could be suggested that this idea of en-
hancing one’s human capital is ubiquitous in contemporary Western 
societies. This is, for example, particularly visible in CVs and the doc-
umentation of training courses.) Crucial to the operation of homo œco-
nomicus is its supposed ‘capacity for self-control’ which Foucault the-
orises within his concept of ‘techniques of the self’ or ‘technologies of 
the self’ (Lemke, 2002:52). It is here, where (neo-liberal) governmen-
tality connects the state with the subjectivation of the individual 
(Lemke, 2016). More specifically, a neoliberal “technology of the self” 
refigures individual subjects, ‘families and associations’ as responsible 
– i.e. as being able to control their own “selves” - which also goes 
alongside the shifting of ‘responsibility for social risks such as illness, 
unemployment, poverty, and so forth’ into issues of ‘self-care’ (p. 59).  
In short, whilst the rise of liberal governmentality enabled the gov-
erning of the population by avoiding large-scale discontent through the 
introduction of laissez-faire, the rise of neo-liberalism allowed for the 
governing of the population through the active creation of competitive 
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markets. That is, whilst some more Marxist orientated scholars may 
frame neoliberalism predominantly as a project of maintaining and 
concentrating financial capital in the hands of an elite (e.g. Harvey, 
2005), Foucault understands neo-liberalism as a governmental tech-
nology which makes it possible to govern the population through the 
market and competition.   
4.2.3 The NSS as Neo-Liberal Governmentality 
Turning now to student feedback systems, it is suggested that the NSS 
and its resultant SETs do not only function as disciplinary technologies 
(as was argued in section 4.1), but also as “apparatuses of security” 
as part of a wider liberal governmentality as well as practices of “com-
petition” as part of a neo-liberal governmentality. Starting with “liberal 
governmentality”, it could be suggested that in analogy to the physio-
crats’ introduction of economic “freedom” into the governing of the pop-
ulation, a similar amount of freedom can also be found in the practices 
of university staff. For example, Emily remarks:   
“This job [as a lecturer] is really hard, but what struck me is the incred-
ible amount of freedom we have here in comparison to when I worked 
at schools. It was almost a little bit hard to get used to this. When I first 
arrived on my first day, I asked whether I could …[do certain activities] 
and … [my senior colleague] just said, “You don’t need to ask me for 
permission, but this sounds wonderful.” (Excerpt 17.  Interview with 
Emily) 
However, just as the “freedom” discussed by the physiocrats and later 
‘Adam Smith’ (cf. Foucault, 2008:38) was about the economic “free-
dom to engage in commerce” (to exchange goods, to make money 
etc.), lecturers are “free” to engage in any activity; but only as long as 
the teaching yields good student feedback. In other words, freedom 
becomes redefined as the freedom to achieve certain narrow quanti-
tative outcomes, such as ranking positions on league tables. 
Interestingly, this, in return, may lead to practices in which the antici-
pation of positive feedback is the guiding principle of pedagogical prac-
tice:  
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“When I’m planning for a session, I often think to myself, “Oh this is 
great. The students will really like this and then hopefully will give me 
good feedback.” (Excerpt 18. Interview with Karl)  
Second, this introduction of “freedom” produces important collateral 
damage, as discussed above. That is, just as the physiocrats accepted 
the deaths of a few members of society within their liberalised trading 
practices, a few individual lecturers, who fail to produce acceptable 
student feedback, may face redundancy:  
“My colleague got some negative feedback. It’s crazy that her boss told 
her that if this negative student feedback keeps on happening that her 
boss is under pressure from above to “keep all options open”. So she 
told me that she’s working “insane hours” to make the students happy. 
She said that it feels a bit like a witch-hunt and she thinks that the stu-
dents pick up on this. She perceives them as especially needy and 
actually quite rude sometimes. For example, apparently one of her stu-
dents interrupted her in the middle of a session, just shouting, “Stop. I 
don’t get it. Explain it again.”  (Excerpt 19. Lisa’s research diary)  
As captured in the experience of Lisa’s colleague, this “threat of re-
dundancy” is, however, not to be avoided, but rather necessary. That 
is, as long as the “rest” of the population (Foucault, 2009) (i.e. the rest 
of the collegiate) do not starve (are made redundant), the deaths of a 
few individuals (the redundancy of a few lecturers) are not only ac-
cepted but also necessary. In Foucault’s (amended) words, ‘the [mass 
redundancy] disappears … [the redundancy] that causes the [precar-
ity] of individuals not only does not disappear, it must not disappear’ 
(p. 42; original changed to suit analysis). Rather, redundancies may 
function as a “warning” along the lines of “look what happens when 
you fail to produce results”12. Consequentially, the possibility of an ‘im-
mediate solidarity’ is not only minimised (i.e. colleagues are less likely 
to step out of line), many lecturers may, indeed, work even harder to 
attain positive ratings, as in Lisa’s colleague who was working “insane 
hours”.  
This importance of apparatuses of security – and their associated 
elements of ‘statistics’ (Foucault, 2009:62) and “collateral damage” - 
                                                 
12 This also resonates with Marx’s notion of the “industrial reserve army” as 
discussed by Srnicek and Williams (2016). 
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are also important for intra-institutional and inter-institutional practices. 
For example, it could be hypothesised that university senior leadership 
may force a department, which fails to achieve acceptable positive 
ratings, to close; however, as long as the whole university remains 
operational, staff of other departments are less likely to mobilise. The 
closed department simultaneously functions as a warning against 
solidary action and produces an urgency for other departments to work 
harder. Similarly, I suggest that widespread discontent in the UK uni-
versity sector can be prevented by introducing university rankings: 
akin to football league tables in which there always must be a bottom 
team, in university league tables, some universities must fail whilst oth-
ers must succeed. This means that some failing universities are a nec-
essary and productive feature: the fear of becoming one of these bot-
tom universities forces university senior leaders into (performative) ac-
tion, oriented towards narrowly defined quantifiable outcomes, such as 
student satisfaction (Ball, 2003). 
 
Turning the attention away from liberalism and towards neo-liberalism, 
the NSS can be understood as a neo-liberal governmental technology. 
Firstly, the NSS operates by establishing competition at various levels 
of scale by inventing ‘market-shaped systems of action for individuals, 
groups and institutions’ (Lemke, 2001:197). That is, individuals are 
pitched against one another in competitive struggles. This also goes 
alongside the desire to be “better than others”, as captured in Lisa’s 
research diary:    
“I really don’t know but I can’t help to feel smug when I get really good 
feedback and others don’t. I don’t think I’m usually very competitive, but 
when it comes to student feedback I can’t help but feel like I’m winning 
when students rate me as excellent and other lecturers worse.” 
(Excerpt 20. Lisa – diary excerpt)   
Secondly, departments are pitched against one another in that those 
departments with the worst student feedback are put under increasing 
pressure to improve their feedback or otherwise face closure. Return-
ing to “Excerpt 4” above, Lisa remarks:   
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“Recently in one of my staff meetings, the course leader suggested that 
if the course was unable to gain better feedback in internal surveys that 
the course might be shut down.” (Lisa’s research diary)  
Lastly, universities are pitched against one another in their pursuit over 
“customers” (i.e. students). This purposeful creation of competition, as 
delineated by Foucault (2008), is reflected in the recent UK white pa-
per “Success as a Knowledge Economy” which had already been 
discussed in section 4.1.2. This white paper praises the virtues of com-
petitive markets (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, DfB, 
2016:8) and needs to be understood in the context of the Teaching 
Excellence Framework (TEF) (see section 2.5). The DfB argues that 
‘a competitive market’ (p. 8) should be created because   
‘competition between providers in any market incentivises them to 
raise their game, offering consumers a greater choice of more innova-
tive and better quality products and services at lower cost. Higher edu-
cation is no exception’. (p. 8) 
Revisiting the quote which was already presented in section 4.1, 
it can be seen that the neo-liberal the signifier “competition” is reiter-
ated throughout:  
 ‘There is no compelling reason for incumbents to be protected from 
high quality competition. We want a globally competitive market that 
supports diversity, where anyone who demonstrates they have the po-
tential to offer excellent teaching and clears our high quality bar can 
compete on a level playing field. If we place too much emphasis on 
whether a provider has a long established track record, this by defini-
tion will favour incumbents, and risks shutting out high quality and 
credible new institutions.’ (p. 8; emphasis added)  
In addition to this (unashamed) avowal of competition, it is inter-
esting to note the seemingly emancipatory language used in this policy 
document. That is, whilst the meaning of diversity is not specified (e.g. 
does it refer to “courses on offer”, “student characteristics”, or “lecturer 
characteristics”?), the signifier “diversity” evokes a feeling of progres-
siveness and openness. This notion of “diversity” is then ‘connected’ 
(Gee, 2005:13) to the concept of a ‘globally competitive market’ (DfB, 
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2016:8) despite the fact that “diversity” and “globally competitive mar-
kets” do not necessarily resonate well with one another. (Put bluntly, 
when I think of “diversity”, I do not think of “global competition”.)  
In addition, this policy section introduces the notion of a ‘level play-
ing field’, something which is characteristic of the neo-liberal - and 
more specifically the ordo-liberal conviction - that it is necessary to 
avoid monopolisation13. It also adds a discourse of ‘fairness’ - reminis-
cent of “wiping the slate clean”. Importantly, this fairness is framed as 
fairness in a “competition” (in comparison to fairness of exchanges; of 
income, etc.). Furthermore, the phrase ‘track record’ has an associa-
tion with “business language”. In other words, as Foucault implies, un-
der neo-liberalism, competition is universalised into all human rela-
tions by inventing ‘market-shaped systems of action for individuals, 
groups and institutions’ (Lemke, 2001:197).  
Moreover, the DfB argues that higher education quality is equated 
to prosperity and the notion of a ‘knowledge economy’ (DfB, 2016:8-
9), suggesting ‘strong arguments to encourage greater competition be-
tween high quality new and existing providers in the HE sector’. Fur-
thermore, in analogy to Foucault’s notion of the introduction of statis-
tics into the liberal art of governing in the middle of the 18th century, 
economic statistics are used to justify political decision-making: 
‘Graduates are central to our prosperity and success as a knowledge 
economy, and higher education is a key export sector. […] Recent re-
search at the London School of Economics demonstrates the strong 
correlation between opening universities and significantly increased 
economic growth. Doubling the number of universities per capita is as-
sociated with over 4% higher future GDP per capita.’ (p .9) 
Importantly, whilst in all competitions there must be losers and 
winners, a small amount of collateral damage is to be expected (i.e. 
some universities will fail in this game); however, as long as there is a 
‘4% higher future GDP per capita’, this collateral damage is necessary 
and desirable as it encourages universities ‘to raise their game’ (DfB, 
                                                 
13 It goes without saying that neoliberalism frequently fails to avoid monop-
olisation which can be observed in the case of Cartels (cf. Harvey, 2005).  
105 
2016:9). Moreover, the above excerpt implies that Higher Education 
only exists for an instrumental purpose: the reason to open higher ed-
ucation is to increase economic performance instead of a myriad of 
other possible reasons, such as personal fulfilment or a desire to learn. 
We see in action what Brown (2015) describes as the refiguring of all 
spheres of life in economic terms (i.e. in this case GDP growth).  
In what follows, the DfB (2016:9) cautions people that ‘we have 
not yet made a decisive enough move to open the higher education 
market. More specifically,  
‘the UK Competition and Markets Authority14 (CMA)’s report on com-
petition in the HE sector concluded that aspects of the current HE sys-
tem could be holding back greater competition and needed to be 
addressed’ (p. 9).  
Utilising Gee’s (2005:12) discourse analysis as presented in sec-
tion 3.1, ‘connections’ are made between “restriction” (i.e. a ‘holding 
back’) and “competition”. In addition, “competition” is given a higher 
status as a “social good” whilst the lack thereof is framed as an unde-
sirable quantity. Competition is then connected to the ‘Conversations’ 
(p. 51) around fairness:  
‘new and innovative providers offering high quality higher education 
continue to face significant and disproportionate challenges to estab-
lishing themselves in the sector.’ (DfB, 2016:9) 
There are also intertextual connections to business language, 
such as refiguring universities as ‘providers’ and the higher education 
landscape as a ‘sector’ (p. 9). This creates ‘significance’ (Gee, 2005: 
11) by appealing to people’s emotional sense of feeling sorry for the 
underdog. In addition, the text enacts the ‘identity’ (p. 11) of a ‘new 
and innovative provider’ (DfB, 2016:9) which, in its “under-dog posi-
tion”, has hitherto found it impossible to compete with other estab-
lished institutions.  
Interestingly, the fact that new institutions are unsuccessful is not 
blamed on the actual model of competition itself. (For example, it could 
                                                 
14 Which was established in 2013 
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be proposed that, if more collaboration (instead of competition) was 
encouraged, older universities, such as Oxford, could significantly as-
sist newer universities in developing their research profile.) Instead, 
competition is not only advocated as the cure against unfair treatment, 
but forced upon universities through technologies, such as the TEF 
and the NSS. This resonates with Brown’s (2015) assertion that under 
neo-liberalism, competition needs to be secured by a strong state. 
Therefore,  
‘making it easier for these providers to enter and expand will help 
drive up teaching standards overall; enhance the life chances of stu-
dents; drive economic growth; and be a catalyst for social mobility. … 
High quality new providers will also serve the national economy by en-
abling us to continue to meet the needs of international students who 
increasingly demand access to top quality higher education, and help 
contribute towards boosting education exports.’ (DfB, 2016:9) 
Not only does the DfB suggest that teaching standards will be 
raised, but competition (in an increasingly unequal world) will ‘enhance 
the life chances of students’ (p. 9). What is not mentioned here is that 
only those students’ life chances will be enhanced who eventually 
manage to secure a job (i.e. those who manage to “win” and not “lose” 
(Brown, 2015)) within a hyper-competitive job market.  
Moreover, in analogy to the physiocrats’ dissolution of grain-price 
regulations in 18th century France, the DfB suggests that ‘in order to 
enable greater competition, we will simplify the regulatory landscape’ 
by reducing ‘unnecessary barriers to entry’. It could be suggested that 
this aim of “deregulating” higher education is not because of benevo-
lent reasons (e.g. that regulation is experienced somewhat negatively 
by university actors which may prompt a “caring” DfB to discontinue 
regulation) but because it simply turns out to be ineffective in govern-
ing the university population. Just as ‘raison d’État’ (“state reason”) 
(Foucault, 2009:237) found that mercantilism was ineffective in pro-
ducing sufficient economic growth because of its ‘barriers to the entry 
of grain’ (which is why political economy was introduced), this policy 
text seeks to introduce political economy to replace ‘barriers to entry’ 
of prospective students. Yet, the DfB (2016:9) acknowledges that 
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there still is the necessity to ‘ensure quality is built into our reforms at 
every stage, from the way we regulate new entrants to the incentives 
on incumbents’.  
 
Moving away from this macro-level policy analysis and returning to the 
NSS, I suggest that the NSS also fosters “homo œconomicus”, i.e. the 
entrepreneurial self who is in constant pursuit to enhance her or his 
human capital. Human capital operates ‘upon the following maxim: do 
what you want but take care that your human capital is adapted’ 
(Simons and Masschelein, 2008a). For example, Lisa quotes a col-
league who remarked that   
“As long as the students are happy, you can do whatever you want.” 
(Excerpt 21. Lisa’s research diary” 
However, upon closer inspection, lecturers are not free to do whatever 
they want (i.e. a genuine freedom), but they are “free” to devise inno-
vative strategies to raise student satisfaction (“as long as students are 
happy”). Moreover, it could be suggested that the NSS promotes neo-
liberal “technologies of the self”. That is, lecturers, departments, and 
universities become successful within the game of competition if they 
enhance their ‘capacity for self-control’ (Lemke, 2002:52) and become 
‘responsibilized’ (Brown, 2015:134). For example, student satisfaction 
is no longer seen as the result of a complex interplay of various (often 
idiosyncratic) factors (such as a “student effort”, “increasing class 
sizes”, “increasing pressure to optimise income streams through tui-
tion fees”; and, most importantly, larger societal factors, such as “in-
creasing precarity” and “raising living expenses”), but becomes the 
sole responsibility of lecturers, departments and universities (just as 
“progress” becomes the sole responsibility of teachers in schools):  
“I was speaking to one of my colleagues today. She said that she thinks 
that often students don’t understand that learning is hard and is sup-
posed to be hard, like “a hard and often painful process”. Instead, stu-
dents see it as the responsibility of their lecturers that they should make 
learning easy.” (Excerpt 22. Lisa’s research diary)  
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In short, the responsibility of enhancing the “student experience” is 
shifted towards lecturers whose primary objective now is to make 
learning “easy” and “fun” instead of “challenging”, perhaps sometimes 
“painful”, but ultimately “rewarding”. When student feedback remains 
poor, lecturers may largely internalise this feedback by “taking respon-
sibility”:  
“I am not teaching this one class any longer as the decision has been 
made to take this class off me due to negative student feedback from 
that class. I feel like I really failed on this instance even though I tried 
really hard to make things accessible and clear. But it is also my stu-
dents’ fault in that they simply don’t understand things. But this won’t 
help me much. If this happens in future seminars, I know that I will get 
into trouble with my line managers.” (Excerpt 23. Lisa’s research diary)  
In other words, Lisa oscillates between attributing the negative feed-
back to her own lecturer identity (“I really failed on this instance”) and 
simultaneously attempts to shift the responsibility onto the students, 
knowing that she, however, will ultimately be held accountable and re-
sponsible. Interestingly, it could be suggested that this “responsibilisa-
tion” has created a contradiction. That is, counter to the neo-liberal 
avowal of the entrepreneurial self, the opposite starts to emerge - a 
rather risk-averse self as captured in excerpt 2 (see page 59): 
“After one of my taught English sessions, [a colleague] informed me 
that he had just had a meeting with student representatives and that 
they were ‘really happy’ with my teaching…[As a result of this feed-
back,] I…asked myself the question, ‘What can I do in the future to at-
tain the same good student feedback?’. I believe this was the moment 
when I also started feeling a little trapped in my practice. That is, I 
wanted to continue teaching in a similar fashion so that my students 
would continue to give me positive student feedback… .” (My Research 
Diary)  
That is, when lecturers are fully construed as homo œconomicus – the 
self-interested entrepreneur – they may reason that in order to suc-
ceed (i.e. to maintain good student feedback) one must recreate pre-
cisely those instances where good feedback was obtained. This desire 
for good feedback (and the fear of attaining less favourable feedback) 
may instead produce subjects who become risk-averse rather than 
risk-taking. Yet, regardless of how responsible lecturers become, good 
student feedback is not guaranteed as  
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‘a subject construed and constructed as human capital both for itself 
and for a firm or state is at persistent risk of failure, redundancy and 
abandonment through no doing of its own, regardless of how savvy 
and responsible it is.’ (Brown, 2015:37) 
 
This resonates with Lisa’s research diary:  
“One of the other campuses is now definitely going to close. I feel really 
sorry for my colleagues because they haven’t really done anything 
wrong. Rather they were just at the wrong place at the wrong time and 
may now be made redundant.” (Excerpt 24. Lisa’s research diary) 
That is, lecturers become ‘human capital’ (Foucault, 2008:219) in that 
they attempt to self-invest in their own futures. However, as in any 
genuine market, they are exposed to all associated risks (Brown, 
2015). Importantly, these risks are sometimes entirely beyond the con-
trol of individual people (and institutions for that matter). For instance, 
larger scale market forces may make impossible any local resistance 
to this competitive HEI landscape. This is captured in Lisa’s following 
diary entry:  
“Today, I went on strike and tried to picket outside the university. It was 
surprising how many of my colleagues, however, decided to come into 
work, presumably because of the university open day. I remember just 
standing in front of the entrance to our university building and realised 
that one of my colleagues entered the building. I remember approach-
ing him in a fashion akin to sellers of charity products on the high street 
and handed him one of the leaflets. He then responded, in what I per-
ceived to be a slightly agitated fashion that he was thinking about going 
on strike but then decided to go into work because if the university does 
not recruit enough students we will not have [a] job to strike within any 
more.” (Excerpt 25. Lisa’s research diary) 
Before moving on, I would like to situate Foucault’s notion of govern-
mentality within his larger conception of power. Power, according to 
Foucault, is about the conduct of conduct (Lemke, 2001, 2002), i.e. 
‘the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be di-
rected’ (Foucault, 1982:790). ‘Power only exists when it is put into ac-
tion’ (Foucault, 1982:788) and describes all processes in which the 
behaviour of people can be changed. To arrive at a more sophisticated 
understanding of power, Lemke (2002) suggests that Foucault differ-
entiates between (i) power as ‘strategic games’ (p. 53; emphasis in 
original); (ii) power as ‘government’ (p. 53; emphasis in original); and 
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(iii) power as ‘domination’ (p. 53; emphasis in original). First, ‘power as 
strategic games’ (ibid.) denotes those everyday relationships where 
one person tries to influence the actions of another person. This type 
of power can express itself in various ways, such as ‘ideological ma-
nipulations or rational argumentation, moral advice or economic ex-
ploitation’ (Lemke, 2002:53) and is not necessarily deplorable, but 
could be empowering. Secondly, government describes the type of 
power discussed at length above, i.e. governmentality as a ‘system-
ised’ technology of government which ‘goes beyond the spontaneous 
exercise of power over others’ and follows ‘a specific form of reasoning 
(a “rationality”)’ (p. 53). Lastly, ‘domination is a particular type of power 
relationship that is both stable and hierarchical, fixed and difficult to 
reverse’ (p. 53; emphasis in original). This, for example, includes ex-
treme forms of subjugation, such as killing someone or strapping 
someone to a hospital bed. That is, “domination” - or “states of domi-
nation” (Foucault et al., 1987; Lemke, 2002) or “violence” (Foucault, 
1982) - describe the following:   
‘States of domination, [are when] the relations of power … find them-
selves firmly set and congealed. When an individual or a social group 
manages to block a field of relations of power, to render them impas-
sive and invariable and to prevent all reversibility of movement – by 
means of instruments which can be economic as well as political or 
military – we are facing what can be called a state of domination.’ 
(Foucault et al., 1987:114) 
In a state of domination, ‘the practice of liberty’ either ‘does not 
exist or exists only unilaterally or is extremely confined and limited’ (p. 
114).  
Another way to conceptualise Foucault’s understanding of power 
is to suggest that power ranges from “technologies of the self”, on the 
one hand, to “technologies of domination”, on the other. Returning to 
the notion of governmentality discussed above, Lemke (2002) argues 
that the meeting point between these technologies of self and domina-
tion is what Foucault calls “government”. That is, ‘government refers 
to a continuum, which extends from political government right through 
to forms of self-regulation – namely, “technologies of the self”’ (p. 59). 
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Interestingly, this is also visible in how students are asked questions 
in the latest instantiation of the NSS. That is, power conceived as the 
“conduct of conduct” – i.e. as the working on the actions of others - is 
clearly visible in that students no longer answer whether their courses 
have taught them something. Instead, NSS questions comprise ‘my 
course has challenged me to achieve my best work’ or ‘my course has 
provided me with opportunities to explore ideas or concepts in depth’ 
(Ipsos Mori, 2017:online). In other words, the NSS seeks to assess 
how well courses have enabled students to conduct their self-conduct.    
Moreover, it could be suggested that government may sometimes 
mean the application of domination (for example, when people are 
strapped to a bed in a psychiatric ward or when people are kettled on 
a demonstration). However, a government of the whole population is 
most effectively achieved through ‘technologies of the self’ which help 
people conduct their own conduct (i.e. they determine their own ac-
tions). Yet, these actions must fall within a certain ‘field of possible 
action’ (p. 52). The latter point is crucial: lecturers may choose from a 
range of possible tactics (a ‘field of possible action’) to raise student 
feedback. However, “not to raise student feedback” is not an option (it 
is not within this ‘field of possible action’).   
4.2.4 Intermediate Conclusion: Competition Everywhere!   
In summary, what according to Foucault defines neo-liberalism and 
delineates it from classical economic liberalism is that neo-liberal ide-
ology does not believe in governments simply playing the “night watch-
man”. Rather, under neo-liberalism, it becomes the government’s duty 
to ensure that competitive markets develop and operate “effectively”. 
In other words, neo-liberalism holds on to the idea of the ‘invisible 
hand’ (i.e. that the people’s self-interest creates the optimal progress 
of humanity), but this self-interest is neither natural nor does it always 
emerge automatically. Instead, it is the government’s responsibility to 
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create the conditions for the emergence of competitive markets. Im-
portantly, this means that instead of denoting a natural phenomenon, 
markets become a desirable phenomenon:  
‘if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health 
care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be 
created, by state action if necessary.’ (Harvey, 2005:2)  
Crucially, this logic of the desirability of markets makes it possible 
that markets are not any longer requested simply in the sphere of the 
economic. Rather, since competitive markets are always desirable, 
they become extended to all realms of social life (Brown, 2015). What 
has come to be known under the terminology of New Public Manage-
ment (Steger, 2010) – i.e. the public (sector) is remade in the image of 
the private sector with the (purported) intention of making the public 
sector more efficient (Steger, 2010) - is just one example of this re-
making of the social in the image of the economic (Brown, 2015). The 
following section now returns to Brown’s (2015) assertion that compe-
tition becomes the new overriding principle how human and institu-
tional interactions are structured by exploring what happens in “hyper-
competitive” situations.   
 
I would like to begin by examining one contemporary television pro-
gramme, entitled “Love Island” (ITV, 2018). “Love Island” in many 
ways could be considered to embody neo-liberalism in its quintessen-
tial form because it incorporates two of its indispensable elements: (i) 
desire (for other people) and (ii) competition (both of which are 
artificially created). For instance, in one stretch of episodes, four 
women were partnered up with four men. Suddenly, one additional 
man was introduced whose task it was to “choose” one of the women 
and thereby break up the partnerships only just formed. This “chosen” 
woman then had to leave her old partner to be with the new contestant. 
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After this contestant made his “choice” 15 , the latest task was 
announced: shortly, all partners would have to reshuffle and the man 
who ended up “partner-less” would be cast out of the competition.  
I suggest that this purposeful creation of a scenario in which the 
production and depiction of competitive desperation is celebrated is 
characteristic of contemporary neo-liberalism in which all social inter-
actions increasingly become framed as competitive interactions with 
necessary losers and winners (Brown, 2015). I furthermore suggest 
that competition – in all of its forms and not necessarily restricted to 
competition in a strictly economic sense (cf. Brown, 2015) - is contin-
gent on desire. If there was no desire for something (to earn more 
money, to get out of a desperate situation, to win against someone in 
a sports competition), there would be no competition. For example, it 
would drastically reduce the extent of economic competition, if people 
were simply not interested in money. If everyone lived in decent hous-
ing, there would be no need to desire better housing. This take on de-
sire is also implied in Foucault’s assertion in the context of the emer-
gence of liberalism in which desire becomes naturalised:  
‘…[Amongst idiosyncratic actions in the population] there is at least 
one invariant that means that the population taken as a whole has one 
and only one mainspring of action. This is desire. Desire is an old no-
tion that first appeared and was employed in spiritual direction (to 
which, possibly, we may be able to return),* and it makes its second 
appearance within techniques of power and government. Every 
individual acts out of desire. One can do nothing against desire.’ (Fou-
cault, 2009:72) 
The liberal art of governing, hence, is about how to govern by al-
lowing desire to flourish. In addition, I propose that competition usually 
involves the desire for something finite. This is precisely what happens 
in Love Island where a desire for the finite love and affection of another 
person (often an exclusive trait) means that competition must arise.  
                                                 
15 Other interesting lines of enquiry could revolve around the question of why 
all contestants were heterosexual and why a man should be entitled or forced to 
“steal” a woman of another man. 
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There are a myriad other reality TV programmes which artificially 
create competition through creating desire over something finite (i.e. 
there can only be one winner), such “The Apprentice”, “X-Factor” and 
“The Great British Bake Off”, though these may somewhat pale in 
comparison to Love Island’s instrumentalisation of one of the strongest 
of desires (i.e. the physical desire for another human being) . 
These “hyper-competitions”, including their construction of artifi-
cially created situations of strong desire over something finite, are also 
embodied in dramatised television series. For example, in the 2005 
final episode of Doctor Who, the Doctor – a benevolent alien who fre-
quently saves the universe from destruction - is caught on a space 
station which continuously broadcasts a plethora of game shows. For 
example, in “The Weakest Link”, a robot (“Anne-Droid”) punishes con-
testants who “are the weakest link” by (apparent) death through a la-
ser-beam. Similarly, the person who is discarded from the Big Brother 
House after each round is “evicted from life”. Importantly, in these 
games, contestants do not have a choice but must participate unless 
they wish to die. Under neo-liberalism, we similarly must participate or 
otherwise are discarded onto the streets (Brown, 2015).  
Competition in its crassest form is, however, famously displayed 
in the film Battle Royale (Battle Royale, 2000). Battle Royale describes 
a hypothetical scenario in which teenagers are forced onto an island 
to play a sickening “game”. Fitted with “explosive collars” they are 
informed that they have exactly three days to kill all other participants 
or otherwise all explosive collars are automatically activated. Explo-
sions are also triggered if any teenagers decide to subvert the game. 
As expected, a brutal massacre ensues in which some teenagers en-
joy the killing process, others feel forced to kill by the sheer fear of 
being killed themselves, some commit suicide out of desperation whilst 
others seek to subvert the game and get killed by their exploding col-
lars. Above all, this film shows what happens if an “ultimate competi-
tion” is implemented: i.e. a competition over life itself.  
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Using Battle Royale as an analogy for everyday life under neolib-
eralism may appear an unfair exaggeration, yet there are striking sim-
ilarities between the artificial and deadly game played in Battle Royale 
and the situation of individuals under neoliberalism. These parallels 
are captured, firstly, in the fact that in Battle Royale there, again, must 
be winners and losers: the winner survives whilst the losers die. Brown 
(2015) suggests that in our contemporary neoliberal society the dis-
tinction of society into ‘winners and losers’ is paramount. This parallel 
between Battle Royale and our contemporary situation becomes even 
clearer when taking into consideration that under neoliberalism eco-
nomic survival is increasingly connected with physical survival:  
‘where there are only capitals and competition among them, not only 
will some win while others lose (inequality and competition unto death 
replaces equality and commitment to protect life), but some will be 
rescued and resuscitated, while others will be cast off or left to perish 
(owners of small farms and small businesses, those with underwater 
mortgages, indebted and unemployed college graduates).’ (Brown, 
2015:72; emphasis added) 
Whilst the competitive situation in Battle Royale is extreme, under 
neoliberalism most people are perpetually confronted with what hap-
pens if they fail to adapt to the current economic climate and fail to find 
employment. For example, I consider the following journal entry:  
“Today I walked home from university to the station. It seems to me that 
homelessness is exacerbating daily. I walked past at least 8 homeless 
people which creates two things for me. The first is a feeling of guilt 
when walking past and not giving money. That is, even though I usually 
give one person money, I still feel guilty for the rest. The other realisa-
tion is that I would do almost anything not to end up in the same situa-
tion myself.” (Excerpt 26. My research diary) 
This also, yet again, resonates with Foucault’s (2009:42) assertion that 
the ‘scarcity-scourge disappears’, but that individual instances of hun-
ger must not disappear. Homelessness may, indeed, be part of this 
neo-liberal technology of government in that it functions as an example 
which aims to instil fear in people (i.e. to become homeless) and en-
hance compliance because of this fear. If people see the alternative to 
a stressful, unfulfilling job, they will still prefer that job over being cast 
onto the street. Similarly, if lecturers see that another colleague is 
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made redundant because she or he failed to raise good student feed-
back, they will work harder to produce good student feedback. The 
event of resistance may be prevented by always making sure that “col-
lateral damage” prevails and is visible. 
 
In conclusion, neoliberalism has the capacity to infiltrate every sphere 
of human existence. Through this emergence of a neo-liberal subjec-
tivity, we are all re-framed as self-investing and responsibilised (and, 
as Brown (2015) argues actually no longer entrepreneuring) individu-
als. One aspect of this is that all members of a nation-state (and, as I 
will argue later, nation-states themselves) become competitors, sellers 
and buyers. For example, when I am at university “I become the ser-
vice provider who sells a good student experience” (My research diary) 
whilst when I am shopping for perfume for my wife, I become the de-
manding and somewhat rude customer who may not even say thank 
you:  
“Yesterday, I went Christmas shopping. I got so increasingly annoyed 
with the prices for everything and the general frenzy of buying 
Christmas presents for everyone (it’s all so expensive) that I was 
thinking to myself, if I’m already paying so much for perfume, I at least 
want to be treated well (after all the customer is king, right?) as a 
compensation of feeling rather unhappy about the lack of money each 
month.” (Excerpt 27. My research diary)  
In short, and put slightly simplistically, it is not only that neoliberalism 
(i) makes most people poorer and/or less secure, (ii) commercialises 
everything, (iii) increasingly corrupts political decisions and (iv) desta-
bilises society by excessive levels of financial risk-taking (Brown, 
2015), it also colonises how we think about ourselves (as human cap-
ital), others (as competitors) and politics (to grow the economy).  
4.3 Conclusion: The NSS as a Neo-Liberal-Disciplinary Amal-
gam  
This chapter hitherto showed how Foucault’s notion of “governmental-
ity” could be utilised to theorise the effects of the National Student Sur-
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vey (NSS). The NSS was first analysed as a “disciplinary governmen-
tality” and then as a (neo)liberal governmentality. The disciplinary 
character of the NSS was shown to be embodied in that “student feed-
back systems” (such as Student Representative Meetings (SRMs), In-
ternal Surveys and the NSS) utilise “normalising judgement”, “hierar-
chical observation” and “examinations”. It was argued that, as a result, 
university lecturers became increasingly compliant by making the 
achievement of student satisfaction their priority. Secondly, a new di-
mension was brought into the analysis by considering Foucault’s work 
on liberal and neo-liberal “governmentality”. Here, it was suggested 
that the NSS governs the academic population by, for example, pitch-
ing lecturers, departments and universities against one another within 
competitive artificial markets (cf. neo-liberalism). That is, by using the 
principles of economic market “freedoms”, these freedoms simultane-
ously avoid large-scale (academic) civil unrest (because most lectur-
ers, by default, produce a normative “acceptable” comparable feed-
back) whilst also producing important collateral damage to function as 
“warnings” along the lines of “look what happens if you don’t produce 
good student feedback”.  
 
The question now arises how these different governmentalities could 
be thought together. Fittingly, Foucault’s (2009:107) lecture series of 
1978 already suggests not to think of sovereignty, discipline and liberal 
governmentality as separate historical epochs in which a ‘society of 
sovereignty’ is replaced by ‘a society of discipline’ which is then re-
placed by ‘a society, say, of [liberal] government’. Rather these differ-
ent governmentalities comprise a  
‘triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and (liberal) governmental manage-
ment, which has population as its main target and apparatuses of se-
curity as its essential mechanism’ (p. 143).  
Whilst discipline was operational in the emerging institutions of 
‘schools, workshops, [and] armies’, it ‘was never more valued than 
when the attempt was made to manage the population …’ (p. 143). 
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Similarly, ‘disciplinary techniques’ are ‘contemporaneous with’ and 
‘bound up with’ liberalism’. For example, Jeremy Bentham, towards 
the end of his life, proposes ‘that the Panopticon should be the formula 
for the whole of [liberal] government’ (p. 67). This government should 
'give way to … [natural, i.e. liberal] mechanisms’ and not interfere apart 
from supervising’ (p. 67). Only if this credo of non-interference proves 
to be ineffective, the government should actively intervene by subject-
ing individuals to discipline or even “domination” (cf. Lemke, 2002).  
As was argued above, in the context of the NSS, lecturers also 
may be free to do what they want, but only as long as they produce 
positive student feedback (i.e. the liberal idea of freedom within the 
neo-liberal framework of artificially created quasi-markets is opera-
tional). However, if this attempt to raise feedback does not produce 
results, lecturers may then be subjected to disciplinary power in the 
shape of “disciplinary hearings” or “disciplinary procedures”. If this dis-
ciplinary process also proves unsuccessful, then perhaps harsher 
“sovereign” logics may be applied, such as redundancy, potentially 
leading to more radical forms of precarity, such as homelessness.   
Perhaps, however, what happens in contemporary HEIs (and in 
society more generally) is something which Foucault could not have 
predicted in his own time: the proliferation of ranking practices facili-
tated through technology. This concluding section, thus, suggests that 
what happens in the NSS is that neo-liberal governmentality and dis-
cipline have morphed into a new amalgamated hybrid. At Higher Edu-
cation Institutions (HEIs), this “neo-liberal-disciplinary governmental-
ity” may, for example, entail artificially created markets (such as the 
NSS) (cf. neo-liberalism) which operate within tightly controlled param-
eters (cf. discipline). More specifically, it could be (schematically) sug-
gested that neo-liberal governmentality is at play in that universities, 
faculties, departments, programmes and lecturers are pitched against 
one another in competitive struggles over positive student ratings and, 
indirectly, future student numbers (and, hence, income streams). This 
neo-liberal governmentality simultaneously utilises “disciplinary 
119 
power” in that the government/senior management nexus instrumen-
talise the panoptic gaze of students to normalisingly judge lecturers 
and departments by ranking them on league tables. Importantly, the 
intention is not to make these entities into “better” people or institu-
tions, but to enhance their “performance” and competitive standing (cf. 
neo-liberalism) within these very tables. If lecturers perform well, they 
are framed as winners (cf. Brown, 2015) and those who perform to-
wards the bottom of the scale are framed as ‘losers’ (which is a typical 
effect of neo-liberalism). The losers may be put under additional sur-
veillance (discipline) to enhance their competitive standing (neo-liber-
alism). At all times, all universitarian actors are under continuous pres-
sure to enhance their “human capital” to further improve their 
competitive standing (neo-liberalism) within, however, highly system-
atised and clearly visible rankings which, of course, operate through 
normalising judgement (i.e. discipline).  
In a wider societal context, rating and ranking practices of services 
and products have similarly proliferated. This is captured in the follow-
ing research diary excerpt:  
“Just in the last month, I received a dozen requests to rate services and 
products. To just mention a few examples the following companies 
asked me to rate them: Amazon regarding the products I purchased; 
British Gas about the experience when they fitted a new electricity line 
(they also asked the question whether staff took off their shoes), Google 
Maps asked me to say how Aldi was today. And these were just the 
instances I remembered.” (Excerpt 28. My research diary) 
Importantly, these individual ratings often accrue into an average 
rating. These average ratings, in return, guide people’s choices and 
are difficult to resist. For example, a restaurant’s two-star rating on 
“Trip Advisor” – an online customer review website which rates restau-
rants, hotels and other hospitality related venues - would deter me 
from dining there. Likewise, when my wife and I recently failed to check 
whether a restaurant was on Trip Advisor – which it was not – this 
restaurant turned out to be of appalling quality. These rating and rank-
ing practices sometimes have negative outcomes: a restaurant owner, 
for example, complained that she was often less likely to urge “rude” 
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customers to leave the premises because of being scared that these 
customers then leave a poor review of her restaurant.  
 
Interestingly, on some of these rating and ranking internet platforms, 
such as Airbnb, customers do not only rate the individual company or 
service provider, but the company also rates the customer. For exam-
ple, on my family’s last holiday in Spain, Airbnb did not only ask us to 
rate the apartment we stayed at, but also allowed the host to recipro-
cally provide a rating (including comment) for us, based on how tidy 
we left the house and how satisfied the host was with us. In other 
words, hosts and guests rate one another reciprocally with potential 
consequences for both parties. Porges (2016) for example, suggests 
that hosts may be driven into “burnout” by Airbnb reviews. Similarly, 
the taxi-company Uber implemented processes in which both custom-
ers and taxi drivers rate each other on the experience of their shared 
car journey with anxiety-inducing effects on both parties (Hunt, 2016).  
This returns this discussion to Charlie Brooker’s Nosedive (2016) 
which was presented in the beginning of this thesis. In this dystopian 
depiction of the future, reciprocal rating practices have infiltrated the 
entire social body in that not only commodity exchanges but all human 
interactions are rated. As mentioned above, this type of social scoring 
system is already being trialled in China where, in one instance, a 
school denied access to a child from parents who were deemed “anti-
social” based on their social citizen scores (Bisset, 2018). I will now 
briefly outline how the proposed amalgam of Foucault’s disciplinary 
and neo-liberal governmentalities is embodied in Nosedive.  
Beginning with disciplinary governmentality, “Hierarchical Obser-
vation” is omnipresent in that everyone in Nosedive wears augmented 
reality contact lenses, making visible everyone else’s scores at all 
times (just like the NSS, where scores and rankings are there for eve-
ryone to see on a scale from 1 - 5). Second, smartphones make it 
possible to rate others for even the slightest transgression: when Lacie 
loses her composure and starts swearing at an airport, people nearby 
instantly rate her down. In Foucault’s (1977) words, she got “observed” 
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(by bystanders) and “normalisingly judged” (i.e. rated down). Put dif-
ferently, Foucault’s panoptical principle of “eyes that cannot be seen” 
is universalised into all realms of social interactions (in which everyone 
judges and is judged).  
Importantly, alongside this universalisation, formal and informal hi-
erarchies co-exist and are even somewhat systematised. For instance, 
people with higher scores possess more “rating-impact” than those 
with lower scores: at some point, Lacie is rated negatively by high scor-
ing “Bets” simply for “trying a little bit too hard”. This significantly affects 
Lacie’s score (and her anxiety levels). Similarly, traditional hierarchies 
persist. Returning to the airport scene, a security police officer pun-
ishes Lacie for swearing by temporarily deducting one point off Lacie’s 
score. 
Moving on, Nosedive also exhibits elements of liberal and neo-
liberal governmentality. For instance, Lacie enjoys a certain “freedom”, 
albeit in a drastically reinterpreted form: whilst in liberal societies free-
dom was focussed on the accumulation of wealth (Foucault, 2009), the 
freedom in Nosedive is focussed on the accumulation of positive rat-
ings. In addition, these ratings “competitise” (cf. neo-liberalism) society 
by producing winners (e.g. those who are given cancer treatments, are 
able to attain attractive housing) and losers (cf. Brown, 2015). This 
competitisation makes everyone into homo œconomicus - i.e. the self-
investing entrepreneur who attempts to invest into his or her own hu-
man capital (i.e. her or his rating score) - by calculating which action 
gives the biggest “return on investment” (i.e. a higher score) (Brown, 
2015). However, this neo-liberal rationality (of competition) is merged 
with a disciplinary element in which everyone is instantly able to (pan-
optically) compare himself or herself to everyone else.  
Going beyond Foucault’s (2008) conception of neo-liberalism, cer-
tain other aspects of neoliberalism (without a hyphen) – such as wealth 
inequality - appear entangled with the social scoring system in 
Nosedive. For instance, Naomi, a person with a very high score, is 
getting married on her fiancé’s private island whilst Lacie, with a lower 
score, is finding it difficult to afford decent housing. In addition, poor 
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ratings may result in exclusions from the workplace – i.e. a low score 
simply denies people access to their office – which in return denies 
them the ability to earn a wage. Consequentially, the constant risk of 
downwards mobility (both in terms of ratings and wealth) keeps people 
in check (they are disciplined), just like in contemporary society where 
the fear of unemployment may keep people from taking collective ac-
tion. In short, those neoliberal aspects – i.e. those aspects which were 
not yet as prevalent at Foucault’s time of writing, such as downwards 
mobility – may function as part of my suggested disciplinary-neo-lib-
eral hybrid. Just like pupils in 18th-century military schools became dis-
ciplined by the constant threat of being relegated to one of the “lower 
classes”, the prospect of “being relegated” into unemployment contrib-
utes to peoples’ docility.  
This closes this chapter. The following chapter will now discuss 
another logic which operates through the NSS: that of antagonism 
(Laclau, 2005). Importantly, antagonism will be presented as another 
governmentality operating alongside the disciplinary and neo-liberal 
governmentalities discussed above.  
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Chapter 5 The NSS as an Antagonistic Governmentality 
‘Populism is the royal road to understanding something about the on-
tological constitution of the political as such.’ (Laclau, 2005:67) 
 
‘It is through the demonization of a section of the population that a 
society reaches a sense of its own cohesion.’ (p. 70) 
 
‘A credible alternative to the neoliberal order […] requires drawing new 
political frontiers and acknowledging that there cannot be a radical 
politics without the definition of an adversary. That is to say, it requires 
the acceptance of the ineradicability of antagonism.’ (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2014:xvi-xvii) 
Dīvide et īmpera (Divide and Rule) is a ubiquitous saying and has been 
utilised in the study of political processes (cf. Xypolia, 2016).  Through 
Laclau’s work, it acquires further plausibility. By building on the previ-
ous chapter which theorised the NSS as a disciplinary and neo-liberal 
governmental hybrid, this chapter argues that the NSS also operates 
as an “antagonistic technology”. This analysis seeks to shed further 
light on how the NSS affects lecturers, departments and universities.  
Laclau’s work has gained some moderate popularity in education 
in recent years. For example, there have been publications in the con-
text of education policy research (Clarke, 2012; Baldacchino, 2017; 
Sokhanwar et al., 2018), educational philosophy and theory 
(Szkudlarek, 2007, 2011, 2016, 2018; Rømer, 2011; Mårdh and 
Tryggvason, 2017); citizenship education (Sant and Hanley, 2018); 
“trust schools” (Warren et al., 2011); and radical democratic education 
(Snir, 2017) 
Crucial to the notion of antagonism is that group identities tend to 
emerge when the members of those groups commonly oppose an-
other entity. Thus, antagonism is akin to the notion of competition in 
that they both involve an enemy, an outside force which prevents peo-
ple from fulfilling their desire. However, whereas in competition one 
group sees another group as their enemy because both groups have 
the same desire (e.g. to defeat each other, to gain the favour of other 
people, to gain customers), in antagonistic relations one group rejects 
another group because the latter keeps the former from fulfilling its 
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desire. Most importantly, in antagonism it is precisely through this re-
jection, that group identities emerge in the first place.  
This chapter argues that in the NSS both logics operate 
simultaneously, and that it is precisely through this simultaneity that 
lecturers become increasingly isolated. Put bluntly, lecturers develop 
an antagonism towards students (as the enemy), yet this antagonism 
fails to create the typical connectivity with other lecturers (because 
they are competitors). In a nutshell then, there is this new strange type 
of antagonism: an antagonism without populism. In addition, this chap-
ter suggests that when competition and antagonism operate simulta-
neously, this combination promotes antagonisms at lower levels of 
scale whilst diffusing antagonisms at higher levels of scale. Put briefly, 
large-scale resistance of problematic policies, such as the NSS (or the 
TEF) are avoided whilst “keeping everyone busy” in antagonisms and 
competitions at lower levels of scale.   
This chapter starts with an elucidation of Laclau’s work on his no-
tion of “antagonism” and “populism”. Next, SETs will be explored as 
technologies which promote antagonisms between students and lec-
turers. This chapter ends with a question. How can a large-scale an-
tagonism be created that critiques precisely the macro processes 
which are the causation of other antagonisms at micro and meso lev-
els of scale? The only tenable option, consistent with Laclau’s (2005) 
logic, is to temporarily give up on the specificity of localised issues and 
to create a popular demand around what Laclau calls an “empty signi-
fier”.  
5.1  An Introduction to Laclau’s Antagonism 
In “On Populist Reason”, Laclau (2005:ix) seeks to address ‘the nature 
and logics of the formation of collective identities’ through his notion of 
“antagonism” and his reworking of the notion of “populism”. Crucial to 
Laclau’s understanding of antagonism is his take on discourse. Dis-
course, according to Laclau (2005), constitutes objectivity and, im-
portantly, is not restricted to writing or speech. Instead, it describes 
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‘any complex of elements in which [differential] relations play the con-
stitutive role’ (68, emphasis in original): ‘elements do not pre-exist the 
relational complex but are constituted through it’ (p. 68). By extending 
Saussure’s assertion that there are ‘no positive terms in language, only 
differences’ (ibid.) from its linguistic orientation to all acts of significa-
tion, Laclau maintains that ‘something is what it is only through its dif-
ferential relations to something else’ (p. 68, emphasis added). In other 
words, ‘an action is what it is only through its differences from other 
possible actions’ or ‘signifying elements – words or actions’ (ibid.). 
These other actions or signifying elements ‘can be successive or sim-
ultaneous’ (ibid.). Either way, identities are always “differential identi-
ties”.  
This is where Laclau’s concept of antagonism comes into play. 
Antagonism is discursive (i.e. fundamentally concerned with “rela-
tions”) in that it builds on the opposition of another entity. Therefore, 
antagonism needs to be delineated from (i) real oppositions and (ii) 
contradictions (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014:124). “Real opposition” de-
scribes the opposition of ‘real objects’ with each object having its own 
positive identity (p. 108), such as two cars crashing into each other. 
“Contradiction”, on the other hand, happens at ‘a logico-conceptual 
level’ (p. 108). In a contradiction, ‘the relation of each term with the 
other exhausts the reality of both’ (ibid.). The difference between real 
opposition and contradiction is that the former comprises “real objects” 
whereas the latter relates to “concepts”. Whilst in contradictions ‘con-
cepts can contradict one another’, real objects cannot; for instance, 
‘no real object exhausts its identity by its opposition to another object’ 
(p. 109).  
Antagonism is structurally different. Antagonism cannot be 
equated to real opposition because ‘there is nothing antagonistic in a 
crash between two vehicles: it is a material fact obeying positive phys-
ical laws’. Similarly, it would be problematic to equate “class struggle” 
(an antagonism) with ‘the physical act by which a policeman hits a 
worker militant’ (p. 109). Likewise, contradictions and antagonism can-
not be equated either. For instance, two groups may hold ‘mutually 
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contradictory belief systems, and yet no antagonism emerges from 
these contradictions’ (p. 109). How is antagonism different from real 
opposition and contradiction? In an antagonism, ‘the presence of the 
‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself’ (p. 127; emphasis 
added). The existence of this “Other” is neither a contradiction – i.e. 
the other clearly exists – nor is the “Other” a simple positive entity, 
such as a physical force which is put to rest by a counterforce. Rather, 
antagonism is captured in the example where a landowner expels a 
peasant ‘from his land’ (p.127). Because the ‘peasant cannot be a 
peasant’ any longer (p. 127), he develops an antagonism towards the 
landowner.  
In short, antagonism can be understood as follows: there is an 
antagonism (i.e. an antagonistic relation) if there is a perceived oppos-
ing force which prevents one person from becoming the person she or 
he wants to be. In other words, as long as ‘there is antagonism, I can-
not be a full presence for myself’ (p. 127).  
On this foundation, Laclau builds his understanding of populism. 
More specifically, he describes how antagonistic relations can promote 
the emergence of group identities by introducing the difference be-
tween “democratic demands” and “popular demands”. Democratic de-
mands describe isolated demands, regardless of whether they are 
‘satisfied or not’ (Laclau, 2005:73). In other words, the antagonism ex-
ists between whoever is the demanding entity and something else, i.e. 
the opposing force. For example, a ‘group of people’ may share a prob-
lem (for example with housing) and demand a ‘solution’ from the local 
government (p. 73). Importantly, this demand exists in isolation from 
the demands of other groups of people. Moreover, if this democratic 
demand for housing is met, it ceases to exist, simply because the op-
posing force stops being an opposing force.  
What happens, however, if this democratic (i.e. isolated) demand 
remains unmet for a longer period? Laclau suggests that this opens 
the possibility for the emergence of popular demands. Returning to the 
example of unmet needs with housing, popular demands arise when 
people, for instance, ‘start to perceive that their neighbours have other, 
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equally unsatisfied demands – problems with water, health, schooling, 
and so on’ (Laclau, 2005:73). This, in return, may establish an ‘equiv-
alential relation … between’ the demands’ of the different groups of 
people’ (ibid.). In short, the initial isolated democratic demands are re-
placed by shared popular ones. These popular demands emerge, as 
in the example above, through the people’s rejection of – i.e. their an-
tagonism towards - a common enemy, in this case, for instance, their 
local authority.  
How can the notion of antagonism now facilitate an understanding 
of the logic of larger-scale populism? Two notions are crucial to 
understand this logic: empty and floating signifiers. To give a larger-
scale example of a populist logic, Laclau draws on the pre-revolution-
ary situation in 20th century Russia. Here, Tsarism – as the ‘oppressive 
regime’ - is separated by an antagonistic ‘frontier from the demands of 
most sectors of society’ (Laclau, 2005:130). Even though each of 
these sectors has a particular demand that ‘is different from all the 
others’ – for example, one group may simply demand “political free-
dom” (but is denied this) whilst another demands food (but goes hun-
gry) - they share a ‘common opposition to the oppressive regime’ (p. 
131). This common rejection of the regime enables ‘equivalential links’ 
between the groups, resulting in what Laclau calls an ‘equivalential 
chain’ (p. 77; emphasis added). Importantly, however, these “equiva-
lential links” are only possible because of one important process: one 
specific demand suddenly becomes the symbol – i.e. the signifier - for 
the demands of all the other groups. For example, the slogan “Peace, 
Bread, Land” may come to represent the demands of all groups (in-
cluding that group which simply demands political freedom and may, 
in fact, not be hungry).  Laclau terms this specific demand, which 
comes to represent all demands, an empty signifier. That is, an empty 
signifier does not refer to any signified - i.e. a specific idea - because 
an empty signifier means something different for each of the groups 
(also see Srnicek and Williams, 2016).  
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It is this logic by which one signifier “steps in” to represent the 
whole of society in relation to an antagonistic force (which denies so-
ciety this wholeness) which Laclau calls hegemony.  To develop this 
notion of hegemony further, I return to Laclau’s idea of the emergence 
of a popular identity through the latter’s shared antagonism towards 
something else. Here, one section of society is demonised so that ‘a 
society reaches a sense of its own cohesion’ (p. 70). In other words, 
this section becomes ‘an excluded one, something that the totality ex-
pels from itself in order to constitute itself’ (p. 70). This excluded sec-
tion is what Laclau refers to as the constitutive outside and is precisely 
the reason how any group forms its own sense of identity. That is, this 
type of populist group identity needs something which the group col-
lectively rejects in order to form equivalential links between its constit-
uent parts (i.e. between what would otherwise be a range of differential 
identities). This is where Laclau injects his notion of hegemony. He-
gemony is the process in which  
‘one difference, without ceasing to be a particular difference, assumes 
the representation of an incommensurable totality. In that way, its 
body is split between the particularity which it still is and the more uni-
versal signification of which it is the bearer. This operation of taking 
up, by a particularity, of an incommensurable universal signification is 
what I have called hegemony.’ (Laclau, 2005:70; emphasis in original) 
This now makes it possible to develop Laclau’s understanding of 
a floating signifier.  Whilst there was a very clear antagonistic frontier 
between the People and the Tsar family resulting in an ‘equivalential 
chain’ between different sectors of society, in other populist configura-
tions the antagonistic frontier is not as “clear-cut” but rather blurred. In 
these examples, one ‘equivalential chain’ can be disrupted by another 
equivalential chain (p. 131) (by a rival hegemonic project) which tries 
to constitute a different antagonistic force as the root of unmet 
particular demands. This happened with the ascendance of the right-
wing populism in the 1950 movements against the American New Deal 
which Laclau uses to show how “floating signifiers” operate. Floating 
signifiers are ‘signifiers whose meaning is “suspended”’ in the sense 
that the meaning of the signifier is ‘indeterminate between alternative 
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equivalential frontiers’ (p. 131). For example, in 1950s right-wing pop-
ulism, the signifier of the ‘small man’ vis-à-vis the power of the elites 
becomes increasingly disconnected from the discourse of the left (i.e. 
the American New Deal) and attaches itself instead to a right-wing dis-
course (p. 131). In this right-wing discourse, the Western liberal left-
wing elite becomes the antagonistic force against which the popular 
identity is constructed. It is important to notice that this example 
demonstrates how democratic demands remained unchanged (people 
were still struggling with the same issues), whereas popular demands 
were constructed around a different ‘equivalential chain’ (Laclau, 
2005:131). Which equivalential chain the democratic demands will 
eventually become attached to (and which empty signifier comes to 
represent this chain) is contingent on the ‘hegemonic struggle’ (p. 132) 
between two rival ‘hegemonic projects’ (p. 131). Put bluntly, it could be 
suggested that in the contemporary United States – and other Euro-
pean countries for that matter - people are struggling over a variety of 
specific unmet democratic demands (e.g. as argued above: longer 
working hours, less income, less job security, omnipresent competi-
tion, demand for safety from gun crime etc.). However, which 
equivalential chain (and associated popular demand) people attach 
their democratic demands to depends on who wins the hegemonic 
struggle. Trump offered the antagonism of the “liberal elitist left”, “im-
migrants” and outside competitors (Europe, China, etc.) and won the 
election. However, there is also a rival hegemonic project underway 
by Bernie Sanders who offers the antagonism of “the billionaire Elite”.  
5.1.1 Modifications to Laclau’s Framework 
Before, moving to this chapter’s analysis, there is the necessity to 
modify Laclau’s framework slightly. This modification concerns the ra-
ther arbitrary nature of when exactly something becomes a populism 
and when it does not. I suggest that populism is by no means restricted 
to large-scale examples; instead, I propose that antagonisms and pop-
ulism can exist at all levels of scale. That is, against Laclau’s assertion 
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that popular identities can only emerge amongst larger population 
sizes, it is suggested that the principle of populism may operate irre-
spective of scale. That is, I ask the blunt question, “How many people 
need to support a political idea so that this idea can be called populist? 
Are five or 500,000 supporters enough, or does it take 1,000,000 or 
even 2,000,000?” I, therefore, suggest that popular logics can operate 
at even the smallest group level.  
I furthermore propose that scale still matters, but only in that it 
affects the degree to which a signifier becomes empty: the larger the 
amount of differing democratic demands, the “emptier” the signifier 
needs to be.  That is, an empty signifier needs to hold all different 
groups and their demands together in an equivalential chain. If those 
different groups do not significantly vary in their democratic demands, 
the signifier similarly does not need to be that “empty”. For example, 
in a hypothetical small company one colleague may be struggling with 
childcare arrangements, whilst another is struggling with an excessive 
workload and wants better working conditions whilst a third suffers with 
anxiety due to the perceived threat of losing his job. All three col-
leagues are confronted with an unresponsive power, i.e. their boss, 
who refuses to meet these demands. As a result, the three colleagues 
may now stand up and confront their boss over these issues and de-
mand “better working conditions”. This signifier – i.e. “better working 
conditions” - is already somewhat emptier than the original concrete 
democratic demands. At a larger scale, on the other hand, there may 
be a country where one group of people are struggling with hunger 
and demand food whilst others suffer under political persecution and 
demand freedom whilst yet another group may be suffering under ra-
cial discrimination and demand equality. These groups may come to-
gether under an increasingly empty signifier, such as “Freedom”. Even 
though freedom does not necessarily address, for instance, those is-
sues of hunger and the specific demand for food, it still may come to 
represent these.  
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5.2 The NSS as an Antagonistic Technology  
This section now discusses how the NSS could be viewed through 
Laclau’s notions of antagonism and populism. I would like to begin by 
considering four excerpts from Lisa’s research diary:  
“this particular class does not seem to have anything in common and 
the students simply do not speak much to each other. The few 
conversation[s] which I managed to overhear were about certain stu-
dents showing off their amazing holidays or talking about something 
that happened to them on their journey to university.” (Excerpt 29. 
Lisa’s research diary, October, 2016) 
 
“After the session, a student came to see me and talked about the fact 
that she was concerned about her assignment.” (Excerpt 30. Lisa’s re-
search diary, November, 2016) 
 
“ I am teaching this one class in which one group of students frequently 
complains about another group of students for being noisy and disre-
spectful. What I found interesting is that their friendship inside the group 
appeared to be strengthened through their animosity towards the other 
group. Honestly, I wasn’t even aware of the fact that this group existed 
until they told me that they really did not like the other group. I also 
found it interesting that there was a strong emotional bond between the 
students, i.e. they passionately expressed their shared rejection of the 
rudeness of the other group. For example, after the [noisy] group had 
left the classroom, the other group stayed behind telling me that they 
found their behaviour so rude, especially towards me. I particularly re-
member one student who appeared flustered and angry whilst saying “I 
think it’s disgusting. They were just so rude towards you.” (Excerpt 31. 
Lisa’s research diary, March, 2017) 
 
“The group I was writing about earlier (i.e. the group that were com-
plaining about the other group) were now increasingly doing social ac-
tivities with one another. One student, for example, told me that they 
were all going on a night out together.” (Excerpt 32. Lisa’s research di-
ary, March, 2017) 
The above sequence of journal entries exemplifies a prototypical 
model of the emergence of my suggested “small-scale antagonism” in 
which a group identity may emerge based on their common rejection 
of another group. That is, when the students first met their group in 
their first year, there were only ‘purely differential’ (Laclau, 2005:69) 
student identities because each student defined his or her own identity 
in relation to everyone else (Excerpt 29). Whilst some initial identifica-
tions might have formed based on clothes, demeanour etc., student 
demands were expressed on a largely differential level. For instance, 
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a student approached Lisa whilst only expressing an individual demo-
cratic demand, i.e. “assignment anxiety” (and not a group demand) 
(Excerpt 30).  
After a few months, however, friendship groups began to emerge 
as is implied in “Excerpts 31 and 32”. Importantly, some of these 
groups appeared to share an animosity towards a “noisy and disre-
spectful” group, prompting one group of students to approach Lisa with 
their concern that “they found a certain group’s behaviour so rude”. 
Implied in this concern was a demand for more polite student behav-
iour and the emergence of a tentative group identity. More specifically, 
although this specific group identity may have emerged on the basis 
of a range of factors (this can only be suggested tentatively because 
there is limited data available here), it could be hypothesised that the 
student group partly emerged on the basis of their shared antagonism 
of another group. Importantly, there was a strong affective dimension 
in the students’ rejection (for instance, one student appeared “flustered 
and angry”). This affective dimension created a “strong emotional 
bond between the students” which managed to maintain itself beyond 
the confines of the classroom; these students were now going “on a 
night out together”.  
In addition, it could be hypothesised that before the emergence of 
their friendship group, these individual students may well have been 
secretly frustrated with the behaviour of this other group of students. 
In other words, the members of the former group of students may have 
secretly demanded “more respect” or a “quieter work environment”. 
However, precisely because these students did not speak much to 
each other, their demands remained isolated. In other words, individ-
ual students’ demands for respectful behaviour remained only ‘demo-
cratic demands’ (Laclau, 2005:125) precisely because they remained 
isolated. When students, however, started to increasingly speak to one 
another, one student, for example, may have realised that another stu-
dent also found the behaviour of certain “noisy students” disrespectful. 
This opened up the potential for the emergence of an antagonism and 
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a “popular demand” (i.e. “more respect”). That is, akin to Laclau’s ex-
ample in which one group of people struggles with housing and real-
ises that another group may struggle with water (see section 5.1), the 
moment each ‘well-behaved” student realised that the other “well-be-
haved” students also found the “disrespectful students” irritating, a 
shared group identity could emerge. Alongside this, a popular demand 
emerges:  
“We had a student representative meeting the other day. One of the 
overarching negative feedback was that the class felt really annoyed by 
a small minority of students who they perceived to be really disrespect-
ful.” (Excerpt 33. Lisa’s research diary) 
In short, the common rejection of the “noisy group” by the rest of the 
group (i.e. the ‘silent majority’ (Laclau, 2005:87) of the class) was the 
basis on which these students could form their equivalential chain 
around the “popular demand” for more respect.  
Empty Signifiers. Importantly, each student who belonged to that 
group needed to maintain his or her democratic demands and associ-
ated individual antagonisms to keep the popular demand alive. For ex-
ample, one student may simply be annoyed by the slang used by more 
“working class noisy students”:  
“I overheard a conversation on one table where one posher sounding 
student made fun of the accent of another student on another table. The 
latter student said something along the lines of “I thought that this was 
just much better (whilst pronouncing the t with a glottal stop). The other 
student then was quietly mimicking [the pronunciation of the other stu-
dent] whilst saying “they are just so rough””. (Excerpt 34. Lisa’s re-
search diary)  
Another student may simply find the excessive talking annoying:  
“[student A] complained to her fellow student, on the way out, that she 
finds this talking of [student x] really annoying and that she couldn’t 
concentrate.”  (Excerpt 35. Lisa’s research diary)  
Yet another student may be worried about her assignment. Lisa re-
marked that one student approached her after a session:  
“This student approached me today and said, “I’m finding it very difficult 
to concentrate, and I’m getting really worried about the upcoming as-
signment.” (Excerpt 36. Lisa’s research journal) 
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Yet, each of these ‘democratic demands’, expresses itself in more gen-
eral signifiers which are emptier than the concrete antagonisms: the 
behaviour of the other students is now simply “rude” whilst rude may 
signify “working class accent” or “excessive talking” or “the reason why 
I cannot concentrate and might fail my assignment”. In other words, 
the popular demand structures itself around the notion of “more re-
spect” which may mean “less working-class accent” or “less talking”.  
 
Floating Signifiers. Interestingly, as Lisa’s group progressed into their 
final year, the antagonistic frontier between various groups of students 
shifted. It could be suggested that it is here where the operation of 
Laclau’s floating signifiers could be observed:  
“The group representatives have now definitely complained against my 
teaching which they found too abstract and as I was told, “too intellec-
tual”. Whilst I’m assuming that this has mainly to do with some anxiety 
regarding the upcoming assignments, there also could be another in-
terpretation. I went down exactly the same trap that classroom teachers 
go down: to increase teach[ing] time and decrease time for group dis-
cussion. The most striking thing, apart from feeling a little bit hurt about 
not being accepted by a group was that there appeared a real sense of 
unity between the members of the group in their rejection of myself. In 
a student representative meeting, the student reps of my group found 
out that other groups were really enjoying their units whilst my group 
did not. Interestingly, through word of my colleagues I was told that even 
groups who did not get on originally (in fact, in the first year there was 
a real witch hunt against another group inside this class) agreed that 
my teaching was too hard and that they were worried about the assign-
ment.” (Lisa’s research diary)  
The operation of Laclau’s “floating signifiers” can be delineated when 
observing the shifting of the group’s antagonism from (i) the “noisy stu-
dents” towards (ii) Lisa. That is, in their first year, the “chatty students” 
(who were in the minority) emerged as the antagonistic force which 
simultaneously made the popular camp (the rest of the class) emerge 
as a group. This antagonism (i.e. the antagonistic frontier) was now 
shifting in the students’ final year which figured Lisa vis-à-vis (Laclau, 
2005:77) the students. More specifically, in their final year, the stu-
dents felt that a range of specific demands were frustrated.  
“Many students feel really tense at the moment. One of the students 
admitted that this largely had to do with the upcoming assignments. 
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They really don’t want to feel that overwhelmed.” (Excerpt 37. Lisa’s re-
search diary)  
 
“One of my students was in tears today. She told me that she had to 
have a part time job which she needed to buy food. But this job kept her 
from studying. She said she wished that she wouldn’t have to work.” 
(Excerpt 38. Lisa’s research diary)  
 
“Today, a range of students said that they wanted easier text[s] and 
complained about how hard the [last] academic text was. They said that 
they didn’t understand a word.” (Excerpt  39. Lisa’s research diary)  
Interestingly, some of these demands were still structured around the 
same democratic demands from year 1. For example, some students 
still felt anxious about their assignments. There also were a few new 
democratic demands around finding the module too difficult. In short, 
students felt ‘confronted with a dichotomic division between unfulfilled 
social demands, on the one hand, and an unresponsive power, on the 
other’ (Laclau, 2005:86). As will be made explicit, this “unresponsive 
power” does not need to be the actual power which is responsible for 
the unfulfilled demand, but only needs to be perceived as such. Which 
power is perceived as the oppressive force is up to who wins the heg-
emonic struggle. For example, it could be suggested that it is unlikely 
that Lisa was the actual culprit of the students’ unmet demands in that 
assignment practices, for instance, were clearly beyond Lisa’s control. 
On the other hand, this exemplifies how antagonistic frontiers may shift 
by actively intervening in the construction of an antagonistic force.  
 
Floating signifiers at meso and macro contexts. The concept of “float-
ing signifiers” is illuminating when considering these shifts (e.g. the 
shift from the antagonism against a specific group towards that against 
Lisa) because they help to explore how antagonisms may break away 
from the micro-level and instead direct themselves towards entities at 
meso and macro levels of scale. In other words, whilst the antagonism 
may change (for example, from seeing the lecturer as the culprit of 
struggles towards seeing, for example, the university or larger scale 
practices as the issue), the unmet democratic demands, again, remain 
intact. Importantly, these democratic (i.e. idiosyncratic) demands re-
main unmet regardless of who is posited as the enemy. In the process, 
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democratic demands may simply attach themselves to an alternative 
equivalential chain. For example, in Lisa’s excerpts, it could be as-
sumed that students genuinely struggled with their assignment anxi-
ety, with difficult course texts or with a lack of time due to the necessity 
to juggle a part-time job (all of which result in democratic demands). 
However, the root (i.e. the antagonism) of these unmet specific (i.e. 
democratic) demands is in need of construction. That is, who is con-
structed as responsible - is it another group, the lecturer, the course, 
the university, or the larger political landscape? – is contingent on 
which discourse wins the hegemonic struggle.  
Accordingly, the popular (i.e. hegemonic) demand is in need of 
construction. This is connected to the question which “democratic de-
mand” manages to become a “popular demand” in the shape of an 
“empty signifier” which is able to signify all of the other students’ dem-
ocratic demands. Will the popular demand become, for example, “Fair 
assignments”, “Less Work”, “Easier Texts” or “More support”. Put dif-
ferently, antagonistic frontiers can be drawn differently with students 
seeing the root of their anxiety in varying postulated entities. It would, 
for example, be easy to picture a situation in which students under-
stand (i.e. construct) that the origin of their assignment anxiety is to do 
with a more structural issue with high stakes assessments instead of 
figuring the overtly intellectual nature of Lisa’s teaching style as the 
antagonism. Similarly, students may attribute the fact that they are 
“struggling to get their reading done” to the necessity to “maintain a 
part-time job” (and, as a result, would be able to identify with a popular 
demand for more “state support”) instead of figuring the lecturer (or the 
module) as the root of the problem. In other words, what is potentially 
“floating” is the perceived antagonistic force (which fails to meet indi-
vidual demands) and the corresponding signifier around which a pop-
ular demand emerges. To see how this may play out in a concrete 
scenario, I consider the following excerpt:   
“I really like this one year 3 group that I’m teaching. They are really 
struggling with some of the course content and complain and openly 
voice these concern[s]; however, they keep on trying and find aspects 
137 
they find interesting. Moreover, I feel that students feel that I’m on their 
side. This may have to do with the fact that I understand their concerns. 
One student for example, complained about the bad situation at place-
ment. The unit I was teaching on, however, helped the student to un-
derstand this situation at a deeper level as she told me later on. Another 
student also had a bad experience on placement and decided to only 
graduate with the degree and not with the teacher qualification. He re-
peatedly told me that my course “blew his mind” and that he is deter-
mined to now study something else. In a nutshell, their concerns 
showed an understanding of the wider factors which constrain their abil-
ity to be successful. Another student said that she did not even know 
what neoliberalism meant before my course. I really feel quite con-
nected to this group and will be sad when they leave.” (Excerpt 40. My 
research diary) 
It could be suggested that this connectivity was perhaps built upon yet 
another operation of a floating signifier and the postulation of wider 
structural issues as the antagonism. For example, there was a strong 
sense of rejecting wider issues, such as “issues with external class 
mentors or headteachers” or “problems with the wider course”. In this 
context, the content of the unit helped to construct antagonisms be-
yond the university because of its specific critical (perhaps biased?) 
political orientation of the topics.  
The fact that this unit was broadly well-received may also have to 
do with the fact that, concurrently, (i.e. in Summer 2017), a certain 
larger-scale enthusiasm with left-wing politics was palpable:  
“Today I spoke to one of my students as part of an undergraduate con-
ference which I organised. I remember that our conversation shifted to-
wards Jeremy Corbyn and Labour and said something along the lines 
of “It’s quite interesting what is happening with Labour at the moment”. 
The student instantly said that he thinks that literally everyone in the 
whole cohort, is supporting Jeremy Corbyn and that he had not heard 
of a single student who didn’t like Corbyn.” (Excerpt 41. My research 
diary) 
5.2.1 A Historical Perspective on Higher Education Populisms  
This initial discussion of phenomena at micro at meso levels of scale 
enables us to consider antagonistic/populist developments at even 
larger scales. Three examples have been picked. One seminal histor-
ical and large-scale example of populism in the realm of higher edu-
cation can be found in the student movements in 1968 Germany - 
which emerged as part of wider student protests in Europe and the US 
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- in which antagonisms may have helped to construct the identity of a 
group (in this case a whole generation). The populist logic in this con-
text is straightforward. Students rose against the establishment which 
comprised (most) professors, university leadership, their parents and 
politics more generally (Della Porta, 1999). This animosity towards the 
“Establishment” was captured in the slogan ‘Unter den Talaren - Muff 
von 1000 Jahren.’ (“Under the gowns – the musty odour of a 1000 
years”) (Nath, 2007:online). Underlying this animosity, there was a 
generational conflict in which the younger generation accused their 
parents of remaining silent about their collaborations and complicity in 
Nazi Germany (Gilcher-Holtey, 2001). Reflexively speaking, this was 
an important time and I feel deeply attached to the emancipatory un-
dertone and anti-authoritarian stance of the 68 movement regardless 
of some later definite disappointments.  
Turning to Laclau, it could be suggested that the group formation 
of the 68 movement (i.e. the populist student movement) was contin-
gent on its mutual rejection of the parents’ generation. My father al-
ways says that the 60s were brilliant because there was a clear enemy 
(i.e. crypto-fascist parents in general). In his view, nowadays, it is 
much more difficult to delineate this enemy. That is, in Laclau’s under-
standing of populism the identity of the 68 movement could be under-
stood as being contingent on the postulation of a clear enemy in the 
shape of the parents’ generation.  
This emergent antagonism between students’ vis-à-vis the par-
ents’ generation (including universities) was variously expressed in 
student demonstrations and sometimes brutal government repres-
sions, such as the fatal shooting of ‘Benno Ohnesorg’ by German po-
lice (Della Porta, 1999:72). In this clash, it only occasionally happened 
that members of the parents’ generation managed to cross over to the 
popular “student camp”. In very rare moments, certain lecturers even 
managed to drive student revolts, such as in the example of artist Jo-
seph Beuys who, together with his students, occupied the vice chan-
cellor’s office in 1971 in a small-scale populist movement against uni-
versity leadership (Riegel, 2013). In other examples, even long-
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standing voices on the intellectual left were rejected by certain student 
factions, poignantly expressed in student boycotts of Adorno’s 1969 
lectures (Adorno, 1969).  
 
Another example of an emergent “student populism” can be found in 
the 2010 anti-tuition fee protests.  London saw four larger scale mobi-
lisations of students against the planned rise of tuition fees from 3000 
to 9000 pounds per annum by the newly formed Conservative-Liberal 
coalition Government: 
‘In the autumn of 2010, the U.K. coalition government of Conserva-
tives (Tories) and Liberal Democrats introduced radical changes to the 
way universities would be funded—for example, funding for teaching 
in the humanities and social sciences was cut by 100 percent and the 
amount which students have to contribute was raised from £3,000 
(US$4,800) to a maximum of £9,000 (US$14,400) per year. Besides 
this, the U.K. government also decided to scrap the Education Mainte-
nance Allowance (EMA), a weekly amount college students from low-
income families received to stimulate them to continue studying.’ 
(Cammaerts, 2013:531) 
In this example, students united behind an “unmet demand”, or 
rather the anticipation thereof: the demand for affordable university ed-
ucation.  More specifically, there is the “whole student population”, on 
the one hand, and certain “student groups”, on the other. One of these 
student groups (i.e. a more radical student faction) now managed to 
successfully form a demand which began to represent an ‘incommen-
surable totality’ (Laclau, 2005:70) (i.e. the whole of the student popu-
lation). In return, the “whole student population” could itself be under-
stood as being a component part of a larger assemblage towards 
which it stands in a ‘part-to-whole relation’ (DeLanda, 2006:40) (as-
semblage theory will be more thoroughly introduced in section 6.1). 
This larger assemblage could be described as UK “society” itself. It 
could now be argued that whilst a “part of the student population” man-
aged to represent the “whole student population”, it did not manage to 
“upscale” its reach towards the “whole of society”. In short, student 
protests managed to win the hegemonic struggle at the level of the 
student population; however, they failed to win at the level of the whole 
140 
population. It could be suggested that one of the reasons for the failure 
of the 2010 protests was that the demand (against the rise of tuition 
fees) did not successfully connect to other democratic demands of 
other sectors of society (e.g. fairer working conditions; better housing). 
In addition, what becomes striking is the role the media played in this 
process which I consider an indispensable part in this hegemonic 
struggle (also see Srnicek and Williams, 2016 on this issue). Whilst 
there was sympathy from a few newspapers (e.g. The Guardian; the 
Independent), the right-leaning newspapers defamed the student pro-
tests with a particular focus on the vandalism of buildings (ibid.). 
5.2.2 Contemporary UK Situation  
Based on this exploration of two historical examples, how could the 
possibility for a populism in the current situation at universities be 
grasped? In other words, is there a possibility of a populist movement 
which encompasses both lecturers and students vis-à-vis a larger an-
tagonistic force? As has been outlined above, populism – including a 
popular demand – is always contingent on democratic demands. Thus, 
the further question arises, “What are the current unmet democratic 
demands of students and lecturers?” Beginning with Lisa’s university, 
I suggest that lecturers at her institution often struggled with large 
group sizes which led to exacerbating workloads (due to an increase 
in marking and email writing):  
“One of my colleagues was almost in tears because of the sheer 
amount of emails she keeps on receiving from students. She said, “We 
have to answer them within a few days, but I just can’t cope any more 
with this pace.” (Excerpt 42. Lisa’s research diary) 
At my university, I similarly remarked:  
“I really don’t know how I’m going to get this done. I have to mark around 
90 3000 words essays in 4 weeks.” (My research diary)  
Similarly, for students, the democratic demand of “more time for stud-
ying” is frustrated due to the necessity to juggle part-time jobs (see 
above) and an increasingly precarious employment future (Neilson 
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and Rossiter, 2008). It could be suggested that it might be relatively 
“easy” for these frustrated lecturer and student “democratic demands” 
to be transformed into shared “popular demands” (Laclau, 2005). This 
popular demand would be contingent on equivalential links between 
students and lecturers which could, for instance, be constructed 
against a larger antagonistic force of “rich policymakers and university 
senior leadership”. This hypothetical populism may go alongside an 
identity construction around the empty signifier of, for instance, “hard-
working exploited lecturers and ripped off students”. That is, whilst the 
sources of these unmet demands are differential - for example, stu-
dents may demand “better tuition”, “lower tuition fees”, and “less exam 
anxiety” whilst lecturers demand “smaller workload” – in this hypothet-
ical scenario students and lecturers may find their equivalential mo-
ment in their common opposition of an antagonistic force (i.e. policy 
makers and leadership) which could then be constructed as the source 
of all unmet demands.  
Considering this potential for a larger-scale student-lecturer 
populism, the question arises, “Why is there currently no populist lec-
turer-student movement?” In other words, “Which forces work against 
a populist student-lecturer movement?” I suggest that two processes 
are responsible, both related to the NSS: (i) the absorption of demo-
cratic demands and (more importantly) (ii) the shifting of the antago-
nistic frontier through the employment of floating signifiers. This re-
turns the discussion to the operation of student feedback systems. 
Firstly, intra-institutional student feedback systems, such as SRMs 
and Internal Surveys, are designed to (i) differentially ‘absorb’ (Laclau, 
2005:89) students’ unmet democratic demands and therefore avoid 
student dissatisfaction in the NSS. That is, akin to Laclau’s example of 
‘agrarian migrants’ whose democratic demands cease to exist when 
they are satisfied – i.e. when they attain ‘water, health, [and] schooling’ 
(p. 73) - students who are unhappy with certain modules or tutors, can 
have their democratic demands met through internal feedback:  
“At my institution, we have SSCF meetings, which stands for Student 
Staff Consultative Forums. Essentially, they are meetings where we 
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meet with student representatives. A few days ago, I attended one of 
these meetings. Students, in this case, were not quite happy with how 
one unit [i.e. a module] was organised. We then publish a ‘you said, we 
did’ letter in which we ‘close the feedback loop’ and show how we at-
tempted to address areas of dissatisfaction with the course. I felt a little 
bit awkward because certain students were not happy with one lecturer 
which really puts that lecturer on the spot.” (Excerpt 43. My Research 
diary)  
That is, this SSCF platform – which has been discussed in this thesis 
under the umbrella of Student Representative Meetings (SRMs) - ex-
ists to pre-empt student dissatisfaction. More specifically, SRMs seek 
to increase the probability of positive student satisfaction in Internal 
Surveys (which is important for individual module or unit leaders) and 
in the NSS (which is important for courses and universities). In 
Laclau’s (2005) words, it could be suggested that SRMs are designed 
to absorb students’ differential, democratic demands. By doing this, 
the “breeding ground” for larger-scale dissatisfaction is made less fer-
tile, and the emergence of a possible popular demand is made less 
likely.  
Second, SRMs, Internal Surveys and the NSS could be figured as 
(ii) technologies which produce certain antagonisms. Combining this 
with Foucault’s notion of governmentality, student feedback systems 
could therefore be termed “antagonistic governmentalities”. For exam-
ple, SRMs produce antagonisms because they often increase the 
workload for lecturers in that these must show how student dissatis-
faction is going to be addressed. This additional workload, in return, 
may make it more likely that students are seen as a threat (i.e. as an 
antagonistic force). Lisa for example remarks:  
“I’ve got a few colleagues who continuously complain about the imma-
turity of students and how they are often dissatisfied. I must admit I 
sometimes join in these student slag-off sessions. It feels like quite a 
relief from when you feel at the mercy of whether students like you or 
not. When I think of how students have quite a lot of power over you as 
a lecturer, I always picture Nero who put his thumb up or down to indi-
cate whether gladiators are supposed to live or die.” (Excerpt 44. Lisa’s 
research diary) 
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Modules which fail to produce positive student feedback prompt mod-
ule leaders into disciplinary action as already discussed in section 
4.1.2:  
“In the internal survey, students also judge the modules. This puts quite 
a lot of pressure on module leaders who are, in a way, made responsi-
ble if the score for the module dips below 80%. This happened the other 
day. It all started when the module leader told us in a meeting that the 
module dropped below 80%. He seemed agitated and identified a few 
lecturers who he [the module leader] thought would be responsible for 
this negative student feedback. Apparently, students mentioned individ-
ual lecturers in their internal surveys – even though they are directed 
not to. The module leader also said that in student rep meetings, stu-
dents complained about the same lecturers. [The module leader] said 
that, as a result of the feedback, the degree leader gave them [the un-
derperforming lecturers] a stern talking to. Another outcome of this 
meeting was that they arranged weekly tutorials with the module leader 
which they [i.e. the underperforming lecturers] had to attend.”  (Lisa’s 
research diary) 
Lisa spoke to one of these “under-performing” lecturers a few days 
later, capturing a real sense of resentment.  
“I met [lecturer x] today. He complained that he has so much on anyway 
and now also needs to attend these tutorials with [the module leader]. 
[Lecturer x then continued] “and all of this just because of some spoilt 
students and a panicky [module leader]. It just isn’t fair.” (Excerpt 45. 
Lisa’s research diary)  
Thus, I suggest that Student Representative Meetings (SRMs) and In-
ternal Surveys are actively implicated in the engineering of lecturers’ 
unmet demands. For example, in the case of Lisa’s colleague, the con-
sequences of bad student feedback meant additional workload for him. 
This in return made him resent students (and the module leader). In 
Laclau’s words, through problems with workload resulting from student 
feedback, lecturers develop a demand for “less workload” and the de-
mand for “student satisfaction” (because a lack thereof may result in 
more scrutiny and additional workload). This engineered demand went 
alongside the creation of a similarly engineered antagonism in the 
shape of the “all-powerful” “never satisfied” “needy” student. Crucially, 
what is excluded from mattering is the overarching structure (i.e. the 
specific student feedback systems) as the “real” origin of the unmet 
demand. In short, there is a causal chain: student feedback systems 
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create the possibility for students to voice their dissatisfaction -> satis-
faction needs to be acted upon because of hierarchical and market 
pressures -> students are figured as the antagonism -> what gets ex-
cluded is the actual feedback technology which produced this type of 
causal chain in the first place.    
In summary, the NSS articulates an equivalential chain amongst 
lecturers by framing students as the antagonism. However, in compar-
ison to hegemonic projects which actively seek to convince the 
populus to see a minority as the antagonism (as is the case in Trump-
ism which attempts to situate immigrants as the source of unmet de-
mands), the NSS functions in a more “automated” manner, not unlike 
a “computer algorithm”. That is, the NSS, once implemented, does not 
need much government “input” or “maintenance” (unlike the Trump 
campaign) because it somewhat automatically produces lecturer an-
tagonisms against students by creating a perpetual urgency to ad-
dress student dissatisfaction. Similarly, frequent “student-testing-re-
gimes” produce student antagonisms towards lecturers by creating the 
perpetual necessity to perform. Without testing, students may be hap-
pier, more eager to learn and, as a result, more satisfied. Thus, in both 
lecturers’ and students’ antagonisms, the hegemonic struggle is im-
manent in the mechanism of the feedback technique. Part of this au-
tomated and reciprocal process (as exemplified in Figure 2) is that (at 
the institutional and national level) the antagonistic frontier is shifted 
away from seeing larger scale university leadership and government 
as the culprit for their unmet demands and rather figure frontline staff 
or individual courses in this position. This process is to be considered 
more thoroughly now, staring with Macro policy.  
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Figure 2 An iterative cycle of antagonism 
 
 
Macro Level: The NSS. As mentioned before, a populism which entails 
an alliance between students and lecturers vis-à-vis the “policymaking 
elite” is somehow prevented. How? It could be suggested that the 
origin of this process lies in national policymaking itself. More specifi-
cally, the NSS – which is underpinned by a range of policy documents 
which situate the reason of “low standards in teaching provision” in a 
lack of competition between universities (e.g. Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, 2016) –  attempts to shift the antagonistic fron-
tier. Instead of the Government being identified as the source of inad-
equate education universities are framed as the culprit. More specifi-
cally, the answer to “low standards” is to establish a neo-liberal logic 
(as was argued in Chapter 4) by creating competition between univer-
sities. Students, in return, are encouraged to choose their university 
based on league tables and TEF accreditations. In addition, students 
pay 9000 pounds per year and expect a ‘return on investment’ (Brown, 
2015:192). These distinct policy implementations thus subtly shift all 
potential “national antagonisms” (i.e. macro antagonisms) away from 
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the Government and towards universities who become ‘responsibil-
ised’ (Brown, 2015). If students are satisfied, they will give good feed-
back and everyone is happy. If they are dissatisfied, however, they can 
hold their institution (and again not the government) accountable – be-
cause, after all, this is who they pay with their money. Lisa remarks:   
“Today, I overheard a conversation of colleagues who work the primary 
department. They seemed quite agitated. Apparently, one postgraduate 
student put his hand up in a lecture theatre and said that he found the 
lecture a waste of his time and money. The student apparently said, 
“We are paying 9000 pounds a year and can expect something much 
better than this.” (Excerpt 46. Lisa’s research diary)  
In Laclau’s words, universities can be held accountable by students 
for not meeting their ‘democratic demand’ to be satisfied (Hall, 2017). 
That is, by containing dissatisfaction strictly within a student vis-à-vis 
the university relationship, the NSS avoids any larger scale dissatis-
faction (against the government) by systematically pointing the meta-
phorical finger at universities (both in the sense of “Great! You are do-
ing well in the league tables” or “Oh dear, you’d better try harder to 
climb those league tables”). Resulting from this complex interplay of 
the NSS and accompanying tuition fee rises, universities see students 
as their customers whom they want to satisfy so that they give good 
feedback in customer satisfaction surveys (i.e. the NSS).  
In an even wider context, it could be suggested that the NSS shifts 
the focus away from the potential to make neoliberal austerity capital-
ism - which itself is expressed in a lack of funding, the raising of tuition 
fees, a lack of employment rights etc. - the culprit (i.e. the antagonism) 
of students’ unmet demands. Instead, the cause for “low post-gradua-
tion employment”, “students dropping out of university” and “low stu-
dent satisfaction” – all of which are measures which inform the rank-
ings and the TEF – is firmly situated in universities themselves and not 
some other macro tendencies at play. In this antagonistic logic, the 
Government may succeed in establishing equivalential links with stu-
dents by, for example, arguing that universities have for too long shied 
away from ‘high-quality competition’ (Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, 2016:8). Put pointedly, the Government can now 
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(together with students) hold universities (as the antagonistic force) to 
“account” through the technologies of student satisfaction. In short, in-
stead of the culprit being the Government, the culprit would (theoreti-
cally) become the university. This would be the case if universities and 
their leaders were not trying to deflect the market pressures down the 
pyramidal hierarchy of the university (see Chapter 4) which will be 
tackled in what follows.  
 
Meso Level: Internal Surveys. Due to the NSS induced competitive 
pressures between universities, and the possibility of an antagonism 
between each university and its students, universities have imple-
mented Internal Surveys. Similar to the NSS, these Internal Surveys 
redraw antagonistic frontiers: whereas the NSS (and associated tuition 
fee rises) produce antagonistic frontiers between universities and stu-
dents, I argue that Internal Surveys promote antagonistic frontiers be-
tween students and modules. That is, I propose that Internal Surveys, 
yet again, shift those unmet student demands (e.g. assignment anxi-
ety, student precarity) away from seeing the actual university leader-
ship as the antagonism (akin to the Government shifting the antago-
nism away from itself in the NSS) and towards the supposed “under-
performance” of individual modules and courses. That is, individual 
courses can be identified to achieve lower student satisfaction ratings 
than other courses and could therefore be made into an antagonistic 
force.  
The scenario in which university leadership shift the responsibility 
towards modules could be described as the attempt to build an “insti-
tutional populism” in which university leaders seek to establish equiv-
alential links between themselves and students. This is why, at the 
university level, we find discourses embodied in banners (e.g. “stu-
dents are our customers”) or “you deserve excellent value for money”. 
Even more poignantly, London Metropolitan University, for example, 
writes the following in their university strategy:  
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‘If you tell us you are dissatisfied, we will listen and we will respond to 
what you say. We will launch a module feedback scheme led and ad-
ministered by students so that you can help improve the quality of our 
teaching.’ (London Metropolitan University, 2015: online) 
Put bluntly, through institutional student feedback systems, 
universities may seek to “make friends” with students by demonising 
certain “underperforming” modules which may be corrected through ‘a 
module feedback scheme led and administered by students’ (ibid.). In 
addition, modules also draw on further micro technologies, such as 
Student Representative Meetings (SRMs).  
 
Micro Level: Within these SRMs, university lecturers are figured as in-
side module antagonisms. More specifically, SRMs shift the “blame” 
away from module leadership (who, yet again received the “blame” 
from university leadership, who received the “blame” from inter-univer-
sity NSS market pressures) to single out individual lecturers as respon-
sible for the negative student feedback. In analogy to the disciplinary 
characteristic of Student Evaluations of Teaching as explored in Chap-
ter 4, it no longer is the fault of actors at the national, universitarian, 
course or module level, but the fault is pinpointed in a downwards spi-
ral towards individual lecturers. In short, it could be suggested that 
there is a continuous deferring of responsibility from the top towards 
the bottom.  
5.3 Conclusion: Alternative Antagonisms beyond the Univer-
sity  
This chapter sought to theorise the NSS as an antagonistic technol-
ogy. That is, the NSS could be understood as an apparatus which 
seeks to avoid large-scale unrest (such as a national populism against 
the Government) by deferring conflicts to the institutional level, which, 
in return, defers it to courses, which, yet again, defer it to individual 
frontline staff. Put simplistically, it could be suggested that, in conclu-
sion, Laclau’s antagonism works akin to the Roman saying “Divide and 
Rule”: by pitching various groups (e.g. lecturers and students) against 
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one another, the forces in power are excluded from the limelight and 
are, therefore, safe from becoming the antagonism themselves (i.e. 
the target of discontent). Again, a large-scale populism is avoided by 
creating a multitude of miniature antagonisms. This point could be 
overemphasised by claiming that the government is “triple shielded” 
by the NSS: if students are unhappy, this unhappiness will firstly show 
up through Student Representative Meetings (SRMs) internally. Indi-
vidual leaders will then try everything to address the dissatisfaction 
because, after all, their careers may be in danger if they don’t. If dis-
satisfaction is not addressed at this level, it will show up in the Internal 
Surveys where module leaders will try everything to address dissatis-
faction. If again unsuccessful, dissatisfaction will show up in the actual 
NSS questionnaire which forces course leaders and university leader-
ship into action.  
This allows me to begin to connect Laclau’s notion of antagonism 
to Foucault’s work on governmentality by proposing a neologism: an 
“antagonistic governmentality”. That is, I suggest that the NSS does 
not only govern the academic population (including students and lec-
turers) through disciplinary governmentality and neo-liberal govern-
mentality (competition), but also through what I call an “antagonistic 
governmentality” (for a further discussion of my concept see Chapter 
7). Put yet differently, akin to my proposed “disciplinary-neo-liberal 
governmentality” which avoids large-scale civil unrest by pitching lec-
turers (courses and universities) against one another in competitive 
struggles within league tables, “antagonistic governmentality” pitches 
lecturers against students by creating antagonisms. Laclau neither fig-
ured populism as something inherently problematic nor positive, but 
rather understood it not only as ‘a political logic’, but as ‘a necessary 
ingredient of politics tout court’ (Laclau, 2005:18). Inherent in this po-
litical logic is the necessity of political demands being overdetermined, 
i.e. covering more than a particular specific demand. Laclau asserts, 
more generally, that ‘there is no social element whose meaning is not 
overdetermined’ (p. 110). This all relates back to Laclau’s understand-
ing of democratic demands (i.e. demands that are specific but isolated) 
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and popular demands (i.e. demands that are vaguer but connected by 
an equivalential chain).  
We could now extend this logic of antagonisms to various other 
interactions at varying levels of scale. For instance, “inter-country an-
tagonisms”, such as wars, may be understood as a structuring device 
in how identities emerge. Again, in analogy to Freud’s delineation of 
group identity formation, we could say, that it is through the ‘demon-
ization of’ (Laclau, 2005:70) another country that one’s own country 
develops its sense of cohesion, solidarity and identity. 
 This ends my Laclauian discussion of the NSS. In the following 
exploration, I now attempt to make sense of chapters 4 and 5 through 
a distinctly realist and materialist ontology.  
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Chapter 6 A (New) Materialist Exploration of the NSS 
This slightly more experimental chapter now offers a distinctly realist 
and materialist take on the NSS. Thus, I explore two “new materialist” 
frameworks in their suitability to offer alternative insights into the work 
presented in the preceding chapters. New materialism is an umbrella 
term for a myriad disparate recent theories which share an interest in 
analysing the material world including (and often going beyond) the 
analysis of human matters (e.g. DeLanda, 2006; Bennett, 2010; 
Braidotti, 2013; Meillassoux, 2015). More specifically, I explore Manuel 
DeLanda’s (2006) “assemblage theory” and Karen Barad’s (2007) 
“agential realism” as each theory may offer its distinct contributions 
towards developing a realist analysis of student feedback systems. I 
argue that, despite their differences, DeLanda’s and Barad’s works 
may resonate fruitfully and complement one another on a range of is-
sues. For instance, I argue that assemblage theory is superior in the-
orising issues of scale (e.g. how a country relates to its component 
parts, such as universities) whereas “agential realism” is better 
equipped to analyse issues of topology (for example, how one univer-
sity may both be a component part of the UK but cut across the UK 
state boundary by competing with another university in China).  
This chapter first discusses DeLanda’s (2006) work and asserts 
that “assemblage theory” is particularly suitable in clarifying my pro-
posed amalgam of disciplinary, neo-liberal, and antagonistic govern-
mentalities as embodied in the NSS. Second, Karen Barad’s “agential 
realism” will be used to develop a realist ontology to re-theorise the 
increasing boundary formation between students and lecturers as 
mentioned in Chapter 5. Hitherto discussed in isolation, both authors 
will then be read through one another whilst attending to similarities 
and differences in their respective approaches with the intention of de-
veloping a joint realist framework which attends to both issues of 
“scale” and “topology”.  
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6.1 The NSS as a “Neo-Liberal Disciplinary Assemblage” 
Why has assemblage theory been incorporated into this thesis? The 
answer is twofold. First, I appreciate assemblage theory for its clarity 
and operationalisability. That is, by building upon and systematising 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work (1988), assemblage theory makes ex-
plicit what it is (e.g. it follows a realist and materialist ontology) and 
what it is not (it rejects, for example, linguistic monism or a radical so-
cial constructivism). Second, I suggest that assemblage theory’s 
strongest feature is its capability to theorise events at micro and macro 
levels of scale whilst also showing how these scales interact with one 
another. That is, in the context of this thesis, assemblage theory is well 
equipped to show how “conversations” between students and lecturers 
(as “micro assemblages”) relate to “university rating and ranking prac-
tices” (as “meso assemblages”) and “macro assemblages” (e.g. the 
competitive higher education sector).  
I begin by asking the question, “What are assemblages and where 
do they occur?” Assemblages can be found at varying levels of scale 
(at the most microscopic and macroscopic). Moreover, they appear in 
the “natural world” (e.g. water molecules, animal bodies, ecosystems 
etc.) (DeLanda, 2012, 2016) and the “social world” (e.g. “social en-
counters”, “interpersonal networks”, “organisations”, “governments”, 
“cities” and “nations”) (DeLanda, 2006). Last, they may range tempo-
rally - from short-lived encounters (such as “conversations” between 
two people on a train) to longer lasting entities (such as “cities”).  
I suggest that the most concise introduction to the concept of as-
semblages can, however, be provided by considering a natural assem-
blage: the water molecule (DeLanda, 2012; DeLanda and Harman, 
2017). The water molecule exhibits the following features of assem-
blages (with crucial “assemblage theory terminology in italics). First, 
every assemblage consists of heterogeneous component parts which 
interact with one another in a continuous fashion. For example, the 
“water molecule” comprises the component parts of one oxygen and 
two hydrogen atoms which are “stuck together” which is the outcome 
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of a continuous interaction in which oxygen and hydrogen attract one 
another through their electric charge. Second, every assemblage has 
emergent properties which come into existence through precisely this 
interaction of its component parts. However, these properties are not 
reducible to the properties of the assemblage’s parts. For instance, 
water has the capacity to extinguish fires whereas its component parts 
display opposite properties (hydrogen and oxygen atoms are both 
gases that can incite fires, i.e. are highly reactive). It follows that the 
properties of each assemblage are immanent (and not transcendental) 
in that they are the direct result of the interaction of its component 
parts. Thus, if these component parts stopped interacting, the assem-
blage would no longer exist: water “disappears” when oxygen and hy-
drogen stop interacting. Connected to this is that all assemblages are 
decomposable into their component parts: if an electric current is ap-
plied to water (a liquid) it separates out into oxygen and hydrogen 
(which are both gases). Consequentially, the component parts of an 
assemblage operate in relations of exteriority16: even when the assem-
blage comes apart, the component parts continue to exist. For exam-
ple, the hydrogen atoms of a water molecule persevere even though 
they may no longer be part of the water molecule. Fourth, every as-
semblage is engaged in processes of territorialisation, deterritorialisa-
tion or reterritorialisation. Territorialisation describes the process 
through which an entity maintains its identity. That is, water is territori-
alising when it keeps its identity through the continuous interaction of 
its component parts (i.e. of hydrogen and oxygen). However, water 
can deterritorialise (i.e. it loses its identity) when its component parts 
come apart. In this case, water disintegrates, again leaving only the 
two gases of hydrogen and oxygen. Water may, however, reterritorial-
ise when hydrogen and oxygen either return to their original identity 
                                                 
16 These “relations of exteriority” have to be contrasted with Hegelian “seam-
less totalities” which operate in “relations of interiority”. The component parts of 
seamless totalities stop existing the moment the totality comes apart. An example, 
of a seamless totality would be a father and his children: The ‘identity of the role of 
father or of that of son or daughter, cannot exist outside their mutual relation’ 
(DeLanda, 2016:1). 
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(i.e. when a spark is added to a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen, an 
explosion results, producing water) or into a different one (e.g. through 
various intermediate steps, oxygen and hydrogen may also assemble 
as, for example, Hydrogen Peroxide (H2O2)). In summary, all assem-
blages are immanent and decomposable, consist of component parts 
which interact in relations of exteriority and variously territorialise, de-
territorialise and reterritorialise.  
6.1.1 The NSS as a Macro Assemblage 
This section now asserts that the NSS could be understood as an as-
semblage. Using Figure 3, as a scaffold, first, the NSS consists of het-
erogeneous component parts which interact with one another. 
Whereas for the water molecule these were oxygen and hydrogen, I 
suggest that the component parts of the NSS comprise (i) universities, 
(ii) the Office for Students (OfS), (iii) policy documents, (iv) current stu-
dents, (v) prospective students, (vi) an online infrastructure (where stu-
dents fill in the NSS), (vii) newspapers which publish the rankings, and 
(viii) the UniStats website. Importantly, each of these component parts 
could be understood as assemblages themselves (i.e. entities in their 
own right), some of which have pre-existed the NSS and, in all likeli-
hood, will outlive it.  
Second – and this is where this discussion connects to this the-
sis’s discussion of governmentality - the NSS attains its governmental 
(Foucault, 2009) ‘emergent properties’ (DeLanda, 2006:56) through 
artificially enforced specific interactions between its component parts. 
More specifically, building on Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, these interac-
tions could be conceived as mixtures of disciplinary, neo-liberal (i.e. 
competitive) and antagonistic modes of interaction whilst one such 
mode may dominate between certain component parts (Figure 3 dis-
plays these modes of interaction in the shape of arrows). For example, 
disciplinary interactions may be more prominent between “governmen-
tal departments and universities” in that the Office for Students (OfS) 
hierarchically observes whether universities are compliant. If they are 
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not, the OfS may step-in to punish universities for exerting “inappropri-
ate influence” (e.g. by excluding those universities from rankings 
(Anyangwe, 2011)). Disciplinary interactions may similarly exist be-
tween “students and universities” in that students “normalisingly judge” 
universities when filling in the NSS questionnaire. Competitive interac-
tions, on the other hand, may dominate “between universities” (e.g., 
universities compete over student feedback and numbers). That is, 
universities - in DeLanda’s social ontology conceptualised as ‘institu-
tional organisations’ - ‘possess an external identity as enduring, goal-
directed entities’ (DeLanda, 2006:75) who ‘exist as part of populations 
of other organizations [i.e. other universities] with which they interact’ 
in competitive relations.  
In addition, the properties of assemblages are not reducible to the 
properties of their component parts, but rather exceed these 
(DeLanda, 2006). For instance, in the NSS, the combination of com-
petition and discipline may result in a more profound internal capacity 
to govern the academic population than either discipline or competition 
could achieve individually. In addition, the NSS cannot be reduced to 
universities, student populations and infrastructures (or even to “indi-
vidual persons”, such as staff members and students). In fact, assem-
blage theory eschews reductionism. DeLanda (2012), for example ar-
gues that people (and larger scale entities) are not just a “cloud of at-
oms”, i.e. a mere collection of individual parts (again the water mole-
cule from above is a perfect example how the properties of the whole 
(water--fluid--kills fires) exceed the sum of its parts (hydrogen and ox-
ygen—gases--incite fires).  
Third, every assemblage is immanent (and not transcendental) in 
that if its component parts stopped interacting, the assemblage would 
also cease to exist (ibid.): the NSS would, for example, cease to exist 
if students refused to be a part of it (e.g. by boycotting the NSS (Grove, 
2016)). This is connected to the fact that every assemblage is also 
decomposable into its component parts: a university (as one compo-
nent part of the NSS) may continue to exist - at least for a few months 
- if it decided to boycott the NSS. This university, of course, is likely to 
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be punished for this transgression through discipline (e.g. by threaten-
ing to close the university) and through the market (e.g. by not attract-
ing students because of its expulsion from league tables). Fourth, 
every assemblage is in a process of territorialisation (which translates 
to an assemblage maintaining its identity), deterritorialisation (it loses 
its identity) or reterritorialisation (it regains its previous identity or as-
sumes a new one) (DeLanda, 2006). For example, the NSS territorial-
ises (i.e. it keeps its identity) through maintaining the specific ways in 
which its component parts interact (i.e. students must continue their 
rating, universities must continue to react to this, and government au-
thorities must continue their supervision). The NSS may, on the other 
hand, begin to deterritorialise when its component parts change (or 
stop) their interactional pattern: again, for example, when students re-
fused to exert their “normalising judgement” through a national NSS 
boycott in 2016, this almost destroyed (deterritorialised) the NSS 
(Grove, 2016). This boycott eventually, however, proved as too weak 
to effect a national change. Consequentially, the NSS reterritorialised 
almost entirely to its original identity.  
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6.1.2 Universities as Meso Assemblages 
This now opens the opportunity to outline what I consider the biggest 
strength of assemblage theory: that “relata” can be significantly af-
fected by their relations whilst still being figured as entities in their own 
right. First, it is important to consider that assemblages can exist at 
varying levels of scale whilst one assemblage may be a component 
part of another assemblage. For example, a water molecule may be 
part of a larger assemblage (e.g. the capillaries of a tree); similarly, a 
university (as an assemblage in its own right) is part of the NSS. In 
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Figure 3: The NSS as a macro assemblage and its component parts. 
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both cases, those former assemblages exist in a ‘part-to-whole’ 
(DeLanda, 2006:34) relationship to the latter. Crucially, whilst an as-
semblage ‘emerges from the interaction among its parts, once it comes 
into existence it can affect those parts’ (p. 34; emphasis added). This 
is fundamental for the present analysis in that the NSS (as one macro 
assemblage) has an effect on its component parts, such as universi-
ties (as already argued in Chapters 4 and 5). That is, universities do 
not only compete with other universities (because of the NSS), but also 
reconfigure internally.  
How do universities (as assemblages themselves) reconfigure in-
ternally? This question can only be answered if, firstly, I clarify what 
those various component parts of universities may comprise. To begin 
with, at my institution, these component parts are “faculties” (in my 
case, the “Faculty of Education”). Faculties comprise further assem-
blages, such as schools. Schools comprise courses, courses comprise 
year groups, year groups comprise units and units comprise lecturers 
and students. Each are assemblages in their own right and are part of 
what DeLanda calls a hierarchical authority structure with the vice-
chancellor overseeing deans (of “faculties”), who oversee heads of 
schools who oversee course leaders. These, in return, oversee year 
group leaders, who oversee module leaders who oversee lecturers 
who “oversee” the coordination of their own bodies and their compo-
nent parts (e.g. their activities, the coordination of extremities, thought 
processes etc.). Importantly, some of these assemblages can be parts 
of other assemblages. For instance, I (as one assemblage) may teach 
on (i.e. belong to) the larger-scale assemblage “Teaching Studies” (a 
specific unit) on Mondays, whilst belonging to the assemblage “English 
Pedagogy” (another unit) on a Tuesday. I currently am also in charge 
of the assemblage “Teaching Studies 3” (I am the unit leader). In ad-
dition, I am part of the department for “Primary Teacher Education” 
(which is part of the school for Teacher Education); however, I am also 
part of a different school “Early Years and Childhood Studies” in that I 
teach on a Masters course. In short, I (as an assemblage) can be 
“plugged into” other assemblages of varying scale.  
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Alongside my university’s academic components (including its as-
sociated hierarchies), there are those component parts which deal with 
administrative and maintenance activities (such as IT, cleaning, cater-
ing etc.). In addition, universities also comprise “material” component 
parts, such as campus buildings, offices, classrooms, chairs, projec-
tors, or IT systems.  
6.1.3 Internal Surveys as Component Parts of Universities  
Returning to the NSS, the NSS measures (i.e. normalisingly judges) 
only universities and courses. It was asserted in Chapter 4 that univer-
sity leaders now increasingly observe individual course satisfaction 
and exert pressures on course leaders (as further component parts of 
universities) to raise their student feedback. Lisa remarks:  
“We had another meeting where [the course leader] reported on a meet-
ing with senior leadership of the university. They [senior leadership] ap-
parently again suggested that the course might be shut down if we don’t 
improve the NSS ratings for our course.” (Excerpt 47. Lisa’s research 
diary) 
Due to the NSS, many universities have now reconfigured internally 
by implementing intra-institutional feedback systems, such as Internal 
Surveys (Canning, 2017a). At my university, these are called Internal 
Student Surveys (ISS) whereas at Lisa’s university I described these 
simply as Internal Surveys. Using Figure 4 as a scaffold, these sur-
veys, of course, could be understood as assemblages themselves. 
That is, these “Internal Survey Assemblages” comprise as their re-
spective component parts (i) university senior managers, (ii) course 
leaders, (iii) students, and (iv) modules who then interact in specific 
ways. Just like the (macro) NSS enacts competitive (between univer-
sities) and disciplinary relations (between students and universities), 
these meso relations are competitive between some component parts 
(e.g. modules compete with other modules over student feedback) and 
disciplinary between others (students exert their panoptic gazes and 
“normalisingly judge” modules whilst managers instrumentalise this 
process).  
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6.1.4 Micro Assemblages  
This analysis can now be continued in the same fashion towards lower 
levels of scale. That is, Internal Surveys, in return, affect the internal 
composition of its respective component assemblages. For instance, 
one such assemblage – a “module” (see Figure 5) (or a “unit” in my 
case) - comprises module leaders, students, and individual lecturers 
as their component assemblages. For example, due to negative rat-
ings in internal surveys, the module leader in Lisa’s excerpt on page 
80 became “agitated” and hence established different (disciplinary) re-
lations of exteriority towards those “lecturers who he thought would be 
responsible for this negative student feedback”. By being ranked on a 
Competition Competition 
Module A Module B Module C 
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Figure 4: Intra-institutional Feedback systems as meso assemblages 
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scale (see excerpt on page 78), lecturers may now enter into compet-
itive relations of exteriority with other lecturers by competing over stu-
dent feedback. These reconfigured relations of exteriority between the 
module’s component parts resulted in a changed identity of the mod-
ule. That is, through Internal Surveys, this specific module “deterritori-
alised” and simultaneously “reterritorialised” into something different 
(i.e. a more competitive module with specific internal disciplinary and 
competitive characteristics). This reterritorialisation again affected the 
module’s component parts. For example, as will be argued in section 
6.2.2, university lecturers may become increasingly anxious due to the 
pressures of student feedback. Apart from disciplinary (between mod-
ule leaders and lecturers) and competitive relations (between lectur-
ers), we now have a third “mode of interaction”: that of antagonistic 
relations. It could be suggested that, precisely because lecturers feel 
disciplined, they may now develop antagonistic relations towards their 
students.  
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To single out “culprits” of negative student feedback, the module 
leader may also make use of further temporary assemblages, such as 
a Student Representative Meeting (SRM) (see page 78). SRMs can 
offer additional “intel” on which lecturers should be individualised and 
made responsible for the negative student feedback. It could, there-
fore, be suggested that through the combined pressure of the NSS 
and Internal Surveys, these Student Representative Meetings (SRMs) 
assume a different quality. I wrote in my research journal:  
“I sat in another [student representative meeting] and really had the 
feeling that my knowledge of how student voice is utilised has an impact 
on how I conducted myself in this meeting. I was really nervous that 
students might single either my unit or even my own teaching out as 
being problematic. This made me feel quite weak and disempowered. I 
remember that my heart was beating fast when different representa-
tives were giving their feedback about specific units. When students 
then finally made some “suggestions for improvement” for my unit, I 
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Figure 5: Student Representative Meetings (SRMs) as assemblages 
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passively thanked them for their suggestions and obediently said that I 
will try to put these into practice. This was despite the fact that these 
suggestions could not be put into practice [for reasons which I cannot 
discuss].” (Excerpt 48. My research journal) 
Due to the NSS, Internal Surveys and Student Representative Meet-
ings (SRMs), further ‘ephemeral assemblages’ (i.e. assemblages with 
short life spans) may reconfigure (i.e. deterritorialise and reterritorial-
ise differently) (DeLanda, 2006:54). These comprise ‘social encoun-
ters’ or, more specifically, ‘conversations between two or more per-
sons’ (p. 54). For instance, revisiting the excerpt on page 63, in which 
I told off a student for distracting behaviour, I  
“started worrying, however, whether he might now give me negative 
student feedback in the future and that, as a result, my contract as an 
associate lecturer would not be renewed.” (My research diary)  
Interestingly, I wrote later that 
“I realised that in the following sessions I was trying to be particularly 
nice to the student.” (Excerpt 49. My research diary)  
This reconfigured behaviour towards the student may be a direct result 
of the pressures generated by the NSS, Internal Surveys and Student 
Representative Meetings (SRMs). In short, if there had not been an 
NSS and resultant university internal pressures, I may not have found 
it necessary to be “particularly nice to the student” in the following ses-
sions.  
In summary, the NSS has the power to reconfigure (i.e. to deterri-
torialise and reterritorialise) a range of smaller scale assemblages 
(such as universities, courses, modules, lecturers and students). That 
is, the NSS reconfigures universities and courses and - through a hi-
erarchical “trickle-down effect” – Internal Surveys are implemented 
and modules, Student Representative Meetings (SRMs), lecturers and 
conversations become reconfigured. As a result, interactions at vary-
ing levels of scale become competitised (Foucault, 2008), disciplinary 
(Foucault, 1977) and antagonistic (Laclau, 2005): universities compete 
against universities, courses against courses, modules against mod-
ules and lecturers against lecturers. This happens on ranked scales 
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accompanied by perpetual surveillance (Foucault, 1977) and increas-
ing antagonisms (Laclau, 2005) of lecturers towards students. 
To reiterate, I maintain that assemblage theory’s strength lies in 
its following characteristics. First, assemblage theory opens the pos-
sibility to figure the NSS, universities, courses, Internal Surveys, mod-
ules, and lecturers as entities in their own right. At each level of scale, 
these entities assume a specific identity. This assemblage theory view 
of “levels of scale” provides insights into how ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ levels 
(DeLanda, 2006, p. 11) stand in a ‘part-to-whole’ (p. 30) relationship 
with one another whilst these parts influence the whole and the whole 
influences these parts. Second, DeLanda’s theory clarifies how disci-
pline may dominate between some component parts (e.g. between 
module leaders and the lecturers on the modules) whilst competitive 
logics may be more prominent between others (e.g. between individual 
lecturers). Antagonistic relations may, on the other hand, exist in a uni-
directional mode (e.g. lecturers develop antagonisms towards stu-
dents). Still, their combination (i.e. a “neo-liberal-disciplinary-antago-
nism”) produces emergent properties which are not reducible to the 
properties ‘of its parts’ (p. 11). Precisely this combination may make it 
possible for the NSS to “govern” its “subjects” more effectively than 
discipline, neo-liberalism or antagonism would be able to in isolation.   
The following section now shifts the focus away from DeLanda’s 
work to theorise the NSS through an alternative realist theoretical 
framework: Karen Barad’s “agential realism” (Barad, 2007). This 
framework is particularly apt to theorise another NSS associated phe-
nomenon: how boundaries are created between lecturers and stu-
dents. In addition, I argue that agential realism is superior to 
DeLanda’s framework in analysing what Barad calls topological rela-
tionships (such as that one university may “connect” with another uni-
versity by traversing state boundaries).  
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6.2 The NSS as an Apparatus: an Agential Realist Contribution  
Plagiarism note: Parts of this section are published in the journal “Dis-
course” (Thiel, 2018).  
As with DeLanda’s work above, Barad’s agential realism gains its an-
alytical strength from its ability to analyse macro and micro levels of 
scale together. In comparison to DeLanda, there are, however, also 
significant differences between the two authors’ works, most promi-
nently embodied in their concepts of intra-action (Barad, 2007) and 
interaction (DeLanda, 2006) and their conceptualisation of knowledge 
and matter (these will be tackled in section 6.3).  In the following, I 
argue that Barad’s framework is superior to DeLanda’s in one central 
aspect, namely how boundaries (for example, between lecturers and 
students) could be understood. More specifically, Barad makes it pos-
sible to show how all boundaries (in the universe) are indissociably 
entangled with identity formations.  
Whilst Barad started her academic career as a theoretical quan-
tum-physicist with publications solely in this area (Barad and Chou, 
1978; Barad, 1984, Barad et al., 1984, 1986) her project of combining 
quantum-physics with the critical social sciences began with her sem-
inal article about posthumanist performativity (Barad, 2003). This 
article was subsequently fleshed out into her magnum opus “Meeting 
the Universe Halfway” (Barad, 2007). Since then Barad has published 
on a range of topics, such as Derrida (Barad, 2010), natural quantum 
phenomena (Barad, 2011b), the philosophy of science studies (Barad, 
2011a), “touch” (Barad, 2012), diffraction (Barad, 2014), queer theory 
(Barad, 2015) and the unity of space, time, and matter (Barad, 2017). 
Importantly, Barad’s work has gained vast academic popularity in 
recent years17 with a steady incline in the use of her work from its ear-
liest utilisations (Adams, 2004; Birke et al., 2004; Rosengarten, 2004) 
                                                 
17 A scopus search with the search algorithm (TITLE-ABS-KEY(Barad) OR 
TITLE-ABS-KEY(Karen Barad)OR TITLE-ABS-KEY(Agential Realism)) on 2/11/17 
yielded 317 results whilst 1715 documents cited her work in total.  
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to its use in a multitude of academic fields. For instance, whilst the 
social sciences have taken up her work with most fervour (e.g. Aradau, 
2010; Hultman and Taguchi, 2010; Leonardi, 2013), other academic 
fields have also utilised her work, such as computer sciences (Prophet 
and Pritchard, 2015; Warfield, 2016); business studies (O’Regan, 
2012; Niemimaa, 2016); psychology (Johnson, 2008; Xenakis and 
Arnellos, 2017); or planetary sciences (Thomson and Engelmann, 
2017). In the field of education, work has been published in the areas 
of gender problematics (e.g. Juelskjaer, 2013; Lenz Taguchi and 
Palmer, 2013; Taylor, 2013); educational philosophy (Edwards and 
Fenwick, 2015; Gough and Gough, 2017; Mazzei and Jackson, 2017); 
early childhood studies (Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2012; Land, 2015); and 
mathematics education (de Freitas and Sinclair, 2013). Yet again, no 
studies have explored the National Student Survey through Barad’s 
lens.  
Since Barad’s agential realism is difficult to grasp, I first provide 
an introduction to her framework. This is then followed by theorising 
encounters with students through Barad’s concept of the “apparatus” 
in which boundary creation and isolation work alongside ongoing and 
iterative (i.e. repetitive) practices. After, the chapter points to a re-
newed understanding of the notions of solidarity as “shared agency”.  
6.2.1 Introduction to Agential Realism  
‘Agential realism is an epistemological and ontological framework that 
cuts across many of the well-worn oppositions that circulate in tradi-
tional realism versus constructivism, agency versus structure, idealism 
versus materialism, and poststructuralism versus Marxism debates.’ 
(Barad, 2007:225) 
 
‘Apparatuses are boundary making practices.’ (p. 148) 
Barad’s (2007) framework of agential realism is novel in that it 
reads Niels Bohr’s quantum-physical insights (i.e. his “philosophy 
physics”) through Foucault’s notion of “discursive practices” and But-
ler’s concept of “performativity”. This “diffractive” reading” culminates 
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in her theoretical framework of agential realism. As the name sug-
gests, agential realism follows a realist ontology whilst eschewing rep-
resentationalist understandings of realism (in the sense of an inde-
pendent world outside that is then somehow represented by ideas in-
side human minds). According to Barad, humans are not simply in this 
world whilst gazing passively at the events around them. Rather, they 
are part of this world - and to gaze at the world ‘one must actively 
intervene’ (p. 97). Similarly, Barad rejects Newtonian physics in which 
independent objects move through space and forwards in time; in-
stead, space, time and matter are fundamentally interconnected in that 
they emerge simultaneously in the shape of ‘spacetimemattering’ (p. 
234). The following section will now first outline some of the quantum-
theoretical assumptions of agential realism. 
a) Niels Bohr’s Philosophy Physics 
Quantum-Physicists Niels Bohr and his colleague Werner Heisenberg 
had a long-standing theoretical argument about the nature of particles 
(Barad, 2007). This debate concerned the question why it was not pos-
sible to simultaneously determine the momentum and the position of 
electrons. Heisenberg’s explanation is commonly referred to as the 
Heisenberg “Uncertainty Principle”. It dictates that it is impossible to 
know the exact momentum and the location of an electron because of 
the disturbance created by measurements (i.e. measurement interfer-
ence). Heisenberg assumed that both momentum and position of the 
particle still existed, but we simply cannot know them. Hence, his ex-
planation is epistemological.   
Bohr, on the other hand, postulated an ontological explanation. He 
argued that it could simply not be that momentum and location of the 
electron were to be measured simultaneously (Barad, 2007). This was 
not because of some measurement interference (as postulated by Hei-
senberg) but because “location” and “momentum” are mutually exclu-
sive phenomena, both contingent on a very specific experimental ap-
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paratus. For example, “momentum” or “location” are not some inde-
pendently existing variables, but are brought into existence through 
the exact experimental ‘material arrangement’, i.e. the type of meas-
uring device in relation to the electron (p. 139). Certain apparatuses 
produce the phenomenon of “momentum” (while excluding the phe-
nomenon of position) whilst other experimental arrangements produce 
the phenomenon of “position” (while excluding the possibility for the 
production of the phenomenon of momentum).  In asserting the impact 
of the apparatus on the object studied, Bohr rejected Newtonian phys-
ics. In short, there are no ‘independent objects with independently de-
terminate boundaries and properties’ (p. 33). Instead, phenomena are 
‘the primary ontological unit’ (p. 33). More specifically, phenomena are 
‘the observations obtained under [a specific] … experimental arrange-
ment’ (Bohr 1963, cited in Barad, 2007:119).  
This process is what Barad refers to as “intra-action”: instead of 
an independent electron “interacting” with the measuring device, both 
electron and measuring device come into existence through their en-
gagement. That is, ‘relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata-
within-phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions' (p. 140). Sci-
entists cannot passively gaze at an electron’s inherent values because 
there simply is no such thing. Rather the value in question (e.g. mo-
mentum or position) is brought into existence through the specific con-
figuration of the apparatus. This exact configuration then creates a 
temporary boundary: the agential cut.  
This agential cut is crucial since it determines which part of the 
phenomenon is about to become either “subject” or “object”. Bohr for 
example preferred the notion of “agencies of observation” instead of 
“subject” because this more effectively captures how the “agencies of 
observation” (subject) affect how the “object of observation” (object) 
materialises. Without the particular arrangement of the apparatus, the 
agential cut does not exist and, hence, there are no subject and object. 
This results in a reconceptualisation of objectivity: Barad argues that 
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“objectivity” exists (it is all around us), not as an absolute exterior con-
dition, but as the product of intra-acting agencies (which we, as hu-
mans, are part of).  
 
Figure 6: Simplification of the apparatus 
 
As will be argued in 6.2.2, in the context of the NSS I conceptualise 
this as follows: Lecturers, students, or feedback systems do not pre-
exist their encounter since, as Barad (2007) highlights, there are no 
inherent boundaries in the world. Rather lecturers, students and feed-
back systems (ontologically) emerge through these encounters. Put 
differently, they emerge as part of their intra-action because no entities 
in this universe exist independently, but always materialise through 
their intra-action. The specific intra-actions between students and lec-
turers then also necessarily create the boundaries between what be-
comes a “lecturer”, a “student” or a “feedback system” (because with-
out boundaries there would be no such entities).  
At this stage, I have to confess that whilst I believe this to be a 
coherent application of Barad’s work, I cannot help but experience a 
difficulty in accepting the proposition of intra-action. That is, I find the 
idea of intra-action rather unsettling. For example, intra-action would 
dictate that whilst I am typing these words, I emerge in a specific way 
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whilst I did not pre-exist my encounter with the computer as a deter-
minately bounded body. Nevertheless, despite its counter-intuitive 
content, Barad argues that intra-action has been confirmed by experi-
mental designs. For example, since Heisenberg’s and Bohr’s initial 
purely theoretical debates, the so-called Micro-Maser (MM) experi-
ments demonstrated that the apparatus really does “co-produce” the 
phenomenon observed (in this case whether an atom becomes a wave 
or a particle) whilst not measuring an observation-independent reality. 
Importantly, these MM experiments make it possible to assert that no 
measurement interference has occurred, thereby disproving Heisen-
berg’s rationale.  
In these MM experiments, gold atoms are fired at a so-called grat-
ing, which is a plate with two slits. The atoms then pass through the 
slits and make a little mark on a detector screen. The crux of the ex-
periment is this. If the atoms are simply fired at the grating, they be-
have like a wave (and not like particles). If a special (photographic) 
device, however, determines which of the two slits the atoms travelled 
through (which it can do without disturbing the atoms18), the atoms 
become particles. In other words, the sheer event of determining which 
slit gold atoms travelled through, makes these atoms materialise as 
particles. In the absence of this measurement, gold atoms become 
waves. More counterintuitively, this particle-like behaviour occurs re-
gardless of whether a researcher actually decides to look at “which slit” 
the gold atoms went through. It is simply enough for there to be the 
possibility of knowing this “which slit information”. (This is why Barad 
argues for an onto-epistemology in which being and knowing are en-
tangled.)  
Even more astoundingly, another variation of the MM experiment 
makes it possible to erase the information which slit the atom travelled 
                                                 
18 This is made possible by first exciting the atoms, then sending them 
through another device in which they lose their excited state which makes them 
discharge a photon (i.e. a light particle). This photon then makes it possible to de-
termine which slit the atoms travelled through without “disturbing” the trajectory of 
the atoms themselves.  
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through after the atom has already made a mark on the screen! (That 
is the “possibility of knowing” can be erased after the atom already 
travelled through the slit and made its mark.) The results are as fol-
lows: those atoms which had their “which slit” information erased sud-
denly behave[d] like waves. I used the grammatically ambiguous word-
ing “behave[d]” intentionally because it becomes unclear exactly 
“when” this change of behaviour occurred. That is, in a traditional New-
tonian world-view (where matter, time and space are separate enti-
ties), an event that has already happened would be reconfigured from 
the future! However, Barad maintains that whilst this behaviour is, in-
deed, paradoxical from a Newtonian perspective, it makes sense from 
a quantum physical world-view which dictates that matter, time and 
space are always entangled and have no separate existence (as New-
ton previously thought). Importantly, this dissolving of the “chronology 
of time” – as recently neatly summarised by de Freitas (2017) - also 
occurs in realms beyond the microscopic quantum physical. For ex-
ample, Barad argues that lightning already “knows” where it will have 
travelled before the lightning actually travels and certain receptor cells 
in the eyes of stingrays activate before light actually reaches these 
receptor cells (Barad, 2011b).  
Before moving on to the poststructuralist underpinnings of agential 
realism, I attempt to utilise these experimental insights for this thesis’s 
analysis of the NSS. Due to their counterintuitive nature, I only dare to 
formulate these as questions. Question 1: Is the sheer possibility of 
knowing NSS results perhaps enough for the NSS to have an effect 
on university lecturers? Question 2: Does this perhaps also extend 
Foucault’s assertion of the impact of the Panopticon? In other words, 
whilst Foucault asserted that the sheer possibility of “being observed” 
affects the behaviour of inmates, Barad’s discussion of the MM exper-
iment perhaps suggests that the sheer material possibility of knowing 
inmates’ behaviour affects inmates’ behaviour regardless of whether 
they are aware of the existence of the Panopticon.  
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b) Foucault’s discursive practices and Butler’s performa-
tivity 
Agential realism is not only underpinned by quantum-theoretical in-
sights, but also by Michel Foucault’s work on discursive practices and 
Judith Butler’s notion of performativity. Starting with the former, Barad 
(2007:62) asserts that Foucault rejected both structuralist and phe-
nomenological theories. That is, there are no ‘external structures’ (p. 
62) which entirely determine the subject (i.e. structuralism); on the 
other hand, there also is no ‘unified subject’ (p. 63) that acts intention-
ally and rationally at all times (humanism). Instead, the historical con-
text produces particular subjectivities over time (p. 62). That is, power 
does not act on ‘a preexisting subject’ as ‘an external force’, but as ‘an 
immanent set of force relations that constitutes (but does not fully de-
termine) the subject’ (p. 63). Moreover, Barad interprets Foucault’s 
work in that ‘discursive practices’ and the human body in its physical 
form are intricately linked (p. 63). Importantly, discourse19 is not ‘a syn-
onym for language’ (p. 146), but rather discursive practices ‘define 
what counts as meaningful statements’ (p. 63). In this sense, discur-
sive practices do not “describe” but “produce” social reality.  
Similarly, regulatory practices produce ‘specific materialization[s] 
of bodies’ (p. 63). According to Barad, this is utilised by Judith Butler 
(1993) in her concept of “gender performativity” (Barad, 2007). Per-
formativity – importantly not to be confused with ‘theatrical perfor-
mance[s]’ (p. 62) – asserts that human bodies are devoid of a pre-
existing sex. Instead, the repeated (i.e. iterative) practice of “perform-
ing” gender produces “sexed” bodies. Put differently, there are no pre-
existing sexes which are then gendered; rather sexes emerge ‘within 
… gender relations themselves’ whilst neither preceding nor following 
‘…the process of gendering…’ (Butler 1997, cited in Barad, 2007:62). 
                                                 
19 Barad generally uses discourse and discursive practice interchangeably which 
can be seen by the following transition from one sentence to the next: 'Discourse is not 
what is said; it is that which contains and enables what can be said. Discursive practices de-
fine what counts as meaningful statements'. (Barad, 2007: 146; italics mine) 
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This concept of gender performativity can be extended to “identity” 
more generally. In this sense, a person’s “identity” is not ‘an essence 
but as a doing’: identity is a ‘kind of becoming or activity . . .  an inces-
sant and repeated action of some sort’ (Butler 1990, cited in Barad, 
2007).  
Relating these insights to this thesis’s exploration of higher edu-
cation, it could be suggested that “performativity” is at play in that lec-
turers assume their specific identities through repeatedly performing 
them. That is to say, identity is the result of a repeated (i.e. an iterative) 
process rather than any form of “essence”. Importantly, this iterative 
performance is unlike a theatrical purposeful performance (which 
would be much more reminiscent of a “humanist” take on identity), but 
has more pernicious qualities in that lecturers cannot fully choose the 
specific identity they learn to perform. For example, as argued in the 
preceding chapters, I, as a lecturer, neither choose to be judged by my 
students nor do I necessarily actively wish to be compared to other 
lecturers. Nevertheless, I simply am judged and compared because 
student feedback systems prescribe that I am. In other words, just as 
“boys” or “girls” do not actively choose to be gendered into “male” or 
“female” bodies, lecturers do not choose to be “normalisingly judged”, 
“hierarchically observed”, “competitised” and “antagonised”. On the 
other hand, lecturers are not subjected to the structural pressures of 
the NSS in an entirely passive manner either: instead of the NSS act-
ing on university lecturers ‘preexisting subject[s]’ as ‘an external force’, 
the NSS could rather be understood as ‘an immanent set of force re-
lations that constitutes (but does not fully determine) the subject’ (p. 
63). In short, there may be some form of agency in this process. That 
is, an “iterative becoming” as part of feedback systems makes lectur-
ers’ (docile yet competitive) identities emerge, but there always is the 
possibility of “becoming differently”.  
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c) Agential Realism  
On these pillars of quantum theory and critical social sciences, Barad 
develops her fully-fledged framework of “agential realism” (Barad, 
2007). I would now like to summarise (and further elaborate on) four 
central interconnected notions which I deem to be particularly im-
portant for agential realism:  apparatus, agency, intra-action and iter-
ativity.  As outlined in section 6.2.1, Barad’s (2007) notion of the appa-
ratus is inspired by Niels Bohr’s theorisation of the influence of the 
experimental setup in quantum physical experiments on the phenom-
ena produced. As already implied, these apparatuses consist of “agen-
cies” that, importantly, do not pre-exist their encounter but rather 
emerge through (and as part of) what Barad calls intra-action, in lieu 
of the more common notion of interaction. Whilst interaction implies 
that certain determinately bounded individual agencies existed before 
their interaction, “intra-action” is better equipped to describe the emer-
gent character of those agencies. Moreover, counter to received wis-
doms about quantum physics, Barad suggests that intra-action is not 
restricted to quantum physical experiments and the microscopic realm. 
Rather, quantum theory ‘supersedes Newtonian physics’ (p. 324; em-
phasis added): humans as ‘determinately bounded and propertied hu-
man subjects do not exist prior to their “involvement” in naturalcultural 
practices’ (p. 171). In short, agential realism asserts that all matter in 
the universe, including those human matters described as “social”, are 
the result of intra-action.  
Importantly, there are three entangled aspects to each intra-ac-
tion: (i) materialisations (of agencies and objects of observations), (ii) 
the agential cut and (iii) exclusions (Barad, 2007). These aspects are 
fundamentally contingent on one another in that materialisations can-
not exist without agential cuts and exclusions. First, matter can only 
emerge (or materialise) through the agential cut. This agential cut 
“splits” – or cuts ‘together and apart’ (p. 389) – the apparatus into the 
‘agencies of observation’ (or effect) and the ‘object of observation’ (or 
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cause). In other words, the agential cut makes the agencies of obser-
vation and the object of observation materialise or “matter” (see Figure 
6 on page 169. It is of crucial importance that Barad uses the verb “to 
matter” in a sense that it simultaneously denotes that something (a) 
materialises (in the sense of taking shape) and (b) that something is 
of significance (i.e. in the sense of “this really matters to me”). This 
relates to one of Barad’s central assertions, namely that matter and 
meaning are indissociably entangled (just like in the micro-maser ex-
periment as described in section 6.2.1 a). Importantly, this entangle-
ment is not to be understood as simply intertwinement, but as quan-
tum-entanglement, i.e. to ‘lack an independent, self-contained exist-
ence’ (p. iv).  
What matters (i.e. what emerges as effect or as cause) is funda-
mentally contingent on the specific material arrangement of the appa-
ratus (Barad, 2007). A small change to the experimental conditions in 
a quantum-physical experiment enacts a different agential cut and, 
simultaneously, different agencies and objects of observation. The 
same logic applies to all other apparatuses (including those that are 
commonly described as “social”). Moreover, in addition to the agential 
cut coinciding with certain materialisations, Barad suggests that the 
(emerging) object (i.e. the cause) always leaves marks on the (emerg-
ing) agencies of observation (i.e. effect). In other words, the agencies 
of observation are marked by the object (of observation). Third, intra-
action always excludes certain things ‘from mattering’ (p. 181). That 
is, utilising Bohr’s principle of complementarity and indeterminacy, one 
particular apparatus produces one phenomenon while another pro-
duces a different one. Both phenomena are mutually exclusive or com-
plementary. Crucially, a phenomenon - including its delineating bound-
aries between agencies of observation and object of observation - re-
mains indeterminate - it is excluded from mattering - ‘in the absence 
of a specific physical arrangement of the apparatus’ (p. 114). As will 
be argued in the following section, lecturers (as part of the NSS) as-
sume a certain identity (a mattering) which is contingent on their intra-
actions with students. This also goes alongside the exclusions of other 
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potential ways of “becoming a lecturer” and “becoming a student” 
(such as lecturer identities which are not based on the fear of being 
rated poorly).  
Barad now utilises the notion of iterativity and develops it as fol-
lows. Firstly, intra-actions (and their associated agential cuts, materi-
alisations and exclusions) may be understood as “becomings” instead 
of “beings”. Barad (2007) achieves this conceptual shift by amalgam-
ating Foucault’s notion of discursive practices and Bohr’s notion of the 
apparatus into her neologism of material-discursive practices (which 
she progressively uses as a synonym20 for “apparatus”). 
Secondly, Barad (2007) builds on Butler’s concept of performa-
tivity and identity formation, suggesting that for boundaries and mate-
rialising effects to emerge more permanently, intra-action (and the as-
sociated agential cuts) need to become iterative. It is this iterative in-
tra-action (i.e. intra-action in a recurring fashion) which produces the 
illusion of a ‘bodily boundary’ (p. 155). Boundaries could therefore be 
understood as repeated agential cuts. Hence, instead of entities exist-
ing in a state of static independent being, they are in a constant pro-
cess of a repeated (i.e. iterative) becoming. As will be argued later, 
this iterative performativity is not restricted to human bodies, but rather 
can be extended to all phenomena in the universe. To exemplify this, 
both a chair and the floor on which it sits could be understood as iter-
atively materialising by intra-acting with one another. This makes it 
possible to understand the NSS as an iterative materialisation in its 
own right (quite similar to DeLanda’s assemblage take on macro ob-
jects as presented in section 6.1).  
Agential realism’s novelty lies in the fact that it goes beyond some 
poststructuralist conceptions, especially those that understood “ontol-
ogy” as mainly the effect of language (e.g. Lyotard, 1984). Barad as-
                                                 
20 Further synonyms which Barad uses for apparatus are phenomenon and struc-
ture.  
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serts that ‘matter matters’ (Barad, 2007:210). Similarly, Barad’s frame-
work also goes beyond Butler’s (1993) poststructuralist feminist under-
standing of discourse which, as Barad (2007:152) argues, only tackles 
how discourse has an effect on the human body - i.e. it describes how 
discourse matters – whilst avoiding to show how ‘matter comes to mat-
ter’. In Barad’s framework, matter is, importantly, not restricted to the 
realm of the “natural” but also comprises phenomena that are classed 
as cultural. In fact, a large proportion of Barad’s project centres on the 
attempt to deconstruct the demarcating lines between nature and cul-
ture. This move is captured in her notion of naturalcultural practices, 
suggesting that all matter in the universe is the result of intra-actions 
(and this includes those matters conventionally described as human 
or social).  
6.2.2 The NSS as an Intra-active Apparatus  
The following section now utilises Barad’s (2007:ix) concept of the ap-
paratus to analyse the ‘entanglements’ that exist between student-lec-
turer encounters, Internal Surveys and the NSS. More specifically, the 
formation of specific lecturer identities (figured as “materialisations” or 
“matterings”) will be theorised together with the emergence of iterative 
boundaries between staff and students within student feedback sys-
tems. As a starting point, encounters with students are theorised whilst 
later sections will then relate these encounters to the workings of the 
NSS. 
a) Intra-actions with students  
Building on Barad’s three dimensions of intra-action mentioned earlier, 
it is possible to ask the following question: Which (i) materialisations 
(of agencies and objects of observation) were enacted by (ii) which 
agential cuts and (iii) what was simultaneously excluded (from matter-
ing)? To explore these three entangled aspects of intra-action, I begin 
by revisiting the academic diary excerpt that depicted a confrontation 
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with a student (see page 63 and page 163) in which, after reprimand-
ing a student for distracting behaviour, I  
“started worrying, however, whether he might now give me negative 
student feedback in the future and that, as a result, my contract as an 
associate lecturer would not be renewed.” (My research diary)  
Again, I wrote later that 
“I realised that in the following sessions I was trying to be particularly 
nice to the student.” (My research diary)  
Focussing on the precise moment of my “telling off”, it could be sug-
gested that this moment cannot only be understood as, but actually 
was an apparatus which emerged through intra-action.  As part of this 
intra-action, (i) the student and I materialised. More specifically, (ii) an 
agential cut (which is inherent in every intra-action) split the apparatus 
into the ‘object of observation’ - i.e. the student - and the ‘agencies of 
observation’, i.e. myself (p. 154). That is, since ‘determinately bounded 
and propertied human subjects do not exist prior to their “involvement” 
in naturalcultural practices’ (p. 171), the student and I did not pre-exist 
our encounter. Rather what we became in that moment - i.e. the short-
lived “identity” that we assumed - was the result of our intra-action.  
Moreover, since I addressed the student during my “telling-off”, it could 
be suggested that for that brief moment, I emerged as the ‘object of 
observation’ whilst the student emerged as the ‘agencies of observa-
tion’ (p. 114). Importantly, the agential cut functioned as a temporary 
boundary separating the student from myself, i.e. as a short-lived cut-
ting ‘together and apart’ (p. 389). This ‘causal intra-action’ (p. 140) re-
sulted in the (iterative) materialisation of a more compliant student for 
the rest of the session under (iii) the exclusion of other materialisations 
of behaviour (e.g. distracting behaviour).  
b) Feedback anxiety  
This section will now apply Barad’s notion of iterativity to the workings 
of student feedback systems by considering the events that unfolded 
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after the confrontation between the student and myself, i.e. the fact 
that “I started worrying” about whether the student might now give me 
negative feedback in one of the Internal Surveys or student meetings. 
Whilst worrying could be conceptualised under the umbrella term of 
“affect” (Yao and Grady, 2005; Sabri, 2013), I feared that this, in return, 
might result in ramifications for my then temporary employment situa-
tion. Could “worrying”, therefore, be understood as a process of ‘itera-
tive becoming’ (p. 151)? Worrying, indeed, has an aura of repetition. 
Some psychological studies, for example, frame worrying within the 
field of repetitive negative thinking (e.g. McEvoy et al., 2010). 
Worrying - as what DeLanda (2006:156) would class a subper-
sonal process standing in a part to whole relationship to the assem-
blage “human” - must, however, not be understood as being sealed off 
from the “outside” world. Rather, an agential realist understanding 
would figure worrying as being entangled with processes that are typ-
ically understood to lie outside the human body, such as encounters 
with students within feedback systems. In other words, worrying, could 
be understood as a subpersonal material(discursive) apparatus which 
intra-acted with apparatuses that would traditionally be described as 
“social”, thereby traversing ‘bodily boundaries’ (Barad, 2007:156). For 
example, returning to the data excerpt above, the process of worrying 
was not only what started to iteratively “matter” as a result of my en-
counter with the student, but also had materialising effects on my 
teaching in the following sessions in that I was trying to be particularly 
“nice” to the student. In other words, worrying about negative student 
feedback (i) contributed to my own materialisation as a “nice”, more 
compliant subject (i.e. “agencies of observation” in Barad’s terminol-
ogy) whilst the student materialised in a more powerful position (i.e. as 
the “object of observation”). As part of this intra-action (ii) an iterative 
agential cut manifested itself in a boundary between myself and (the) 
student(s) which (iii) excluded a range of other materialisations. 
These, importantly, were indeterminate in this particular intra-action 
since they did not “matter” (in Barad’s double sense of the word). One 
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possible exclusion from mattering could have, for example, comprised 
a stricter expectation of respectful student behaviour.   
Re-examining the research diary excerpt from above (page 59), 
positive student feedback, interestingly, also had iterative materialising 
effects on my teaching practice, similar to worrying about potential 
negative student feedback: 
“After one of my taught English sessions, [a colleague] informed me 
that he had just had a meeting with student representatives and that 
they were “really happy” with my teaching. […] [As a result of this feed-
back,] I … asked myself the question, “What can I do in the future to 
attain the same good student feedback?”. I believe this was the moment 
when I also started feeling a little trapped in my practice. That is, I 
wanted to continue teaching in a similar fashion so that my students 
would continue to give me positive student feedback …” (My Research 
Diary)  
In other words, positive feedback “mattered” (in Barad’s understanding 
of the word, i.e. as having a materialising effect and being of signifi-
cance) in that I tried to iteratively recreate the status quo. This iterative 
intra-action also excluded other things from mattering, such as de-
creasing my motivation to be more experimental.  
The following excerpt from my interview with Melissa (see page 
62) is another example of the entanglement between subpersonal ap-
paratuses and student/lecturer apparatuses. In this interview, Melissa 
reported on an outright traumatic experience with student feedback in 
an interview when a student “complained on behalf of the entire 
course”: 
“… the lowest moment, now I think of it, was in my first term when a 
student complained about me on behalf of the entire group. [Even 
though it turned out that] the rest of the group didn’t share [this student’s 
opinion] .. it was very, very hard. I think you can feel very isolated at 
university per se, that kind of thing, you’re left, there is more thinking 
time, but there’s also more time to kind of become self-critical I think.” 
(Truncated Excerpt. Interview with Melissa) 
This encounter – i.e. when Melissa learned about the negative student 
feedback – could be understood as yet another apparatus in which 
Melissa emerged as an “agency of observation" whilst the complaining 
student emerged as the object (of observation). Similar to my experi-
ence with the disrespectful student above, Melissa experienced this as 
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“more time to kind of become self-critical” (i.e. the experience had a 
lasting materialising effect). Interestingly, this emerging “self-criticality” 
could be understood as yet another form of subpersonal iterative intra-
action. That is, through student feedback another agential cut was en-
acted (this time “inside” a person, i.e. “inside” Melissa). More specifi-
cally, this agential cut split Melissa’s self into one part (agencies of 
observation) being critical of another (object of observation). This, in 
return, exacerbated Melissa’s feeling of “isolation” at her institution.  
c) Anxiety as a “threat” from the future  
This “feedback anxiety” can also be usefully theorised through Brian 
Massumi’s (2010) work on “threat” which I argue, in return, resonates 
with Barad’s understanding of space, time and matter. Threat, Mas-
sumi suggests, ‘is from the future’ (p. 53). An avian flu, for instance, 
does not yet exist; however, it still makes a front-page newspaper 
headline. This does not, however, mean that ‘threat is not real in spite 
of its nonexistence. It is superlatively real, because of it.’ (p. 53). Lisa, 
for instance, describes in her research diary that the course leader re-
iterated that “if we don’t get better NSS feedback, our department will 
close”:  
“We were all working frantically to analyse various sections of the re-
sults of the NSS. For example, my team was working on one section of 
the student feedback which tackled the question of academic rigour. My 
colleagues were particularly elated to find that this section was not even 
judged that badly by students. We then continued our discussions to try 
and understand student perceptions of the course and how we could 
improve it even further.” (Excerpt 50. Lisa’s research diary)  
In this example, a feeling of threat invades the present from a future 
which does not yet exist; still this makes it ‘superlatively real’ (p. 53). 
Hence, everyone was working “frantically” to improve student feed-
back. In another section of her research diary, Lisa writes:  
“I was chatting to Rachel, and she was saying that another colleague 
was under really bad scrutiny because of students finding her seminars 
too challenging and too intellectual. Apparently, the colleague was told 
that if the negative feedback persists, they will have to think about her 
future employment.” (Excerpt 51. Lisa’s research diary)  
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Again, threat enters the present only through its nonexistence. The job 
is not lost yet (i.e. unemployment does not yet exist) which, neverthe-
less, makes joblessness ‘superlatively real’: Rachel’s colleague will try 
hard to counteract the threat which has not actualised yet. Massumi 
further observes that ‘the future of threat is forever’ (p. 53): for exam-
ple, George W Bush’s decision to start a war in Iraq was afterwards 
justified on the basis that Iraq simply had the capacity to produce 
weapons of mass destruction which it could then have supplied to ter-
rorists. Massumi concludes that the invasion was justified on the basis 
that ‘in the past there was a future threat’ (p. 53). Thus, regardless of 
whether the threat was real or not, it was enough that the threat ‘was 
felt to be real’ (p. 53; emphasis in original); hence, ‘what is not actually 
real can be felt into being’. Importantly, the threat is ‘felt in the form of 
fear’, that is ‘fear, as foreshadowing’ (p. 54). ‘Threat has an impending 
reality in the present’ (p. 54). Massumi then concludes: ‘If we feel a 
threat, there was a threat. Threat is affectively self-causing’ (p. 54).  
Hence, the threat of negative student feedback and potential re-
dundancy (including the associated feeling of fear) needs to be under-
stood as a fundamental operating principle of the NSS. On this basis, 
it is possible to justify any preemptive action - such as a university’s or 
a department’s strategy to boost student feedback – with the sheer 
perception of threat. That is, regardless of whether the danger of neg-
ative student feedback exists or not,  
‘the felt reality of threat legitimates preemptive action, once and for all. 
Any action taken to preempt a threat from emerging into a clear and 
present danger is legitimated by the affective fact of fear, actual facts 
aside.’ (Massumi, 2010:54) 
This is where Massumi’s work can be brought into conversation 
with Barad’s understanding of space, time and matter. “Threat” could 
be understood as something which has a materialising effect from the 
“future”. Threat “matters” in that it affects how lecturers, departments 
and universities behave (come to matter). It is hyperreal and traverses 
temporal boundaries.  
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However (going beyond Massumi) through Barad’s work, threat 
may be reconceptualised as having an ontological (material) quality. 
More specifically, the micro-maser experiments above (see page 170) 
suggest that the sheer possibility of knowing which slit an atom trav-
elled through influences whether atoms become a wave or become a 
particle. This “becoming” was influenced “after” these atoms had al-
ready passed through the respective slits and made their mark on a 
screen. Similarly, it was argued that receptor cells in the eyes of sting-
rays activate “before” light actually arrives at these. In a traditional 
Newtonian conception of space, this would (paradoxically) mean that 
the present is changed from the future (i.e. a future event has an effect 
on a past one). However, from a quantum theoretical perspective, 
Barad argues this simply means that space, matter and time do not 
exist in isolation – hence, “spacetimemattering” may be a more apt 
description of what is all around us. This still does not alter the pro-
foundly challenging implications these propositions raise. An event, in 
this understanding, can become entangled with an event in the “past” 
or the “future. In Barad’s words, ‘what seems far off in space and time 
may be as close or closer than the pulse of here and now’ (Barad, 
2007:394). Threat, in this sense, could be understood as just one ex-
ample where certain events become entangled across the ‘spacetime-
matter manifold’ (p.246). Therefore, threat could be conceptualised as 
an example of what Barad (2007:181) argues is a more fundamental 
ontological quality of the universe where  
‘the past matters and so does the future, but the past is never left be-
hind, never finished once and for all, and he future is not what will 
come to be in an unfolding of the present moment; rather the past and 
the future are enfolded participants in matter’s iterative becoming’ 
In other words, threat may be understood as invading the present 
from the future and exerting power over the present. The anticipation 
of negative NSS results – which might never fully manifest - has ma-
terialising potential on what unfolds in the “present”.  
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d) Topology and Enfolding  
Building on this, the question arises how to theorise together (i) the 
iterative processes of worrying; (ii) encounters between students and 
lecturers; (iii) institutional student feedback systems (such as Internal 
Surveys); and (iv) the National Student Survey. To think the “inside” 
and “outside” together, resonates with Moore’s (2006:487) suggestion 
that there is a need to ‘take account both of sociological and of psy-
chological issues’ and that  
‘we need to combine approaches and perspectives that may be per-
ceived as strictly sociological with approaches and perspectives that 
may be perceived as more strictly psychological.’  
Barad’s work, in this sense, may be understood as adding another 
layer of analysis towards troubling some of these bodily boundaries 
(such as the psychological-sociological or natural-cultural binary). A 
Baradian take on thinking these different realms together may be 
found in her notion of “enfolding”. Enfolding suggests that apparatuses 
are enfolded into other apparatuses. This enfolding must not be un-
derstood within a geometrical conception of scale - in the sense that 
one apparatus is nested in another - but rather as the ‘agential enfold-
ing of different scales through one another’ (p. 245). (In this respect, 
Barad deviates from DeLanda’s (2006) understanding of scale.) The 
notion of “agential enfolding” may help explain how the change of one 
enfolded apparatus has the agency to reconfigure the workings of the 
apparatus into which it is enfolded. Hence, akin to the pyramidal work-
ing of power in section 4.1 and Manuel DeLanda’s assertion that as-
semblages can be part of other assemblages (see 6.1), it could, for 
example, be suggested that my “worrying” (as one apparatus) may be 
understood as being agentially enfolded into another apparatus (e.g. 
encounters with students). These, in return, are agentially enfolded 
into “meso” institutional apparatuses (such as Student Representative 
Meetings (SRMs) and Internal Surveys) which, yet again, are agen-
tially enfolded into national apparatuses (e.g. national policy imple-
mentations such as the NSS). What happens nationally contributes 
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agentially (but not deterministically) to what “matters” within the other 
apparatuses and vice versa.  
This notion of enfolding is connected to Barad’s understanding of 
entanglement and the question where an apparatus starts and where 
it stops. Whilst the preceding section suggested some entanglements 
across time, entanglement also happens across space. Or put more 
precisely, entanglement always happens across ‘spacetime’ (p. 240). 
That is, apparatuses are not some pre-constituted object perched ‘on 
a shelf waiting to serve a particular purpose’; rather ‘… any particular 
apparatus is always in the process of intra-acting with other apparat-
uses’ (Barad, 2007:203). Through this intra-action the apparatuses do 
not only shift in their relation to one another but also change their own 
respective topologies which then leads to ‘the production of new phe-
nomena, and so on … ’ (p. 171). Topology, for Barad refers to how 
apparatuses connect to other apparatuses and where they form 
boundaries. This again invites the question: where does the apparatus 
start and where does it stop? Taking the example of STM images (mi-
croscopic logos made, for example, by the company IBM at the scale 
of atoms), Barad argues that an ‘entangled set of practices … go into 
making these images’. The practices are: 
‘STM microscopes and practices of microscopy, the history of micros-
copy, scientific and technological advances made possible by scan-
ning tunnelling microscopes, the quantum theory of tunnelling, mate-
rial sciences, IBM's corporate resources and research and develop-
ment practices, scientific curiosity and imagination, scientific and cul-
tural hopes for the manipulability of individual atoms, Feynman's 
dreams of nanotechnologies, cultural iconography, capitalist modes of 
producing desires, advertising, the production and public recognition 
of corporate logos, the history of the atom, the assumption of meta-
physical individuals, complex sets of visualizing and reading practices 
that make such images intelligible as pictures of words and things, 
and the intertwined history of representationalism and scientific prac-
tice. This is merely an abbreviated list that doesn't even scratch the 
surface when it comes to the kinds of genealogies that are needed to 
give an objective accounting of the micrograph.' (Barad, 2007:360-
361) 
To put this yet differently: when one apparatus changes, it also has an 
effect on everything else (ibid.). Apparatuses are enfolded into other 
apparatuses as well as consisting of other apparatuses (phenomena) 
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(ibid.). Similarly, the NSS is entangled with a myriad other apparat-
uses, such as IT systems which students use to fill in the feedback, 
which are enfolded into the vast structure which is the internet, stu-
dents’ own biographies including their experiences of past schooling 
etc.  
The importance of topology is also captured in the fact that uni-
versities could be understood as being enfolded into the NSS (in that 
they are a part of the NSS); however, universities may also be entan-
gled with other universities which are spatially much further away, 
thereby traversing “national boundaries”. That is, in a neoliberal glob-
alised society, my university may in fact be competing with another 
Chinese university over Chinese students (see Figure 7).  
 
 
 
 
It could now be suggested that it is precisely through the enfolding of 
these apparatuses that the materialising effects of Student Evaluations 
of Teaching (SET) attain their full-blown force. For example, I consider 
Uni A 
UK 
Uni B 
Uni C 
Uni D 
China 
Figure 7: Competitive topologies across national boundaries 
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the following excerpt in which Lisa reflects on a conversation with a 
colleague. Both had received mildly negative student feedback in a 
student representative meeting, and now discussed that  
…the meetings with student representatives [are] really useful because 
they allow for change. It is only through the combination of the meetings 
and [internal surveys] … that the meetings become much more devious. 
It almost feels a little bit that through having [internal surveys…] that 
whatever the students say in student rep meetings mutates into some-
thing much more powerful and absolute. I feel a little anxious now that 
my senior colleagues might make this into a bigger deal which will add 
to my already extensive workload. (Excerpt 52. Lisa’s research diary)  
This is where Foucault’s notion of power can be incorporated into the 
current agential realist discussion. Again, power, in its Foucauldian 
take, is not to be confused with “domination”, i.e. a complete state of 
submission where one person has no room for manoeuvring (Lemke, 
2002) (such as when a psychiatric patient is tied to a bed and forced 
to take intravenous medication). Rather, power always involves some 
room for making choices, however contrived these may be (Foucault, 
1982). Building on Foucault’s understanding of power, Barad (2007) 
extends this understanding into all, and not only human, realms of re-
ality. Power in this understanding is figured as ‘materializing potential’ 
(p. 210). That is, power might involve humans, but could also involve 
marine animals, such as the ‘brittlestar’ (p. 375) intra-acting with its 
environment. Based on this posthuman understanding of power, re-
garding the previous data excerpt it could be postulated that it is 
through the agential enfolding of (i) lecturer-student encounters and 
(ii) institutional feedback systems that student voice developed its 
“power”. In other words, it could be suggested that (a) the intra-action 
between Lisa and her student feedback attained the power to (b) pro-
mote a subpersonal iterative materialisation of anxiety, precisely be-
cause both apparatuses (i.e. (a) and (b)) were agentially enfolded into 
Internal Survey apparatuses. In return, these Internal Surveys attained 
even more power through various other ‘material-discursive practices’ 
(p. 146) such as anxiety ridden team meetings as captured in Lisa’s 
previous diary excerpt:   
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This all is a little worrying. Recently in one of my staff meetings, the 
course leader suggested that if the course was unable to gain better 
feedback in internal surveys that the course might be shut down. (Lisa’s 
research diary) 
In addition, the following research diary entry can be revisited (see 
page 108):  
I am not teaching this one class any longer as the decision has been 
made to take this class of me due to negative student feedback from 
that class. I feel like I really failed on this instance even though I tried 
really hard to make things accessible and clear. But it is also my stu-
dents’ fault in that they simply don’t understand things. But this won’t 
help me much. If this happens in future seminars, I know that I will get 
into trouble with my line managers. (Lisa’s research diary)  
Of course, this now opens the opportunity, to argue that these appa-
ratuses (worrying, student-lecturer encounters, internal survey), in re-
turn, are agentially enfolded into national apparatuses, such as the 
NSS. That is, as outlined in Chapter 4, NSS results are used to enact 
a market which creates competitive pressures for universities who now 
start to pay close attention to feedback attained by individual courses. 
If courses do not manage to improve their student feedback, university 
lecturers may now focus their attention on internal student feedback 
systems (Canning, 2017a). In other words, the NSS has the power to 
“matter” (i.e. increase the materialising potential) in that more im-
portance is allocated to the NSS and Internal Survey results. Both the 
NSS and Internal Surveys, in return, exacerbated Lisa’s anxiety and 
agentially reconfigured her intra-actions with students. Importantly, it 
could be hypothesised that it is precisely this anxiety which functions 
as an intra-active and enfolded “building block” of the NSS. Without 
anxiety, the NSS may lose its cutting edge.  
6.2.3 Differential Gears and Solidarity  
This opens the opportunity to explore the question of potential univer-
sity lecturer agency in the context of an agential realist understanding 
of the relationship between structure and agency. First, it is important 
to note that Barad claims that ‘structures are apparatuses…’ (Barad, 
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2007:237), thereby conflating the two notions. It could hence be sug-
gested that one set of structures (e.g. the NSS and Internal Surveys) 
comprises enfolded intra-acting structures (e.g. lecturer-student con-
frontations and anxiety), the latter functioning as the formers’ intra-act-
ing agencies. Barad understands agency as ‘the enactment of iterative 
changes of particular practices…’ (p. 178). The moment practice is 
changed (regardless of whether the cause of this change is a “mal-
functioning computer server” or a “student NSS boycott”), agency is 
enacted.  
In the context of “agency”, Barad offers a significant theoretical 
contribution by now considering intra-acting agencies (e.g. universi-
ties) of apparatuses (e.g. the NSS) as “differential gears”. That is, dif-
ferential gears reside within their respective structures and thus, struc-
tures could be understood as ‘differential gear assemblages’ (p. 239). 
A crucial feature of differential gears is that one malfunctioning cog 
does not break a machine (in contrast to a conventional gear). For 
example, if one university lecturer decided to enact her agency by, for 
instance, refusing to act upon student feedback, this would not signif-
icantly affect the functionality of Internal Surveys and the NSS (i.e. it 
would not “break” the NSS). Put differently, the refusal of one lecturer 
would lack the agency to reconfigure the structure (i.e. Internal Sur-
veys and the NSS). Rather, this differential gear (i.e. the lecturer) could 
easily be replaced by another differential gear (i.e. another lecturer). A 
different picture, however, emerges when considering a range of dif-
ferential gears breaking (i.e. by a range of lecturers or other stakehold-
ers refusing their participation). That is, a significant reconfiguration of 
the NSS could only be effected by non-participation of a range of its 
intra-acting agencies, foremost by students. As had been argued in 
Chapter 5, whilst lecturer non-participation would leave the market 
pressures of the NSS intact, students possess the power to prevent 
the NSS from “mattering” since universities are compelled to have a 
50% response rate in order to be included into the NSS rankings (Ip-
sos, 2017). That is, collective “non-participation” of lecturers and stu-
dents would be the precondition for the NSS to lose its materialising 
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potential (i.e. its power). As already implied in Chapter 5, this almost 
happened as a result of the 2016 student boycott (Grove, 2016).  
This raises one central question. Rather than perpetuating the on-
going boundary creation between lecturers and students, the central 
question must now centre on how to create connectivity between stu-
dents and lecturers, especially since students appear to share eco-
nomic pressures similar to (or worse than) lecturers, necessitating the 
juggling of part time jobs while facing an uncertain and increasingly 
precarious employment future (cf. Neilson and Rossiter, 2008). In 
other words, ways must be found to theorise the NSS in its entangle-
ment with other concurrent policy apparatuses (such as assessment 
practices and the UK Research Excellence Framework) which pro-
mote increasing workload, competitisation (Brown, 2015; Steger, 
2010), and precariatisation (Lopes and Dewan, 2014). As was argued 
in Chapter 5, it is perhaps the analogous working of these apparatuses 
that could explain the atomisation and isolation (Bourdieu, 1998) of 
lecturers and students, in particular, and of people, more generally. 
Moreover, the NSS could be understood as being agentially enfolded 
into larger-scale international apparatuses, such as international ne-
oliberal policy practices, international HEI ranking industries (cf. Jöns 
and Hoyler, 2013; Ordorika and Lloyd, 2015) and bottom up streams 
of capital distribution (cf. Piketty, 2014) and resultant plutocratisation 
(Gates, 2000).  
As already argued in Chapter 5, it is now somewhat poignant that 
the NSS may turn out to be precisely the technology which prevents 
lecturers and students to develop this capacity for joint agency to un-
dermine the functionality of the NSS. For example, further data indi-
cated that as a result of the perceived pressures of student feedback 
systems, lecturers at Lisa’s university increasingly developed a (some-
what covert) negative attitude towards students (i.e. what I called an-
tagonism in Chapter 5). Lisa, for example, notes the following: 
One of my colleagues continuously complains about students along the 
lines of “they’re never satisfied regardless of what you do” and “they 
simply can’t think for themselves”. Then one of these students knocked 
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on the door and this very colleague suddenly turned into the friendliest 
person imaginable. (Excerpt 53. Lisa’s research diary)  
That is, since Barad suggests that materialisations, boundary crea-
tions and exclusions always emerge simultaneously as part of their 
intra-action, I postulate that the NSS functions as an apparatus which 
– in addition to the materialising effects above - draws iterative bound-
aries between students and lecturers, thereby preventing potential stu-
dent-lecturer alliances.  
Nevertheless, Barad’s notion of a differential gear assemblage 
perhaps might not only provide a better understanding of how the 
(post)human subject is thoroughly implicated in - and an agentic part 
of - the (iterative) maintenance of (neoliberal) structures, but might also 
provide us with an analytical tool so as to theorise potential ways of 
subverting and reshaping the naturalcultural becoming at university 
and beyond. In other words, the aim should centre on arriving at po-
tential strategies to counteract the negative effects of (neoliberal) ap-
paratuses, such as the NSS. That is, instead of students, lecturers, 
colleagues, senior-colleagues to be played against one another in a 
reciprocal process (see page 145) that enacts (iterative) boundaries, 
ways to create connectivity need to be explored. The nature of this 
renewed “shared agency” (cf. Smith, 2015) may contain a re-evalua-
tion or reassertion of notions of solidarity. That is, the traditional work-
ers’ song of “Und erkenne deine Macht/Alle Raeder stehen still wenn 
dein starker Arm es will” (“And recognise your power. All gears stand 
still if your strong arm commands it”) might attain a reconfigured mean-
ing when read diffractively with Barad’s metaphor of the differential 
gear assemblage. How this solidarity could be promoted and how it 
could potentially transgress the confines of the university will, how-
ever, have to be explored elsewhere, with recent developments in the 
context of accelerationism perhaps indicating some ways how this 
may be achieved (see Srnicek and Williams, 2016).  
 
Before moving on to the next section, I would now like to briefly discuss 
how Barad’s work has been taken up in the academic community and 
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how a selection of relevant studies resonate with my take on Barad’s 
work. In particular, I would like to focus on certain trends in Baradian 
studies which, I argue, fail to do justice to Barad’s agential realism be-
cause they either misrepresent or under-utilise the profound potential 
in her work.  
One of these trends is a certain favouring of the (seemingly) “im-
mediate” and ‘local’ over the “large” and “abstract”. This focus on im-
mediacy resonates with Srnicek and Williams’s (2013:online) critique 
of some of the left’s valorisation of ‘communal immediacy’ and ‘neo-
primitivist localism’. This focus on the immediate and local, under ex-
clusion of the “larger” or “longer”, is, for example, captured in Taylor’s 
(2013) account. Whilst rightly allocating agency to material objects and 
practices in the classroom as producing gendered practices (p. 691), 
Taylor’s analysis remains firmly contained within the locality (i.e. within 
the confines of the classroom). Hereby, Taylor fails to acknowledge 
how these classroom objects may connect to other structures which 
are spatiotemporally larger and further away. In short, precisely the 
novelty of Barad’s work – i.e. that one apparatus (e.g. a chair) may 
have ontological spatiotemporal connectivities to other apparatuses 
(e.g. trees and factory workers) and may be enfolded into other appa-
ratuses (e.g. the classroom, the school, the country) - is “excluded 
from mattering” (to use one of Barad’s phrases). Instead, Taylor valor-
ises the ‘minutiae of bodily practices’ (p. 689) and ‘micro practices of 
matter’ (p. 690).  
This valorisation of immediacy dominates the Baradian literature 
base (e.g. Seear, 2013; Ford et al., 2017) and even extends to aca-
demic fields with strong temporal qualities. For instance, Alberti and 
Marshall’s (2009) study is situated in archaeology but still only focus-
ses on the material qualities of artefacts whilst failing to discuss their 
temporal connectivities (i.e. those topological relationships which may 
show stronger connectivity across time than across the immediate 
space that surrounds them).  
Then there are those articles which do theorise the macro and mi-
cro in their very entanglement, such as Rosiek (2018) in his discussion 
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of racism or Nilsson Sjöberg (2017) in his of ADHD. However, these 
contributions still fail to reference certain key features in Barad’s work, 
such as her discussion of topology and of the micro-maser experi-
ments.  
There are, of course, exceptions to this. For example, Sherfinski 
and Chesanko (2016) explore the micro-practices of homeschooling 
whilst also acknowledging their entanglement with environmental, eco-
nomic, cultural, historical and political processes. I suggest that it is 
paramount that a “posthuman ontology” or “morethanhuman” ontology 
should not be restricted to the level of discrete and minute objects and 
practices, but that it shows how certain apparatuses are ‘always in the 
process of intra-acting with other apparatuses’ (Barad, 2007:203). This 
entanglement of apparatuses also comprises those apparatuses that 
are dispersed, both temporally and spatially.  
 
This closes this agential realist discussion of the NSS. So far, this sec-
tion sought to exemplify how Barad’s (2007) framework of agential re-
alism has the capacity to theorise the workings of the NSS and its ef-
fects on university lecturer practice. It was suggested that by partici-
pating in the NSS, lecturers materialised as being increasingly anxious 
which, in return, reworked the ways how they enacted their practice. 
It, furthermore, was argued that the NSS simultaneously enacted iter-
ative boundaries between students and lecturers as part of their ongo-
ing intra-action. The intra-actions specific to the NSS also excluded 
other potential “matterings”, such as more experimental approaches 
to teaching. Lastly, the attempt was made to connect agential realism 
to a discussion of shared agency and solidarity. In short, if there are 
no inherent boundaries (and connectivities) in the universe, people (as 
part of the universe) can actively intervene to redraw some of these 
boundaries. Hence, whilst the NSS could most fittingly be described 
as a boundary-drawing, ‘material-discursive apparatus of bodily pro-
duction’ (Barad, 2007:218), its disciplinary and competitising qualities 
may be resisted through the attempt to actively create connectivities 
between stakeholders.  
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6.3 A Comparison of Agential Realism and Assemblage Theory  
This section explores some fruitful resonances between Barad’s agen-
tial realism and DeLanda’s (2006) assemblage theory (see 6.1). First, 
I discuss conflicts between both authors. Second, I trace some simi-
larities and differences with the intention of sketching out a combined 
framework.   
Before beginning this “diffractive” reading, it must be mentioned 
that DeLanda rejects (and even has “contempt” for) Barad’s agential 
realism. DeLanda’s rejection transpires in his discussion with Graham 
Harman. In this discussion, Harman suggest that Barad’s take on ma-
terialism is a ‘materialism without realism’ since Barad is  
‘a materialist who … argues that objects have no reality apart from 
their interactions with the mind; … Although Barad calls her philoso-
phy “agential realism,” there is nothing realist about it, since she 
grants reality no autonomy from the human mind, or at least not from 
human practices.’ (DeLanda and Harman, 2017:3) 
This is followed by DeLanda who expresses an outright animosity 
towards Barad:  
‘I have even more contempt for those who appeal to the worse parts 
of science – such as Barad. The idea that the consciousness of the 
observer determines the actual state of an electron is a myth. It was 
floated in scientific circles (by von Neumann?) as a funny idea to con-
vey the flavor of the uncertainty principle to non-specialists, but it has 
no basis whatsoever in experimental science …’ (p. 7; emphasis 
added)  
Harman returns to this argument and suggests  
‘Barad and Žižek, … give the human subject an outsized role making 
up 50 percent of the cosmos. … Barad gives the observer the almost 
magical power of co-creating the universe, and Zizek holds that the 
thinking subject is so important and unique that it had to be created 
through some sort of “ontological catastrophe.”’ (p. 8)  
Unfortunately, these assertions mispresent Barad’s work pro-
foundly (as also discussed by de Freitas, 2017), raising the question 
as to whether either author has read Barad’s (2007) work at the depth 
it deserves. In short, Barad could not be further from claiming that re-
ality has ‘no autonomy from the human mind’, or that human subjects 
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make ‘up 50 percent of the cosmos’. In fact, large parts of her discus-
sion make direct opposite claims, for instance in her discussion of the 
‘brittlestar’ (Barad, 2007:375), a marine animal, which brings phenom-
ena (including its own “knowing” body) into existence through its intra-
action with its surroundings. This posthuman ontology is ubiquitously 
reiterated throughout her work. For instance, she argues that ‘human 
practices are not the only practices that come to matter…’ (p. 206) and 
that her posthumanism ‘is not calibrated to the human … taking issue 
with human exceptionalism’ (p. 136). Similarly, DeLanda’s claim that 
Barad suggests that ‘the consciousness of the observer determines 
the actual state of an electron’ (DeLanda and Harman, 2017:8) consti-
tutes a misreading of her work. Yes, Barad suggest that human minds 
can become “entangled” with quantum phenomena when humans are 
involved, but humans are not a pre-requisite for these phenomena to 
emerge. More specifically, in the micro-maser ‘quantum-erasure’ ex-
periment (2007:311), the possibility of knowing the location of an atom 
makes this atom “become” a particle. Whether the researcher actually 
decides to look at this location information is irrelevant (i.e. it does not 
change the phenomenon in question) as long as the possibility of 
knowing this information is maintained.  
Despite DeLanda’s misinterpretation of Barad’s work, I maintain 
that agential realism and assemblage theory share many similarities 
which go beyond their mutual affiliation with what has come to be 
known as the “new materialisms”, especially when reading both au-
thors’ respective projects closely. For instance, DeLanda’s concept of 
the assemblage and Barad’s understanding of the apparatus are con-
gruous in various important respects. That is, first, whilst DeLanda ar-
gues that assemblages may consist of smaller scale assemblages 
(e.g. the NSS consists of universities, which consist of courses etc.), 
in Barad’s understanding, apparatuses can be enfolded into one an-
other. In short, apparatuses are enfolded into (DeLanda: assemblages 
can be component parts of) other apparatuses (DeLanda: assem-
blages); and apparatuses can intra-act (DeLanda: interact) with other 
apparatuses (DeLanda: assemblages). Moreover, DeLanda and 
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Barad resonate regarding (some of) their metaphysical assumptions. 
For instance, as implied above, both authors reject anthropocentrism 
by arguing for the existence of a world beyond that of human experi-
ence. In this respect, both authors also share an interest in traversing 
the boundaries between the “social” and the “natural”. For example, 
both “apparatuses” (Barad, 2007) and “assemblages” (DeLanda, 
2016) exist in social and natural realms. More specifically, DeLanda 
consistently outlines the interconnections between natural and social 
assemblages in that for example, nation-states contain both social 
(e.g. conversations, interpersonal networks) and natural (e.g. infra-
structures; genetic codes; bacteria) component parts. Barad, going 
somewhat further, challenges any a priori distinction between the so-
cial and the natural which is captured in her preference for the neolo-
gism of ‘naturalcultural practices’ (Barad, 2007:225).  
 
Yet, there are also important differences between the two authors 
which will be tackled in what follows. As mentioned above, Barad’s 
(2007) concept of “enfolding” (as discussed on page 184) is not to be 
understood within a geometrical conception of scale (in the sense that 
one apparatus is nested in another) but rather in a topological sense, 
i.e. as the ‘agential enfolding of different scales through one another’ 
(p. 245). It was argued that this makes it possible to theorise how one 
“smaller” enfolded apparatus has the agency to reconfigure the work-
ings of the apparatus into which it is enfolded (see section 6.2.2d). This 
privileging of topology over issues of scale is captured in the following 
quote: 
‘During a transatlantic flight from New York to London, at a cruising al-
titude of thirty-five thousand feet, a communications link between an 
Intel-based notebook computer, perched on a tray in front of the pas-
senger in seat 3A of the Boeing 747, and a Sun workstation on the 
twentieth floor in a Merrill Lynch brokerage house in Sydney initiates 
the transfer of investment capital from a Swiss bank account to a cor-
porate venture involving a Zhejiang textile mill. The event produces an 
ambiguity of scale that defies geometrical analysis. Proximity and lo-
cation become ineffective measures of spatiality. Distance loses its 
objectivity – its edge – to pressing questions of boundary and connec-
tivity. Geometry gives way to changing topologies as the transfer of a 
specific patterns of zeros and ones, represented as so many pixels on 
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a screen, induces the flow of capital and a consequent change in the 
material conditions of the Zhejiang mill and surrounding community. 
With the click of a mouse, space, time, and matter are mutually recon-
figured in this cyborg “trans-action” that transgresses and reworks the 
boundaries between human and machine, nature and culture, and 
economic and discursive practices.’ (Barad, 2007:223) 
Similarly, a university lecturer could be lying on a beach in Aus-
tralia or dancing in a nightclub in Tokyo whilst looking at the responses 
of the latest National Student Survey. A student may be partying on 
Ibiza or picking fruit on New Zealand whilst filling in the NSS. In addi-
tion, as argued above, Reddish University may be competing and col-
laborating across national boundaries. Topology21 undoubtedly is im-
portant, particularly in the age of the Internet. Scale shrinks in im-
portance when global communication is possible close to the speed of 
light.  
On the other hand, in her favouring of “issues of topology” over 
“issues of scale”, Barad, unfortunately, is unclear with respect to her 
exact definition of scale, especially her understanding of the relativity 
of size. For instance, it would be difficult to maintain that the NSS (as 
a national apparatus) is not in some sense larger than Internal Surveys 
(as institutional apparatuses), in return being somewhat larger than, 
for example, “confrontations with students” (as micro-scale apparat-
uses).  
This is where DeLanda’s assemblage theory usefully comple-
ments Barad’s framework. Similar to Barad, DeLanda eschews a ge-
ometrical understanding of scale whilst nevertheless holding on to the 
notion of “bigger than” and “smaller than”. That is, rather than figuring 
“larger-scale” as, for example, ‘one nation-state’ occupying ‘a larger 
                                                 
21 It needs to be mentioned that DeLanda also heavily utilises the conception of to-
pology in the context of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the “virtual” (i.e. a possibility 
space of unexercised capacities). For example, a body plan for all vertebrates may 
be characterised only by its topological relations (e.g. in ‘the overall connectivity of 
the different parts of the body’ (DeLanda, 2006:29). How this topology is then actu-
alised (e.g. in humans, pigs or cows) varies whilst the topological possibility space 
persists. I have decided that it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a 
thorough account of this understanding and have therefore made the choice to ex-
clude it. 
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area than another’, DeLanda conceptualises the relationship between 
“smaller-scale” and “larger-scale” through the relationship between 
‘number of components’, such as ‘number of members’ of a larger-
scale entity (DeLanda, 2006:12). Put simply, a university is larger-
scale than its component parts (e.g. its staff and students); the UK 
higher education sector, in return, is of a larger-scale than the number 
of its respective components (e.g. the number of its universities).  As 
was already indicated in section 6.2.2, this allows a holding onto the 
classic sociological realms of micro, meso and macro whilst adding a 
“psychological22” or ‘subpersonal’ (DeLanda, 2006) realm. Further-
more, a conception of scale is also important when considering how to 
resist the NSS. As mentioned in Chapter 5, it matters whether two or 
300,000 students decide to boycott the NSS. Similarly, it matters 
whether one or 50 universities comply with the regulations of the NSS.  
As a joint reading, it could hence be suggested that issues of scale 
and issues of topology should be conceptualised  together. That is, 
topology may be more important in that universities may be competing 
(or cooperating) with other universities both within the UK and across 
UK boundaries. In this case, it is more about issues of connectivity and 
boundary creation. Nevertheless, scale also matters. Firstly, ‘geomet-
ric’ (DeLanda, 2006:6) conceptions of scale matter (i.e. have a mate-
rialising effect) in that, for instance, only wealthier domestic students 
may be able to study further away from their hometown, and only 
wealthier international students may be able to afford tuition fees and 
accommodation costs in the UK. Similarly, a “non-geometric” under-
standing of scale matters in that the ‘number of components’ (p.7) (e.g. 
universities and students) influence supply and demand. That is, the 
larger the number of universities who compete over a certain number 
of students, the less these universities (theoretically) would be able to 
                                                 
22 This psychological realm could be figured as having a myriad of further apparat-
uses enfolded into it from neurons intra-acting with other neurons; to connectivities be-
tween brain and other emotional networks of the body; apparatuses that are outside of com-
monsensical human boundaries to neuro-transmitters to photons intra-acting with receptor 
cells in the human eye.  
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charge. To the contrary, the larger the number of students who com-
pete over a certain university, the more these universities can demand 
in return. For instance, Oxford may be able to demand higher qualifi-
cations (whilst tuition fees are restricted by national policy) whereas 
some other international universities (whose tuition fees are not 
capped) can demand higher tuition fees.  
There are further important differences between DeLanda’s as-
semblages and Barad’s apparatuses. Whilst the “component parts” of 
assemblages act in relations of exteriority (i.e. the component parts 
retain their identity and could be plugged into other assemblages), 
Barad’s notion of the apparatus sits between DeLanda’s “assem-
blages” and Hegel’s “seamless totalities” in that intra-action creates 
‘exteriority within’ (Barad, 2007:377). More specifically, Barad’s con-
ception of intra-action resonates with Hegel’s notion of interiority23 in 
that subject and object emerge as part of their intra-action whilst out-
side this intra-action they do not exist as such. The exteriority (within 
intra-action), on the other hand, is created through the agential cut 
which delineates subject from object. According to Barad it is, in fact, 
impossible to ever step outside of intra-action, not even in the hypo-
thetical scenario where space-travel may make it possible to view the 
universe in its entirety. Still, there would be intra-action between the 
observer (i.e. the person in the spaceship), on the one hand, and the 
rest of the universe, on the other. To conclude this comparison, Table 
3 provides a summary of similarities and differences between 
DeLanda’s and Barad’s paradigms.  
 
 
 
Table 3: A comparison between DeLanda's and Barad's framework 
 Manuel DeLanda Karen Barad 
                                                 
23 De Freitas (2017) also discusses Barad and Hegel, but by contrasting Barad’s 
diffractive methodology with Hegel’s negative dialectics.    
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Theoretical 
Framework 
Assemblage Theory Agential Realism 
Key notions Interaction Intra-action 
 Assemblage Apparatus 
 Component (Part) Intra-acting agency 
/ Subject-Object 
Similarities  Component parts can be assemblages themselves.  
 Intra-acting agencies can be apparatuses them-
selves. 
Differences  Entities pre-exist 
their encounters.  
 
 Entities emerge 
from (and do not 
pre-exist) their en-
counters.  
  Component parts 
may retain their indi-
viduality. For exam-
ple, a human heart 
remains a human 
heart when trans-
planted. Yet, compo-
nent parts may per-
ish when they are 
 Intra-acting agen-
cies (i.e. subjects 
and objects) are 
fully contingent on 
their specific intra-
action. 
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not plugged into an-
other assemblage. 
For example, if a 
heart, after being re-
moved from the 
body, is not trans-
planted, it dies. 
 
  Assemblage: Com-
ponent parts exist in 
‘relations of exteri-
ority’ (DeLanda, 
2006:11). 
 Apparatus: “Com-
ponents” exist in 
relations of ‘exteri-
ority within’ 
(Barad, 2007:340), 
i.e. a cutting ‘to-
gether and apart’ 
(p. 394). 
  Issues of scale are 
figured as parts to 
the whole relation-
ships. For example, 
a meso assemblage 
(e.g. a university) 
exists in a part to 
whole relationship to 
 Issues of Scale are 
undertheorised 
whilst prominence 
is given to ‘topol-
ogy’ (Barad, 
2007:240), i.e. 
where apparatuses 
connect and where 
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a macro assemblage 
(e.g. a country).  
 Topology is theo-
rised in the context 
of the ‘diagram’ and 
its outline of ‘quasi-
causal topological 
constraints’ 
(DeLanda, 2006:31) 
they form bounda-
ries.  
6.4 --- Paradigmatic Interlude --- 
This section is a (necessary) rupture within this thesis. Since agential 
realism is not just one specific theory which applies to a very specific 
field, but rather concerns the ontology of this universe, this section out-
lines some of the implications of agential realism on how to understand 
research and its underlying paradigm. Therefore, this section could be 
understood as an addition to (and perhaps a troubling of) the paradig-
matic considerations outlined in the methodology chapter of this the-
sis. That is, since a researcher’s ontology has implications on her epis-
temology and, hence, methodology (see Chapter 3), a few implications 
of Barad’s framework on methodology will be outlined. More specifi-
cally, this section revisits some of the methodological underpinnings 
of this thesis to then show how agential realisms shifts an understand-
ing thereof. Thereafter, some limitations of Barad’s agential realism 
will be explored and some alternative conceptualisations proposed.  
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6.4.1 Methodological Implications of Barad’s Framework 
The following section will now elaborate an agential realist take on 
methodological issues, such as data collection methods and data anal-
ysis. A particular focus will be on agential realism’s distinctly post-hu-
man dimension where both human and non-human entities enact their 
agency. First, interviews will be discussed. Under agential realism, ra-
ther than using the concept of an inter-view – i.e. as the position be-
tween views (Barbour and Schostak, 2005) – interviews may be more 
fittingly described as intra-views in which “interviewee” and “inter-
viewed” materialise through, instead of pre-existing, their encounter. 
To exemplify this, the interview with Stacey will be considered (see 
page 64). This interview was conducted in a small room on the second 
floor of a large campus building of a medium-sized post-92 university. 
Agential realistically speaking (Barad’s (2007) key notions in italics), it 
could be suggested that it was through intra-action that Stacey and I 
emerged, or mattered. This also included specific marks that were left 
on bodies. More precisely, when I listened to Stacey, I materialised as 
the agencies of observation which were marked by Stacey who 
emerged as the object of observation. When I asked interview ques-
tions, the opposite was the case (i.e. Stacey = agencies of observa-
tion; myself = object of observation). Furthermore, the tape recorder 
emerged more permanently as the agencies of observation because 
of being “marked” by our dialogue (in that the tape recorder recorded 
our conversation).  These marks in themselves could be understood 
not as static imprints, but rather as material-discursive matterings in 
their own right. In this respect, marks could also be understood as the 
marks left on mine and Stacey’s minds, in the shape of memories (for 
a more thorough theorisation of memories as representations see 
6.4.2a). Further material-discursive practices (i.e. apparatuses) were 
implicated in this intra-action whilst it is only through the enactment of 
these practices that they became meaningful. That is, ‘discursive prac-
tices are always already material’ (Barad, 2007:152): they have a ma-
terial quality both “in the brain” and “outside” in the social world” whilst 
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the boundaries between the brain and the “outer-world” are enacted 
(and do not pre-exist intra-action).  
Moving on to the transcription process which happened “after” I 
conducted the interview, certain important inclusions and exclusions 
were enacted. Implicated in these, were both human and nonhuman 
agencies. For example, the tape recorder (as a nonhuman agency) 
actively excluded visual, olfactory and other perceptual qualities of the 
original interview. This mattered, because the lack of these qualities 
influenced my later interview transcription which, yet again, needs to 
be understood as an intra-active process with associated exclusions 
and inclusions. Importantly, this interview transcription process was 
different from all the other times when I was transcribing, because this 
time I used different software to aid the transcription process. This, in 
return, produced different matterings. Since the process of “transcrib-
ing”, however, does not exist solely in the mind of the researcher (i.e. 
my mind), but is part of a naturalcultural practice (which includes lan-
guage, written words, computers, habits, etc.) ‘what matters and what 
is excluded from mattering’ (Barad, 2007:394; emphasis added) in 
transcription processes are not entirely subjective matters. More pre-
cisely, the whole notion of subjectivity and objectivity as a binary must 
be contested because there simply is no independent “outside reality” 
(Barad, 2007:394), i.e. an objective exteriority, in the first place. Rather 
this exteriority is exteriority within, i.e. the result of intra-action (a ‘cut-
ting-together and apart’).  
What else mattered in this transcription process? I suggest that 
the fact that I am not an English native speaker had a materialising 
effect. Being a non-native speaker creates different intra-actions from 
people who speak English as their first language. I wrote in my re-
search diary that  
I am sometimes finding this transcription process really difficult and I 
think that this has something to do with the fact that I’m not a native 
speaker. I remember that I once needed to transcribe a video on 
YouTube and even though my English was probably almost as fluent 
as it is now, I still did not understand certain words. When I then asked 
my partner to listen to those phrases I could not figure out, she was 
instantly able to tell me what they were. (Excerpt 54. My research diary)  
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In other words, the interview recording intra-actively activated and re-
shaped my brain differently from my partner who has English as her 
first language. Yet, I - as one particular non-native speaker of English 
– do not share “identical” experiences with all the other “thirty-some-
thing year old”, “German”, “lower middle class”, “male”, “former pri-
mary school teacher”, “left-wing”, “early career social science re-
searchers”. My experience was (is and will be) “non-identical” which 
made certain things matter whilst excluding others. All of these intra-
actions (with past, present and future (!) experiences) determined how 
my body (including its brain), as well as the computer (on which I was 
transcribing), topologically reconfigured.  Both my computer and I have 
power – i.e. materialising potential - in this iterative performativity. For 
example, a slow computer makes transcribing harder than a faster 
one.  
Moving on to the data collection method of narrative writing, 
McLaren (2002:92) suggest that narratives help to ‘share our social 
reality as much by what they exclude as what they include’. Similarly, 
according to Barad (2007) intra-action always entails exclusions and 
inclusions; however, these are not limited to human practices. Instead, 
all practices (including those which do not involve humans) entail in-
clusions and exclusions. Hence, narrative writing is a specific type of 
intra-action, a material-discursive practice which may change various 
other material-discursive practices of which we are a part. For exam-
ple, reflective writing can reshape how we think about our professional 
practice, such as “writing an academic paper” or “teaching”. By reshap-
ing what we think about our practice, we may also reshape what might 
be possible in the future. I reflect in my research diary:  
Using my own situation as an example, structure has to be understood 
as the totality of intra-acting agencies which impacts on my own life 
as a researcher and associate lecturer who researches and teaches at 
an old-polytechnic university in the UK. Through reflective writing about 
my situation, I bring into existence/make explicit one particular view-
point of my professional practice and get better at articulating this ver-
sion. In other words, I reconfigure my view of my professional practice 
in a way which makes certain things matter while excluding others 
from mattering. And every reflection slightly shifts the boundaries and 
connection points of my view of my practice. It is through the recon-
figuration of both the topology of my word document as well as the 
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topology of my brain which brings to the forefront potential other ways 
of acting in my professional practice. (Excerpt 55. My research diary; 
changed to suit analysis with agential realist terms highlighted in bold)  
 
Data analysis. This section now turns to discuss data analysis which 
is also reconceptualised through the application of agential realism. 
First, the analytical method often labelled as coding (Cohen et al., 
2007) is considered. “Coding” stems from the research methodology 
of grounded theory. By repeatedly exploring data, the researcher rec-
ognises similarities between data sets which leads to the emergence 
of themes. This, in return, may then lead to theory formation (Corbin 
and Holt, 2004). I, for example, arrived at the category of “student feed-
back as an imposition for lecturers” through the coding of data.  
As already suggested, agential realism invites a conceptualisation 
of coding as “diffraction” (Barad, 2007; agential realist terms, yet again, 
in italics). Akin to diffraction in which waves immerse through one an-
other, coding could be viewed as the immersion of participants’ stories 
through one another, including our ‘specific histories within academe, 
and the context in which the article is to be published’ (Zabrodska et 
al., 2011:711). The same applies to theoretical frameworks and data. 
That is, data and theoretical framework could be conceptualised as 
agencies which intra-act, emerge as part of this intra-action and are 
diffracted through one another to produce certain phenomena (cf. 
Barad, 2007). This also means that what constitutes the “object” of 
enquiry (and how this object unfolds in the process of writing) will never 
sit still, but will reconfigure in the process of writing and reading. 
More specifically, an agential realist approach changes how data 
is understood. Data, instead of having an external existence, comes 
to life through a complex set of intra-actions. Put bluntly, data only 
“matters” when someone intra-acts with it. Through this intra-action 
various human and nonhuman agencies emerge. In data analysis, 
these agencies may comprise (i) the researcher’s conscious (and un-
conscious) concepts (i.e. “material discursive practices”); (ii) data; (iii) 
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the precise location of the researcher (e.g. whether he or she is work-
ing from home or from an office). Further agencies are (iv) the body of 
the researcher (e.g. thought processes, hormonal and neurotransmit-
ter levels, orthopaedic and prosthetic enhancements, dietary pro-
cesses); and (v) the computer (again, work can be slowed down by a 
slow computer). Of course, these intra-acting agencies continuously 
shift their topology, i.e. their connectivities and boundaries (see 
6.2.2d). For example, Foucault’s theory of neo-liberal governmentality 
made certain meanings matter when it started to intra-act with my data 
whilst his concept of “discipline” produced different meanings. Simi-
larly, data is not passive in that I (in the active subject position) use a 
tool (e.g. governmentality) to passively gaze at the data (the passive 
research object). Instead, theory, data, and I immersed through one 
another and in the process reconfigured by variously becoming subject 
and object in a ‘differential dance of intelligibility and unintelligibility’ 
(Barad, 2007:149). At specific points, the stories of my research par-
ticipants and my own researcher self, for example, could be seen as 
waves diffracting with one another. This led to positive interferences 
(matterings in the shape of themes, new ideas) and negative interfer-
ences (exclusions in the shape of all these things which did not be-
come clear). Barad (2007) argues that the notion of diffraction is pow-
erful because when waves (e.g. participants’ stories) intra-act, they 
sometimes strengthen and sometimes subtract from one another; 
sometimes, they produce new phenomena altogether (i.e. the visually 
novel patterns on the edges of constructive and destructive diffraction 
patterns).  
6.4.2 Issues with Agential Realism 
Moving on from methodological implications, this section seeks to 
problematise agential realism. This section has been included into this 
paradigmatic interlude because it does not add many (direct) analytical 
insights into the operation of the NSS as such, but rather further theo-
rises how internal experience may connect to the outside world. The 
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paradigmatic interlude appeared as the most viable space to provide 
an inclusion of these issues. At this stage, I feel the need to highlight 
that other authors have problematised Barad’s work. Rather strange 
accusations comprise that Barad somehow denies “experience” and 
“subjectivity” (Braunmühl, 2018) (correction: Barad does not deny this, 
but goes beyond this by arguing that subjectivity is not restricted to 
humans or even animals). Others accuse Barad of a lack of ‘episte-
mological theorizing’ (Calvert-Minor, 2014) (Correction: Barad’s epis-
temology is clearly articulated throughout her work in the shape of her 
onto-epistemology). On the other hand, Aigner and Čičigoj (2014) 
raise the legitimate question of how “abstractions” could be theorised 
through Barad’s work. More specifically, they ask the question how 
commonalities between certain groups could be conceptualised 
through an agential realist framework (this connects to my second cri-
tique below).  
My first critique of agential realism can be tackled concisely. This 
issue concerns what could be called the “all-encompassing nature of 
intra-action”. In short, Barad argues that everything in the universe 
which involves matter or meaning making practices is the result of in-
tra-actions. This has to be understood quite literally, since intra-action 
spans the microscopic and macroscopic. For example, intra-action 
may comprise “light particles” coming into existence through intra-ac-
tion with its “apparatus”; “humans” coming into existence through intra-
action with other “humans”; “buildings” coming into existence through 
intra-action with the “ground”; “reconfigured working conditions” com-
ing into existence through intra-action with “computers”, “millionaires” 
and “capital”; and “planets” coming into existence through intra-action 
with “star systems”. Through its overdetermination, intra-action hence 
becomes a useful term to theorise just about everything in the uni-
verse. Importantly, whilst critics may argue that this makes it a mean-
ingless notion, it could also be suggested that this overdetermination 
is actually a strength because of intra-action’s universal applicability. 
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In what follows, I problematise two further aspects of agential re-
alism. First, I will tackle Barad’s rejection of “representationalism”. 
Next, I move on to theorise language from an agential realist viewpoint.  
a) Barad’s anti-representationalism: towards an agential re-
alist theorisation of the brain 
One of the central tenets of Barad’s work is her rejection of represen-
tationalism. More specifically, Barad critiques 'the representationalist 
belief in the power of words to mirror preexisting phenomena’ (Barad, 
2007:133). She argues that this ‘is the metaphysical substrate that 
supports social constructivist, as well as traditional realist, beliefs, per-
petuating the endless recycling of untenable options' (p. 133). Tracing 
representationalism back to Cartesian mind-body dualism and Newto-
nian conceptualisations of the existence of separate entities in a Eu-
clidian space, her argument against representationalist thinking is that 
there is not simply a world out there which is then represented by ideas 
inside, but that we are part of and implicated in the material meaning-
making-practices of this world. Meaning-making is not restricted to hu-
man practices but can include, for example, the meaning making prac-
tices of animals, such as the ‘brittlestar’ above (Barad, 2007:375).  
Yet, this outright rejection of representationalist thinking may 
prove problematic when trying to explain certain “internal” phenomena, 
such as “worrying” (see section 6.2.2b)) or “dreaming”. Representa-
tionalism, at first glance, appears better equipped to respond to this 
“internality of experience”. Since Barad, however, rejects representa-
tionalism and its associated Cartesian mind-body dualism, what may 
an agential realist take on internal processes be? Despite Barad’s rel-
ative silence on this topic, I propose the following. An agential realist 
understanding would figure the mind as a collection of intra-acting ap-
paratuses. In this view, thoughts and dreams are “materialisations” in 
their own right which have the potential to remain either internal 
(dreams) or intra-act with the wider world. Hence, against Barad’s re-
jection of representationalism, representations could themselves be 
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figured as material-discursive apparatuses which are not simply in, but 
part of this world.  
I furthermore suggest that this take is consistent with some neu-
roscientific understandings of the (human) brain, an area which Barad 
leaves underexplored. In fact, she only mentions the brain in her de-
scription of the ‘brittlestar’ (Barad, 2007:372) – here, knowing and mat-
tering do not require a brain (i.e. the brittlestar has no brain) – and in 
the context of the “intra-activity of seeing”, but only as a side note (p. 
156). Barad’s rejection of the importance of the brain can be traced in 
her claim that  
‘memory does not reside in the folds of individual brains, rather, 
memory is the enfoldings of spacetimematter written into the universe, 
or better, the enfolded articulations of the universe in its mattering.’ (p. 
ix)  
Despite Barad’s downplaying of the importance of (human) brains, 
I suggest that agential realism is actually well equipped to theorise the 
brain. This also resonates with other theoretical developments in the 
field (Wendt, 2015; de Freitas and Sinclair, 2018). Whilst a genuine 
dialogue between Barad’s iterativity and neuro-cognitive theories 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis, it may hence be worth briefly 
exploring the ways in which Barad’s proposed simultaneity of matter 
and meaning resonates with the idea of neuro-cognitive processes 
and circuits. To begin with, I return to the example above in which stu-
dent feedback systems produced iterative processes of worrying and 
suggest that Barad’s notion of iterativity is consistent with some neu-
roscientific research, more specifically with the idea of ‘neural circuit’ 
activations (Liberzon et al., 2015:117). In fact, neural circuits may con-
stitute a perfect example of how matter and meaning emerge simulta-
neously: it is through the iterative activation of brain cells (a circuit!) 
that human consciousness – and the experience of anxiety - is possi-
ble. This would also enable an understanding of why “worrying” some-
times appears to be relatively shielded from the outside world. For ex-
ample, in one instance in which students gave me negative feedback, 
I was worrying about this feedback at home whilst sitting on the sofa:  
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Yesterday, I was sitting on the sofa and kept on worrying about the fact 
that some students weren’t quite happy with my last few sessions. They 
simply found them too hard and not enough examples. It annoys me 
that I don’t even seem to be able to relax in the evenings any longer. 
(Excerpt 56. My research diary)  
That is, the experience of student feedback reconfigured the ‘iterative 
intra-activity’ (p. 210) of my brain and therefore liberated the process 
of anxiety from the moment of its inception24.  
Similarly, dreams are shielded from the outside world at the time 
of happening. In fact, agential realism may figure dreams as ‘phenom-
ena’ (p. 206) produced through agential intra-activity inside the brain. 
For example, it could be hypothesised that various brain regions are 
the brain’s intra-acting agencies. These regions have come to matter 
and have reconfigured through past intra-actions with the world (this 
reconfiguration is often described under the phenomenon of “neuro-
plasticity” (Malabou, 2008)). Even more importantly, these regions, of 
course, could themselves be understood as apparatuses which con-
sist of agential intra-activity: the brain regions themselves consist of a 
myriad intra-acting (“smaller”) apparatuses, which themselves are 
made up of other (“even smaller”) apparatuses etc. (e.g. smaller brain 
cell clusters, consisting of brain-cells, consisting of molecules, electron 
flows, atoms, protons etc.). DeLanda’s (2006) conception of scale is 
relevant once again here. Brain cells need to be understood as being 
somewhat smaller than a whole brain region. That is, building on the 
previous section, it makes sense to view these cellular, molecular and 
atomic apparatuses as somehow smaller and in a ‘part-to-whole rela-
tion’ with larger brain regions (p. 40).  
                                                 
24 In could, on the other hand, be suggested that this postulated “relative autonomy 
of the brain” during sleep could also be contested from an agential realist perspective when 
taking into consideration Barad’s rejection of Newtonian physics, i.e. dreaming is not 
viewed in the context of a linear progression of time through space. An agential realist per-
spective takes spacetimemattering as the basic operating principles of the universe. It is par-
ticularly the micro-maser experiment above which suggests that space, time and matter are 
not separate entities, but are rather “quantum entangled”. Importantly, this experiment 
shows paradoxical findings from a Newtonian perspective of space and time because, as 
has been argued, the past could be changed in the present.  
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Yet, all of these “sub-apparatuses” also are in complex and topo-
logical (and not only ‘geometrical’) relations with one another (Barad, 
2007:223). These brain regions intra-act with one another and are, 
most importantly, inseparable from the phenomena produced. At the 
same time, brain regions have to be seen in their agential inseparabil-
ity from all the other brain regions, some of which are less malleable 
by experience (e.g. the brain stem (O’Shea, 2005)) than others (e.g. 
the cortex). Simultaneously, the brain needs to be understood as being 
in constant intra-activity with the rest of the body. In fact, the notion of 
geometrical spatiality (again) loses its meaning when the intricate top-
ological relationship between the body and brain are considered. For 
example, one could legitimately ask where the (electrical) topological 
connectivity might be stronger: between (i) certain brain regions and 
their corresponding parts in the body or (ii) between neighbouring 
(proximal) brain regions. For example, the primary motor cortex (Nolte, 
2009), located within the frontal lobe, is often understood to be an in-
teractive map of the whole body25. If the body is, in fact, mapped onto 
this brain region - and agential realistically speaking is in constant in-
tra-action with this region - connectivity may, in fact, be weaker be-
tween this primary motor cortex and its neighbouring brain regions 
(even though these are in closer geometrical proximity) than between 
the primary motor cortex and, for example, the right thumb.  Moreover, 
brain regions and their bodily connections are in constant intra-action 
with the surrounding world. Whilst sense-activity is reduced when the 
body sleeps, the body still is connected to the outer world; for example, 
through respiration, temperature, bodily contact points with the bed, 
gravity etc.  
Representations, however, are also important when being awake. 
In fact, representations emerge as intra-acting agencies when they in-
tra-act with other agencies in this world, some of which may “emerge” 
                                                 
25 Even though it has to be acknowledged that this is a simplification and 
that there always are significant overlaps between parts of the brain which are as-
sociated with other parts and movements of the body (e.g. Meier et al., 2008). 
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outside the human body. For example, I imagine myself looking at stu-
dent feedback on my computer at my desk. In this process of looking, 
the computer could be seen as one apparatus (i.e. an intra-acting 
agency) which intra-acts with my representations (as active neural 
“matterings”). Part of this intra-action is that individual words now 
emerge as bounded objects. This process is also entangled with fur-
ther intra-acting agencies which may comprise the light which is re-
flected off the screen (e.g. from the sun or an electric bulb); the screen 
itself, as a product of past intra-actions (e.g. factory workers who as-
sembled the specific computer; exploitative practices in factories); 
connected practices of computer technology; and my “iterative” habits 
of engaging with computers. Then there are my eyes performing those 
“micro intra-actions” whilst being involved in a whole intra-active 
causal chain which comprises lenses, retinas, muscular movements, 
blood flows, optic nerves, chiasms, tracts (Nolte, 2009) my thalamus, 
visual cortex, the dorsal and ventral streams, and those complex (and 
still poorly understood) neural language networks (Tovée, 2008). Fur-
ther intra-acting agencies are the discourses circulating in society re-
garding computers, students, feedback, work practices; my own stress 
levels; my unique biography; the neurotransmitter levels in my brain 
as well as other hormonal, nutritional aspects and the surrounding 
room. This list of entangled ‘naturalcultural practices’ (Barad, 
2007:232) is not endless, but could still go on.  
In summary, instead of perpetuating Barad's accusation that rep-
resentationalism potentially reinforces a mind-body dualism, represen-
tations could be figured as embodied, material ‘intra-acting agencies’ 
(Barad, 2007:33) which are the result of and intra-act with past and 
present ‘naturalcultural practices’ (p. 232; emphasis added). Brain cell 
clusters, visual cortices, eyes, screens, computer chips, processors 
and keyboards do not pre-exist their encounter, but rather emerge 
through this encounter. Using a copy of the diagram which sought to 
visualise the topological relationships between universities (see page 
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186), Figure 8 seeks to visualise (again in drastically reduced com-
plexity) some of the topologies inside the brain and how they traverse 
bodily boundaries.   
 
 
b) Barad’s under-theorisation of language  
‘The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cul-
tural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every “thing”- even materi-
ality - is turned into a matter of language or some other form of cultural 
representation.’ (Barad, 2007:133) 
Barad’s rejection of representationalism is strongly connected to 
her critique of language, i.e. of ‘linguistic monism’ (p. 133). Barad ar-
gues that '[l]anguage has been granted too much power’ in twentieth 
century philosophy and asks ‘how did language come to be more trust-
worthy than matter?’ (p. 132). This privileging of language is, indeed, 
problematic. For example, it excludes any non-linguistic meaning mak-
ing practice as evident in the decision-making practices of animals – 
i.e. animals famously are unable to acquire language, yet, can still rec-
ognise people and form memories (Wynne, 2004). It also downplays 
the importance of non-biological matter and dynamism. For example, 
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lightning strikes or earthquakes clearly have agentic qualities (as un-
derstood in Barad’s version of agency), e.g. by being able to kill.  
Whilst this rejection of linguistic monism had already been enthu-
siastically adopted by qualitative researchers (e.g. St.Pierre, 1997) in 
what may be described as a broadly Deleuzian ontology, it could be 
suggested that Barad (2007:146) goes too far in her under-theorisation 
of language, for example when arguing that:  
‘Discourse is not a synonym for language. Discourse does not refer to 
linguistic or signifying systems, grammars, speech acts, or conversa-
tions. To think of discourse as mere spoken or written words forming 
descriptive statements is to enact the mistake of representationalist 
thinking.’ (Barad, 2007:146) 
The critical question could be posed: is the notion “discourse” 
even needed when its origin – i.e. language– is completely removed 
from its conceptual framing? Put bluntly, if discourse really has nothing 
to do with language, why not simply use the word “practice”? Hence, 
in her objections regarding the importance of language, Barad spins 
the wheel too far and, thus, under-theorises language by failing to 
show its precise place in her ontology26. The question emerges, “How 
does language matter?”  
As a productive way forward, an agential realist reading of lan-
guage could be suggested by providing a diffractive reading of Barad’s 
and James Paul Gee’s (2005) work (see page 48 above). For instance, 
it could be suggested that instead of reducing the importance of ‘lin-
guistic and signifying systems, grammars, speech acts, or conversa-
tions’ (Barad, 2007:146), these linguistic phenomena could be figured 
as intra-acting agencies in their own right - similar to the discussion of 
representations in the preceding section. Language, hence, could be 
understood as one (but not the sole) material-discursive practice (i.e. 
an apparatus) which intra-acts with other non-linguistic apparatuses. 
If we are, as Barad argues, not simply ‘in the world’, but ‘part of the 
world’ (Barad, 2007:91), so is language.  
                                                 
26 At least she does so in Meeting the Universe Halfway (Barad, 2007). In another 
paper she engages with Derrida’s Deconstructionism  
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Importantly, in this framework, language has power (i.e. material-
ising potential’ (Barad, 2007:210)). For example, grammar has a 
meaningful implication on how the world matters (cf. Gee, 2005) in that 
if a sentence is changed from passive voice to active voice this enacts 
a specific agential cut (whilst excluding other potential ways of mean-
ing). This, in return, makes the subject of that sentence materialise as 
“being in charge” of events (it allocates it more agency) whereas a 
passive sentence construction makes the subject materialise as being 
“less in charge” (and responsible). For example, if I use the language 
construction: “The course leader told us that we need to raise better 
student feedback”, this makes the course leader materialise as an ac-
tive agent whereas when this is changed to, “We were told that we 
need to raise student feedback”, this excludes the active role of the 
subject. An agential realist understanding may, hence, figure both lin-
guistic and non-linguistic elements as entangled ‘becomings’ (Barad, 
2007:393) in which language is not understood as a separate entity 
which then inter-acts with other entities in world, but as a specific intra-
acting agency which is inseparable from the phenomena produced. 
Hence,  
‘[Language matters] in that we continually and actively build and re-
build our worlds not just through language but through language used 
in [intra-action with] actions, interactions, non-linguistic symbol sys-
tems, objects, tools, technologies, and distinctive ways of thinking, val-
uing, feeling, and believing.’ (Gee, 2005:10; original changed to suit 
analysis)  
Furthermore, Gee argues that people build their reality ‘in more or 
less routine ways’ (p. 10). This routine is captured in Barad’s notion of 
‘iterative intra-actions’ (Barad, 2007:179; emphasis in original). For ex-
ample, Melissa’s traumatic experience with student feedback was a 
product of various intra-acting agencies, comprising the ‘feeling’ (Gee, 
2005:10) of rejection, enfolded past experiences, the ‘technology’ (p. 
10) of online feedback systems, of past intra-actions with the students 
and many other agencies which were not explicitly mentioned in her 
interview transcript.  
217 
Turning to Gee’s (2005) “building tasks”, all material discursive 
practices (including language), firstly, build ‘significance’ (p. 11) in that 
they ‘matter’ (Barad, 2007; 180) whilst language is one way to build 
this “significance”. That is, bodies, rooms, non-linguistic concepts and 
language matter simultaneously (i.e. they materialise and become 
meaningful) whilst excluding other aspects of reality. This reality is not 
restricted to some ill-guided conception of the social in delineation from 
the natural (Barad, 2007). Rather language is part of a ‘naturalcultural’ 
becoming (p. 230). Importantly, the way language is used ‘matters’ (p. 
132) and actively changes phenomena. As Barad points out, people 
cannot make things happen just by “willing” them into existence 
through language; there always ‘is a sense in which “the world kicks 
back”’ (Barad, 2007: 215). For example, just because I say that my 
lessons are “dialogic”, they automatically become dialogic when they 
are clearly “teacher centred” and “autocratic”. We are ‘part of the world’ 
and not simply ‘in the world’ (Barad, 2007:91) and so is language. Sec-
ondly, ‘activities’ (Gee, 2005:11) could be understood as iterative and 
intra-active becomings whilst some activities involve humans. This it-
erative intra-activity sometimes ‘stabilizes’ (Barad, 2007:191) and be-
comes intelligible.  Through particular material discursive practices, 
people have developed a shared sense of what certain activities mean 
and recognise others as engaging in these activities if they speak and 
act in certain ways (Gee, 2005). Language is one, but not the only 
intra-acting agency in this intra-activity. Thirdly, ‘identities’ (p.11), sim-
ilarly, could be understood as iterative ‘matterings’ (Barad, 2007:149) 
which are enacted through language. People act and think in behav-
ioural patterns and believe they have an identity (as an essence), but 
really just iteratively (and often unknowingly) perform their identity. 
Identity may appear to be fixed and unchangeable, but there is always 
the potential to break out of this iterative intra-action. Fourthly, lan-
guage may help to build or reconfigure ‘relationships’ by enacting par-
ticular agential cuts which make certain things matter while excluding 
others from mattering. When I speak to my students, my students and 
I emerge through this intra-action. Simultaneously, we intra-act (i.e. 
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build relationships) with the particular room we are in, with our unique 
histories, whilst our bodies themselves are filled with further intra-ac-
tivity (see my previous discussion of neurocognitive processes). Rela-
tionships are not simply Euclidian, but topological (i.e. about connec-
tivities and boundaries). By speaking to my students, I enact a bound-
ary – an iterative agential cut - which is the necessary condition for 
materialising in the way I do. Without these boundaries, there would 
be no intelligible (human and nonhuman) bodies in the first place. On 
the other hand, when my students and I both listen to another student, 
topologies change. In this case, the students and I emerge as the 
“agencies of observation” who are marked by the speaking student. 
Relationships are topological matters.   
Language may, fifthly, help to build ‘politics’ in that language intra-
acts with the world by judging whether the distribution of ‘social goods’ 
(Gee, 2005:12) is legitimate or illegitimate. When I, for example, say, 
“Jeff Bezos worked extremely hard to get where he is …” I may actively 
legitimise extreme wealth whilst only a slight addition, such as, “… but 
he did not work harder than most other people”) delegitimises this in-
equality. Sixthly, language can create spatial and temporal ‘connec-
tions’ (Gee, 2005:12) whilst “connections” in an agential realist under-
standing have to be understood as being indissociable from the notion 
of “relationships” and “boundaries”. For example, Barbara made con-
nections by contrasting the current version of student voice to previous 
examples of student voice before the NSS came into existence. This 
connection was built by contrasting, i.e. by enacting a boundary (a de-
lineating line, an agential cut) between the past and the present. Sev-
enthly, language may privilege certain ‘sign-systems’ (Gee, 2005:13) 
over others whilst these sign systems are themselves iterative mate-
rial-discursive practices which do not exist outside of intra-action. 
(That is, the black marks inside a book still exist in that they intra-act 
with the white paper; however, in order to be intelligible as words they 
need to intra-act with someone who can read.)  That is, people need 
to engage with each sign system in order to bring it to life (to make it 
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matter). When I speak in a formal way on a conference and use tech-
nical vocabulary (such as “intra-action”), I enact this specific technical 
sign system whilst this intra-action is also enfolded into my own bio-
graphical experiences. In order for these sign systems to be recog-
nised (to become intelligible), I also require a listener who engaged 
with the same theory (or, alternatively, I need to pedagogically develop 
this theory so that listeners can engage with it). Sign systems, from an 
agential realist perspective, are dynamic “becomings” and not static 
“beings”.  
 
This closes this chapter’s new materialist discussion. The following 
chapter now seeks to show how the theories utilised for this thesis 
resonate with one another.   
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Chapter 7 Theoretical Diffractions  
Building on the previous three chapters, this chapter attempts to dif-
fractively read Foucault’s (2009, 2008) governmentality through 
Laclau’s (2005) antagonism and Barad’s (2007) agential realism to 
work towards an integrated (but still diffractive) framework. That is, this 
chapter delineates the similarities and differences between these re-
spective frameworks and contextualises them against the data utilised 
in this thesis. This, in return, provides some further insights into the 
analysis of rating and ranking practices and student feedback sys-
tems.  
Importantly, relating this back to the methodological considera-
tions in the context of Barad’s agential realism, this could be under-
stood as a diffractive reading which attends to some of the diffraction 
effects when Foucault’s, Barad’s, and Laclau’s frameworks are im-
mersed through one another. Each framework, for example, could be 
understood as a metaphorical ripple on a pond. When reading all three 
main theoretical frameworks through one another, it is as if these rip-
ples (i.e. the resultant waves) merged through one another to create 
an ‘interference pattern’ (Barad, 2007:77). As mentioned in 6.4.1, an 
interference pattern has characteristic areas where waves add to one 
another other (positive interference) or where they subtract from one 
another (negative interference).  
7.1 Foucault and Barad 
I begin by reading Foucault and Barad through one another. Clearly, 
there are similarities between both scholars’ frameworks, not least be-
cause Barad’s work builds on some of Foucault’s central concepts. For 
example, as mentioned in 6.2.1, agential realism builds on Foucault’s 
notion of discursive practices by extending these into her neologism of 
“material-discursive practices” (which she then conflates in her under-
standing of apparatuses). Moreover, Barad refigures Foucault’s (1982) 
notion of ‘power’ - as denoting the capacity to change the conduct of 
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other people - into her understanding of “materialising potential”. 
Power in this sense, is figured as something wider, i.e. as the agency 
to make “something” appear (e.g. a social action, a disciplined body or 
an atom).  
Since these issues have already been discussed, this section will 
not repeat these here. Instead, this section will focus on the question 
of how Foucault’s lecture series on governmentality may resonate with 
Barad’s agential realism. Barad’s failure to include this lecture series 
into her 2007 book ‘Meeting the Universe Halfway’ could probably be 
attributed to the fact that this lecture series was only available on audio 
tape at Barad’s time of writing. However, there are resonances be-
tween both concepts, particularly in their respective foci on “larger 
scale structures of domination”. Both concepts are somehow con-
cerned with how smaller scale and larger scale structures are entan-
gled with one another: i.e. they both interrogate how large structures 
impact on (and are maintained by) smaller ones. A useful exemplifica-
tion point can be made when considering Barad’s interpretation of 
Leela Fernandes’s (Fernandes, 1997) (Marxist and Foucauldian!) eth-
nographic study in a Calcuttan jute mill and diffracting this work 
through Foucault’s Governmentality. Importantly, Barad argues that 
Fernandes succeeds in discussing how issues of power on the Jute 
Mill Factory Floor do not only have implications for what unfolds within 
the factory, but also have an impact on wider societal matters such as 
a maintenance of certain capitalist structures of exploitation.  
In what follows, I outline Fernandes’s (1997, cited in Barad, 2007) 
depiction of events that unfolded after a weaving machine inside the 
jute mill factory broke. After the machine stopped working, the weaver, 
who operated this weaving machine, became anxious because he 
feared for lost work and wages and hence called a mechanic to fix it. 
(The broken machine is one example of Barad’s take on non-human 
agency: the machine enacted its agency by changing the material con-
figuration of the work process.) The mechanic, however, arrived rather 
late which enraged the weaver, resulting in an argument between 
weaver and mechanic. Consequentially, ‘the mechanic injured the 
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weaver with his hammer, and in the ensuing fight the mechanic was 
also injured’ (Fernandes, 1997:1). When the weaver (together with two 
further workers from his caste), confronted management, the ‘general 
secretary of the leading trade union’ got involved because he felt that 
his expertise had been undermined (ibid.). In front of a large crowd, 
one of the workers then pushed the assistant manager who fell 
‘against a machine’ resulting in the four workers being banned from 
the factory (ibid.). This in return resulted in an ultimatum by the trade 
union to reinstate the workers within 24 hours. Meanwhile, the me-
chanic went into hiding because he ‘was being hunted by the weaver’s 
caste members’ (p. 2). The next day, the union members managed to 
convince the weavers to strike for one hour. However, because other 
departments in the mill did not go on strike, this did not result in any 
real challenge to management.  
Barad’s (2007) take on this confrontation is that human and non-
human agencies were involved. These agencies comprise capital (the 
lost wages), caste (the weaver and mechanic were from different 
castes), union politics (the weaver’s caste had a strong union) and 
gender (women were dis-privileged in the factory and did not even fig-
ure in this confrontation); machines (the gears of the machine broke 
down which resulted in the lost wages for the weaver). Importantly, 
Barad suggests that it is through these conflicts between castes, gen-
ders, and trade union affiliations that larger societal factors were kept 
intact. That is, ‘[c]aste, gender, and class materialize through, and are 
enfolded into one another’ (Barad, 2007:242). That is, large-scale cap-
italist structures impacted on the jute mill factory workers but it is also 
the behaviour of the factory workers themselves which reinforced is-
sues of class, gender, racism and caste politics. This, in return, again 
fed back into the maintenance of a particular national version of capi-
talism. In other words, subjects - i.e. the workers - on the shop floor 
were not only at the receiving end of larger scale capitalist structures, 
but ‘the spatiality of capitalism [was] itself produced through the politics 
of gender, community, and class and daily contests over the relations 
of power by those very subjects’ (Barad, 2007:236). More specifically, 
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it is through particular (material-discursive) practices (for example ex-
clusionary practices towards women) that the (male) workers perpet-
uated class relations at a national level (ibid.). By actively producing 
what it means to be male and female, the workers (inadvertently) rein-
force ‘the powers of management’ and undermine ‘attempts by the un-
ions to successfully intervene in certain class-based-always already 
gendered-practices of management’ (Fernandes 1997, cited in Barad, 
2007:236). Barad argues that capitalism is (re)produced through both 
the ‘actions of managers who carve up the production process’ as well 
as ‘through the workers' own exclusionary practices…’.  Hence ‘the 
exclusionary practices of the workers need to be understood to be part 
of the technologies of capitalism’ rather than separate to these (p. 
237). Importantly, ‘production is a process not merely of making com-
modities’ (which is reminiscent of a Marxist approach) but also of mak-
ing subjects, and remaking structures’ (which is more of a Foucauldian 
take on the subject) (p. 238). These processes of production are not 
static, but are ‘continually reworked as a result of human, nonhuman, 
and cyborgian forms of agency’ (p.238).  
This resonates with Foucault’s work on governmentality 
(2008,2009) in that local practices of competition for power could be 
understood as distinct mechanisms of government.  For example, neo-
liberal governmentality avoids large-scale protests by fostering a ra-
tionality which pitches individuals against one another in competitive 
struggles. Put bluntly, it could be suggested that as long as people are 
competing with one another (for example, in Fernandes’s work, 
castes, trade unions and genders), they are less likely to rebel against 
larger structures. Hence, the maintenance of confrontations between 
these entities could be understood as one of Foucault’s governmen-
talities (that is, technologies of government). This liberal governing by 
“freedom” - and neo-liberal governing by “competitisation” - is comple-
mented by disciplinary forms of government. Disciplinary power is em-
ployed when the neo-liberal games of freedom and competition fail. 
For example, Lecturer X (see page 143) failed to raise positive student 
feedback which resulted in disciplinary mechanisms to be employed. 
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In this case, the awareness of a panoptical gaze was heightened in 
that Lecturer X realised that he was under surveillance on whether he 
tried hard to improve student satisfaction. In addition, normalising 
judgement operated in that Lecturer X was made aware that he was 
lacking behind other colleagues. As a result, Lecturer X had to be 
shown how to ‘control’ his activity (Foucault, 1977:156) (e.g. the mod-
ule leader showed Lecturer X how to teach a certain subject, what to 
say and what not say). Lecturer X was made into a docile body which 
displayed “genetic” characteristics: the action plan which was devised 
specified precisely when and where to meet - and when these meet-
ings should stop (i.e. an end-point was specified). As discussed in 4.2, 
the process by which society can be governed can vary from creating 
competition towards using a disciplinary model.  
In summary, Foucault’s’ governmentality and Barad’s agential re-
alism share their focus on how subjectivity at the micro scale (i.e. com-
petitive relations) functions to maintain the operation of larger struc-
tures. Yet, Barad’s notion of intra-action transcends Foucault’s work in 
one central aspect. Whilst Foucault’s work remains firmly anchored in 
human practices, intra-action describes the process by which every-
thing in the universe comes to matter (including entirely non-human 
aspects on other planets). Governmentality, hence, could be under-
stood as one specific type of intra-action which makes it possible to 
control large populations. This is schematically visualised in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9: Governmentality as intra-action 
 
7.2 Foucault and Laclau 
This section turns to the diffractions which result from reading Laclau’s 
and Foucault’s works through one another. Importantly, Laclau (2005) 
built some of his concepts on Foucault’s archaeological work in the 
context of the notion of a ‘discursive formation’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2014:91) whilst Foucault’s genealogical phase, including the latter’s 
notion of governmentality (Foucault, 2008, 2009), remained underuti-
lised. Foucault’s genealogy and Laclau’s antagonism resonate in im-
portant ways, however. First, as already implied in Chapter 5, antago-
nism could be figured under Foucault’s (later) understanding of “gov-
ernmentality. As mentioned in Chapter 4, governmentality refers to a 
range of different “technologies of government”, such as discipline, 
sovereignty, and neo-liberalism. I suggest that antagonism could be 
understood as just another distinct type of governmentality, i.e. an “an-
tagonistic governmentality”. This means that the NSS may simply 
make use of disparate technologies of government, such as discipli-
nary, neo-liberal and antagonistic ones which are all designed to gov-
ern the academic population. Importantly, this understanding would 
Intra-action
Governmentality 
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also introduce opportunities to theorise how some lecturers feel iso-
lated in the context of their work environment. For example, Melissa 
suggested that she felt “isolated per se” but that this feeling was exac-
erbated “when things go wrong”, such as a “student complaining on 
behalf of the entire course”.  
More specifically, the following (diffractive) argument could be de-
veloped: the NSS governs by pitching lecturers against students. That 
is, students are reframed as an antagonism, i.e. as powerful “custom-
ers” of the university who demand “value for money” and a good “stu-
dent experience”.  In addition to these antagonistic tendencies, liberal 
governmentality is at play in that lecturers are “free” to devise innova-
tive strategies to raise positive student feedback. Similarly, neo-liberal 
governmentality is at play in that lecturers are more likely to compete 
with colleagues over that feedback. This competition may result in a 
resentment of colleagues who attain better feedback, but also creates 
an urgency to improve their feedback.  
If things go well, lecturers try to recreate this success. Conversely, 
if things go badly, lecturers feel pressured to raise better student feed-
back. This pressure could be of a disciplinary nature. For example, 
Lisa’s colleague who is a module leader disciplined Lecturer X (see 
page 143) and implemented fine-grained mechanisms to ensure that 
Lecturer X would be turned into a docile body who knows exactly 
“what” and “how” to teach whilst being subjected to a (i) panoptical 
gaze and to (ii) normalising judgement.  
Similar to the suggestion that discipline and governmentality might 
have merged into an amalgamated assemblage (Chapter 4), perhaps 
antagonism (Chapter 5) needs to be understood along the same lines. 
That is, discipline (lecturers compare themselves to other lecturers), 
liberalism (lecturers are “free” to win students’ approval), neo-liberal-
ism (lecturers are forced to compete) and antagonism (students are 
figured as the “enemy”) operate simultaneously in the NSS. It is the 
diffraction of these technologies which creates an atomisation (i.e. iso-
lation) of individual lecturers.  
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Figure 10: Antagonism as a governmentality 
7.3 Barad and Laclau 
Despite the fact that Laclau’s Postmarxism and Barad’s agential real-
ism are often categorised in distinct theoretical fields – with Barad’s 
framework being subsumed under what has come to be known as the 
new materialisms (Dolphijn and Tuin, 2012) and Laclau’s framework 
being described as postmarxist (Sim, 2000) - a closer inspection of 
both theorists’ works makes visible (almost uncanny) similarities. 
Hence, the combination of these aspects may allow for a more useful 
combined analytical tool. Therefore, this section will firstly attend to the 
difference to then progress to the similarities between both frame-
works.  
First, there are important differences between Laclau’s and 
Barad’s distinct ontological assumptions, most prominently the fact 
that Barad seeks to theorise nature and culture together whilst 
Laclau’s work clearly draws a dividing line between these two realms. 
This becomes particularly transparent in Laclau’s distinction between 
the notions of antagonism, real opposition and contradiction which 
have been outlined in Chapter 5. Revisiting this argument, Laclau be-
gins his discussion by critiquing Lucio Colletti’s (1975, cited in Laclau, 
Governmentality
Neoliberal 
Governmentality / 
Disciplinary 
Governmentality / 
Sovereign Governmentality 
/Antagonistic 
Governmentality
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2014) ontological assumptions that there are only two mutually exclu-
sive kinds of entities: ‘real objects and concepts’ (p. 126). In other 
words, there is a clear ‘separation between thought and reality’ 
(p.126). He then suggests adding a third concept: that of antagonism. 
Antagonism, according to Laclau, functions as an impossible object 
which operates thus: “I cannot be my ideal self, because you (i.e. the 
antagonism) hinder me to become that ideal self”. Instead of, however, 
rejecting “real-oppositions” and “contradictions” as distinct principles, 
he accepts their existence and simply adds antagonism as a separate 
category. This acceptance, for example, transpires when discussing 
the notion of real opposition and its distinction from that of antagonism. 
In real opposition we have two already fully formed objects. Put con-
cisely, ‘there is nothing antagonistic in a crash between two vehicles: 
it is a material fact obeying positive physical laws’ (p. 126). Similarly, 
Laclau cautions us that it would be problematic to equate class strug-
gle with  
‘the physical act by which a policeman hits a worker militant, or the 
shouts of a group in Parliament which prevent a member of an oppos-
ing sector from speaking.’ (p. 126)  
This is where Barad’s framework contradicts Laclau’s assump-
tions. That is, Laclau’s assumptions regarding the ontological status of 
real opposition, indeed, may hold true, but only when thinking inside a 
decidedly Newtonian ontology, an ontology which - as reiterated 
throughout this thesis – has been challenged by Barad’s concept of 
intra-action. For example, in Newton’s framework we encounter inde-
pendent, fully formed identities which interact with one another whilst 
in Barad’s framework these identities emerge through intra-action be-
cause there are no already fully formed entities in the word to begin 
with! In fact, Laclau’s notion of antagonism (which subsequently builds 
the backbone of his populist theorisations) describes a phenomenon 
which is much closer to Barad’s intra-action than “real opposition” ever 
could be. The only difference, of course, is that Laclau uses antago-
nism to describe the processes which emerge in the social world whilst 
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intra-action presents itself as a more generic blueprint to describe the 
materialisation of matter in the entire universe. This universe, in 
Barad’s framework, comprises the social (whilst what is “social” and 
what is “natural” cannot be disentangled).  
 
Discourse. This opens the opportunity to examine some of the paral-
lels between Laclau’s and Barad’s frameworks. First, there are some 
striking similarities in Barad and Laclau’s understandings of discourse. 
Laclau (2005, 68-69) suggests that ‘discourse is the primary terrain of 
the constitution of objectivity as such’. Importantly, his definition of dis-
course is not  
‘essentially restricted to the areas of speech and writing, but any com-
plex of elements in which relations play the constitutive role. This 
means that elements do not pre-exist the relational complex but are 
constituted through it.’ 
In fact, the similarities between Laclau and Barad’s understanding 
are so striking, that the above quote could also have been printed in 
Meeting the Universe Halfway. That is, at the heart of intra-action is 
that ‘relata do not pre-exist relations’ (Barad, 2007, p. 140). In addition, 
Barad’s conception of material-discursive practices resonates with 
Laclau’s version of discourse in that both argue that “discourse” is not 
restricted to language. Even more importantly – and this part is identi-
cal to Barad’s work – ‘elements’ (which equates to Barad’s intra-acting 
agencies) ‘do not pre-exist’ (Barad, 2007:ix; Laclau, 2005:68) ‘the re-
lational complex but are constituted through it’ / ‘emerge as being part’ 
of their intra-action (Barad, 2007:360). In addition, both Barad and 
Laclau hold on to a certain conception of “objectivity”. Whilst Laclau 
suggests that ‘“relation” and “objectivity” are synonymous’ (Laclau, 
2005:68), Barad similarly figures objectivity in the Bohrian sense of an 
unambiguous specification of the material and conceptual apparatus. 
That is, Laclau asserts that ‘discourse is the primary terrain of the con-
stitution of objectivity as such’ whereas Barad sees material discursive 
practices as the practices which create objectivity. Even when it comes 
to Barad’s famous assertion that intra-action is not about relations of 
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pure exteriority (as Manuel DeLanda would argue), but rather – due to 
the emergent character of intra-acting agencies – about ‘exteriority 
within phenomena (Barad, 2007:340), Laclau provides an almost iden-
tical explication of how group identities emerge, namely through the 
articulation of a demand:  
‘This articulation, however, does not correspond to a stable and posi-
tive configuration which could be grasped as a unified whole: on the 
contrary, since it is in the nature of all demands to present claims to a 
certain established order, it is in a peculiar relation with that order, be-
ing both inside and outside it’ (Laclau, 2005:ix; emphasis added).   
 
Boundary. Another similarity between both scholars can be found 
when comparing Barad’s agential cut and Laclau’s antagonistic fron-
tier. According to Laclau, antagonism is constitutive. By putting into 
question ‘objectivity as such’ (Laclau, 2005:85), Laclau outlines the 
differences between Saussure’s structuralist claims and his notion of 
antagonism. Whilst Saussure’s differences, for instance, ‘still presup-
pose a continuous space without which they [i.e. differences] are, as 
such, constituted’, in Laclau’s (2005:85; italics in original) notion of dif-
ference, there is no continuous space. Rather, antagonism describes 
‘a radical frontier’ and ‘a broken space’. The construction of a group 
identity, such as the people, fully (and not only partially) depends on 
the antagonistic frontier. Without the antagonistic frontier which sepa-
rates the “oppressor” from the “oppressed”, no group identity of the 
“oppressed” would be possible. For example, in the context of this the-
sis, there is no possibility of the emergence of a resentful lecturer iden-
tity without the antagonism of students. Both elements are entirely con-
tingent on one another. Moreover, there is no shared student-lecturer 
identity without the construction of “oppressive policy makers”. The an-
tagonistic frontier, in other words, creates objectivity as such. Frontier 
and group identity emerge simultaneously.  
This antagonistic frontier is almost identical to Barad’s general 
logic of intra-action and its accompanying agential cut. Intra-action de-
scribes the process by which there is no pre-existing matter in this 
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word. That is, there are no independent particles or other entities, such 
as a lecturers, electrons, cells or stars. Rather all entities (whether 
small or large) emerge as part of their intra-action: all matter comes 
into existence through its intra-action. For example, in experimental 
settings, there is no such thing as a pre-existing “light particle” or “light 
wave”. Rather, whether light becomes a wave or a particle in contin-
gent on the material conditions of the intra-action.  
In this sense, both Laclau’s antagonistic frontier and Barad’s intra-
action describe the process by which reality is created as such. In 
Laclau’s version, there is no group identity without an antagonistic 
force which prevents this group from having their differential demands 
met: the antagonistic frontier is constitutive of “the people”. In Barad’s 
version of intra-action this logic is generalisable to all social – and even 
further to all phenomena.  
7.4 Foucault, Barad and Laclau 
This section now provides an integrated reading of Barad’s, Laclau’s 
and Foucault’s works. A visualisation of this framework is displayed in 
Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: An integrated framework 
 
As can be seen, intra-action is the conceptually largest of notions 
since it describes all matter in the universe, from the smallest elements 
towards the largest stars. Governmentality is nested within this as one 
specific type of intra-action - that is, as one specific material-discursive 
apparatus of bodily production (see Chapter 4). Governmentality, in 
itself, describes a technique of government, of which there are many. 
As argued in Chapter 4, there is not only neo-liberal governmentality, 
but discipline and sovereign power can also be reframed as govern-
mentalities. To this, as Chapter 5 argued, one further governmentality 
needs to be added: that of antagonistic governmentality.  
Intra-action
Governmentality
Neoliberal 
Governmentality / 
Disciplinary 
Governmentality / 
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Relating this back to the NSS, it could hence be postulated that 
the NSS is a material discursive apparatus which utilises various en-
folded governmentalities. This matters (i.e. it is simultaneously mean-
ingful and has material effects) (Barad, 2007) in that it creates (mate-
rial) boundaries between lecturers and students and specific anxious 
lecturer identities. Foremost, these boundaries are iterative (Barad, 
2007) – in that they have to be maintained through iterative worrying 
and other repeated intra-active practices - and antagonistic (Laclau, 
2005). These boundaries moreover function as a technology of gov-
ernment - a governmentality (Foucault, 2009) in that they keep lectur-
ers in an antagonistic struggle with students (Laclau, 2005) who itera-
tively and intra-actively (Barad, 2007) emerge as the antagonistic force 
(Laclau). Importantly, the NSS is not the only technology which guides 
university lecturer practice or certain antagonisms between students 
and lecturers. Entangled with and enfolded into the NSS –as under-
stood in Barad’s sense of different scales being folded through one 
another – are further concurrent technologies, such as the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF) and Ofsted practices (in teacher educa-
tion). For example, at Lisa’s university, competitive logics are facili-
tated by a practice which is geared towards improving REF outputs. In 
this process, lecturers can “bid” for hours to improve their REF status 
whilst people in management positions allocate these hours. In other 
words, lecturers are pitched in competitive struggles against one an-
other over research hours. Lecturer subjectivities, hence, become 
competitised (Foucault, 2008). Further entangled technologies shall 
be considered in the following conclusion 8.3.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 „Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im Falschen.27“ (Adorno, 2018) 
 
The discussion in the previous chapter brings this thesis to its conclu-
sion. This chapter, first, provides a brief summary. Next, the important 
issue of student voice is approached from a more general perspective. 
Subsequently, it will be argued that any local version of student voice 
is severely limited due to larger-scale market and governmental pres-
sures. Therefore, some wider implications of current global issues are 
considered. It is argued that the NSS is entangled with these macro 
processes and that future research needs be attentive to these entan-
glements. Last, I try to outline some limitations of this study as well as 
resituating the enquiry in the context of my own biography.  
8.1 Summary 
This thesis sought to enquire into the effects of Student Evaluations of 
Teaching in the context of the National Student Survey. I started by 
reviewing the literature on the NSS and SETs more generally. This 
literature review concluded that the NSS may neither accurately meas-
ure student satisfaction, nor may it be capable of meaningfully com-
paring universities or improving student outcomes. Rather the NSS 
may produce course deflation, maintain gender biases, and promote 
contested pedagogies, such as rote memorisation. This raised the 
question: what are the actual effects of the NSS on lecturer identity 
and higher education in the UK more generally.  
Next, some paradigmatic issues were considered, such as my de-
cision to conceptualise the NSS within a (tentative) realist paradigm. I 
then outlined my research methods and ethical decisions and dis-
cussed notions, such as reflexivity.  
                                                 
27 The quote “Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im Falschen“ is a quote from Adorno’s 
(2018:18) Minima Moralia. It translates to ‘Wrong Life cannot be lived rightly’ (Adorno, 
2005:39).  
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On this basis, it was then suggested that the NSS functions as a 
technology of government, i.e. as a governmentality (Foucault, 2009). 
First, “disciplinary governmentality” was explored (Foucault, 1977). 
More specifically, it was argued that the NSS governed my participants 
through what Foucault (1977) referred to as the disciplines, i.e. “hier-
archical observation” and “normalising judgement”. For example, uni-
versity lecturers, modules and universities were subjected to (i) “hier-
archical observations” by senior management - who instrumentalised 
students’ panoptic gazes - and to (ii) “normalising judgement” in that 
lecturers, departments and universities were continuously ranked 
against one another. In addition, discipline operated by closely deter-
mining the space, time and interactions of university lecturers, partic-
ularly if they failed to achieve positive student satisfaction. As a result, 
lecturers, departments and universities became “docile”, but also “use-
ful” (by aligning themselves with strategic university decisions).   
However, discipline as a mode of governing academics did not 
sufficiently explain some of the other phenomena operational at the 
universities of this study, including occasional moments of lecturers’ 
perceived “freedom”. Hence, Foucault’s later work on liberal and neo-
liberal governmentality was used to make sense of these phenomena. 
After providing a brief general overview of the concept of “neoliberal-
ism” (without a hyphen) - such as its origins in economic liberalism or 
its associated phenomena of rising inequality, financial instability, cor-
ruption and unethical commercialisation – I then went on to discuss 
Foucault’s delineation of the term. The attempt was made to exemplify 
how the NSS could be understood as a liberal technology of govern-
ment (by introducing a narrow conception of “freedom” into the art of 
governing the academic population). In addition, by introducing com-
petition within artificially created quasi markets, it was argued that a 
distinctly neo-liberal element permeates the NSS. It was asserted that 
university lecturers, courses and universities, become “competitised” 
and, thus, governable because, put bluntly, lecturers who are in per-
petual competition with one another are less likely to challenge larger 
power structures.  
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On this basis, it was suggested that the NSS may perhaps consti-
tute a novel combination (an amalgam) of disciplinary and neo-liberal 
governmentalities. The attempt was then made to view rating and 
ranking practices as neo-liberal disciplinary hybrids in wider societal 
contexts. For this purpose, “Nosedive” – an episode of Charlie 
Brooker’s television series Black Mirror - was utilised. In Nosedive, rat-
ing and ranking practices have permeated virtually all realms of social 
life through the use of augmented-reality technology. Whilst this depic-
tion may still seem like science fiction, these trends are already trace-
able in companies such as “Airbnb” or “Uber” as well as a novel Chi-
nese project which uses a “citizen score” to determine access to cer-
tain goods and services.  
 
I then proposed that in the NSS another type of logic is present which 
I termed “antagonistic governmentality”. This notion capitalises on 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality (Foucault, 2009) and combines 
the latter with Ernesto Laclau’s work on populism and antagonism 
(Laclau, 2005). It was argued that antagonism describes the process 
of group formation which occurs when people jointly reject another en-
tity. It is then precisely through this rejection that they form their group 
identity. It was suggested that students may develop a group identity 
by rejecting their lecturer, and lecturers may develop a group identity 
by rejecting students. However, going beyond Laclau’s specific mean-
ing of antagonism, I proposed that the NSS could be considered an 
“antagonistic technology” which generates antagonisms between lec-
turers and students not so much as a strategy which requires (human) 
energy, but rather automatically, that is akin to a computer algorithm. 
For example, through the NSS, lecturers situate students as antago-
nisms due to the latter’s artificially created power over the lives of the 
former. This, importantly, also creates a boundary (which Laclau calls 
an antagonistic frontier) separating lecturers from students. Connect-
ing this to previous sections in the thesis, lecturers, departments and 
universities are not only disciplined and competitised, but are also put 
into a position in which they see students as the “enemy”. The most 
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crucial “side-effect” of this figuring of students as the antagonistic force 
is, however, that the very technologies which created the antagonisms 
in the first place (such as the NSS) become increasingly “unintelligible” 
as the root of the problem. That is, akin to the logic of neo-liberal gov-
ernmentality which makes lecturers less likely to challenge the status 
quo because they are too busy competing with one another, antago-
nisms make lecturers less likely to challenge the status quo because 
they are too busy resenting students for their perceived power. In other 
words, antagonism “governs” the (academic) population. Hence, in ad-
dition to disciplinary and neo-liberal governmentality, “antagonistic 
governmentality” governs the academic population through antago-
nism.  
I then argued that it is precisely through the simultaneous working 
of discipline, competition and antagonism that an “antagonism without 
populism” emerges. That is, whilst this antagonism should really cre-
ate connections between lecturers because these begin to jointly re-
ject students (e.g. as “demanding customers”), this connection is sab-
otaged because lecturers are simultaneously in “competition” with 
each other. It was therefore hypothesised that the NSS – as a discipli-
nary, neo-liberal, antagonistic hybrid - systematically undermines at-
tempts of solidarity between students and lecturers whilst simultane-
ously decreasing the likelihood that policy makers or the “ruling elite” 
are constructed as the “culprits” behind particular unmet demands. 
The NSS resonates with the Roman saying, “Divide and Rule”: lectur-
ers are divided from lecturers through competition and lecturers are 
divided from students through antagonism.  
 
Subsequently, a more experimental stance was taken to further 
deepen the enquiry into the NSS by utilising two “new materialist” 
frameworks (Iris van der Tuin & Rick Dolphijn et al., 2010). First, Ma-
nuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2016) was discussed 
as an additional way to systematise the preceding analysis. The NSS 
was hereby understood as an assemblage with specific component 
parts. These parts, in return, stood in particular disciplinary, neo-liberal 
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and antagonistic relations towards one another. On the basis that the 
NSS competitises and simultaneously disciplines and antagonises its 
subjects (i.e. lecturers), it was established that DeLanda’s theory is 
particularly powerful in theorising how macro and micro levels of scale 
relate to one another. It was argued that the NSS (as one assemblage) 
consists of certain component parts (e.g. universities, students and an 
infrastructure). Importantly, universities, students and infrastructures 
could be understood as assemblages themselves. Universities contain 
smaller assemblages (e.g. courses) which contain smaller assem-
blages (e.g. modules) comprising smaller assemblages (e.g. lecturers) 
comprising further assemblages (e.g. psychological processes) com-
prising smaller assemblages (e.g. brain cell clusters) etc. Importantly, 
DeLanda argues that what makes an assemblage an assemblage is 
that its component parts interact with one another in characteristic 
ways. In the context of the NSS, it was therefore argued that interac-
tions between universities are more competitive (they are guided by 
neo-liberal governmentality) and those between students and univer-
sities are more disciplinary (they are guided by disciplinary govern-
mentality). DeLanda’s framework was then discussed as particularly 
apt to show how the NSS affects its component parts (such as univer-
sities). That is, the NSS makes universities reconfigure internally 
which makes smaller assemblages reconfigure (e.g. modules) which 
transforms lecturers’ interactions which reshapes psychological pro-
cesses.   
Karen Barad’s “agential realism” was then utilised to revisit a 
range of further phenomena, such the increasing boundary creation 
which appears to coincide with my proposed disciplined and “competi-
tised” lecturer identity. After introducing her work, the NSS was theo-
rised through Barad’s suggested simultaneous emergence of matter, 
boundaries and exclusions. Agential realism suggests that all matter 
in the universe is in a constant process of “materialisation” through 
what Barad terms “intra-action”. Put bluntly, all material entities in the 
universe do not exist outside of intra-actions; thus, people (such as 
lecturers) do not pre-exist their encounters with the world, but rather 
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are in a constant process of (ontologically) emerging out of these en-
counters. In other words, it is “encounters” (i.e. intra-actions) between 
lecturers and students which make lecturers and students materialise 
in the first place. This materialisation – i.e. the taking shape – coincides 
through what Barad calls the “agential cut”. The agential cut, so to 
speak, makes the delineating boundaries between bodies (e.g. lec-
turer bodies and student bodies) intelligible. Barad suggests that for a 
more permanent boundary to emerge, agential cuts need to become 
“iterative” (i.e. they need to assume some sense of repetition). This 
iterativity was captured in lecturers “worrying” (i.e. anxiety as repetitive 
negative thinking) as well as repeated ways of intra-acting with stu-
dents.  
I then utilised another Baradian concepts: that of “enfolding”. It 
was argued that since lecturer anxiety and lecturer/student encounters 
are “enfolded” into student feedback systems, these encounters de-
velop a somewhat pernicious quality. For example, I discussed that at 
some point I was worried that a student whom I told off for disrespectful 
behaviour may in fact take revenge and give me negative feedback in 
the future. As a result, I materialised as anxious and, hence, as partic-
ularly “nice” towards the student in the following session. Macro-scale 
student feedback systems (e.g. the NSS) could therefore be under-
stood as being ‘enfolded through’ (Barad, 2007:245) meso-scale insti-
tutional practices (e.g. Internal Surveys), my micro-scale encounters 
with the students, and resultant subpersonal (psychological) pro-
cesses of “worrying”. It was argued that perhaps instead of having a 
relatively neat “nested model” where subpersonal processes, interper-
sonal encounters, institutions and nation-states are situated within 
each other (as is the case with DeLanda’s assemblage theory), 
Barad’s work might be more suitable in showing how “topologies” (i.e. 
boundaries and connectivities) sometimes cut across issues of scale. 
I concluded, that both issues of scale and issues of topology need to 
be taken into account because, put simplistically, it matters whether 
five or 500,000 students resist the NSS.  
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In what was termed a “paradigmatic interlude”, I then discussed 
some implications of Barad’s framework on the research process, i.e. 
the impact of a Baradian ontology on methodological issues. Next, I 
argued that there are several weaknesses in Barad’s framework, such 
as the all-encompassing nature of intra-action (which also could be 
considered a strength) and Barad’s anti-representationalism and un-
der-theorisation of language.  
 
Subsequently, a comparison – or using Barad’s terminology “a diffrac-
tive reading” – was attempted between the main theoretical frame-
works of this thesis. First, Barad’s and Foucault’s work were read dif-
fractively. Whilst Barad made extensive use of Foucault’s notion of dis-
cursive practices and, to a lesser degree, discipline, Barad failed to 
utilise Foucault’s lecture series on governmentality (Foucault, 2008, 
2009). I therefore suggested that “governmentality” may be conceptu-
alised as one specific type of intra-action. Next, Foucault and Laclau 
were read diffractively. Whilst in “Hegemony and Socialist Strategy”, 
Laclau and Mouffe (2014) draw on Foucault’s work, this was limited to 
Foucault’s earlier “archaeological” phase in contrast to his later “gene-
alogical” phase (cf. Gutting, 2006). Thus, I reiterated that antagonism 
does not only comprise a distinct social operational principle, but ra-
ther could be instrumentalised for the purpose of governing a popula-
tion. In short, the NSS may be an example of an “antagonistic govern-
mentality”. Last, the most striking similarities emerged between Laclau 
and Barad’s works. In particular, both author’s definitions of discourse 
(Laclau, 2005) and material-discursive practices (Barad, 2007) dis-
played almost uncanny resemblances, including their agreement that 
people do no pre-exist relationships. In summary, it was argued that 
intra-action is the most general conceptual category; Foucault’s notion 
of governmentality then becomes one mode of intra-acting at both 
macro and micro levels of scale (governmentality, according to Fou-
cault, connects the practice of governing a whole population with the 
technologies of the self (i.e. self-control)). As a next step, four govern-
mentalities could be identified: sovereign governmentality, disciplinary 
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governmentality (Foucault, 1977), neo-liberal governmentality (Fou-
cault, 2008) and, as a novel contribution, antagonistic governmentality 
(Laclau, 2005). As a result, lecturers (i) become increasingly resentful 
towards students (whilst larger scale issues, such as the NSS, are less 
likely to appear as the real source of their unmet demands) (antago-
nism); (ii) compete with other lecturers over student feedback (neo-
liberalism); and, if this competition fails to raise student feedback, lec-
turers (iii) may be subjected to more fine-grained disciplinary practices. 
When viewed from these multiple angles, the NSS transpires as a 
technology which promotes an increasing atomisation of university lec-
turers. Put concisely, the NSS could be understood as a material-dis-
cursive apparatus which competitises, disciplines and creates antag-
onisms without creating connectivities. This analysis now opens a 
range of further questions and lines of enquiry which will be discussed 
in what follows.  
8.2 The Future of Student Feedback 
There is a central issue which has not yet been adequately discussed 
in this thesis, but which, nevertheless, is of crucial importance. It con-
cerns the danger of positing students as seemingly all-powerful actors 
within the field of UK higher education. Such a view would mistakenly 
neglect the multitude of further disciplinary and neo-liberal assem-
blages within higher education, including those which figure students 
at the receiving end of disciplinary technologies, such as perpetual 
student assessment regimes (Raaper, 2016). Hence, rather than see-
ing student feedback assemblages in isolation, I suggested that there 
is the need to seek an understanding of how these assemblages inter-
act with other (disciplinary/neo-liberal/antagonistic) assemblages, in-
cluding the effects of this interaction (intra-action) on all stakeholders 
at universities. For instance, I argued that this interaction may occur in 
the shape of a perpetual and reciprocal disciplining cycle (see page 
145) in which students discipline university lecturers (through Student 
Evaluations of Teaching) and lecturers discipline students (through 
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conventional means of testing and examinations). This, as was shown, 
was another “theme” which emerged from my initial observational 
data, namely that students spent a significant amount of time in their 
seminars straying off task by expressing how worried they were about 
their assignments. Assignments are clearly disciplinary (after all, Fou-
cault (1977) called the combination of normalising judgement and hi-
erarchical observation the “examination”). When students are judged 
on their academic performance, they are judged on a scale from 0-100 
(normalising judgement) and this observation is top down (hierarchical 
observation). Hence, lecturers rate students (in assignments) and stu-
dents rate lecturers (in student evaluations of teaching). Again, I ar-
gued that this reciprocal disciplining (and the resultant reciprocal an-
tagonisms) mirror what is found in Airbnb practices where both apart-
ment host and guests rate one another. This, yet again, resonates with 
the saying Divide and Rule. Perpetual, reciprocal assessments divide 
students and lecturers.  
In addition, students are forced to compete with one another in the 
“employment market” after graduation. In other words, students (simi-
larly to lecturers) find themselves at the receiving end of a perpetual 
competitisation as characteristic of Foucault’s understanding of neo-
liberal governmentality. Furthermore, many students are also sub-
jected more harshly to other effects of neoliberalism (without a hy-
phen). For example, both lecturers and students face an increasingly 
uncertain employment future (Lopes and Dewan, 2014). Further com-
plexity emerges when vocational degrees are added into the analysis.  
For example, Ofsted appraisals of universities in the context of UK in-
itial teacher education (MacBeath, 2011) could be understood as a 
further disciplinary assemblage in which discipline filters down the uni-
versity hierarchy with students at the receiving end. In short, these 
technologies are entangled and cannot fully be understood without ac-
knowledging this entanglement.  
I would now like to draw the following analogy. Since I frequently 
commute into work on overcrowded trains, I suggest that the relation-
ship between lecturers and students under technologies, such as the 
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NSS, assessment practices, and Ofsted regimes, is a little bit like the 
relationships between passengers on an overcrowded train. I fre-
quently observe people getting frustrated with this lack of space. In-
stead of, however, blaming the train company for refusing to provide 
further compartments, people’s frustration, at times, appears to be di-
rected at their fellow passengers for “deciding to travel at the same 
time”. Similarly, under the technologies discussed in this thesis, lectur-
ers, students and managers may begin to blame one another for their 
lack of creative space (and time) whilst forgetting the structural origins 
of their competitive and antagonistic behaviour.  
This now raises the question what a non-disciplinary, non-antag-
onistic, non-governmental student feedback could look like. Is there 
the possibility of meaningful student feedback with the agency to 
change institutional practice without engaging in the governing of any 
stakeholder? After all, it could be maintained that it is not student feed-
back which is the problem, but the managerialist, competitive and dis-
ciplinary fashion in which it is currently instigated and maintained at 
many universities across the world (Deem, 1998; Winter, 2009). Per-
haps this would necessitate the provision of democratic platforms that 
are safe from threats of lecturer redundancy (or low student grades) 
and in which a much more direct voicing of student (dis)satisfaction is 
possible. These platforms may open spaces in which students and lec-
turers can engage in genuine debates on how to best structure higher 
education instead of disciplining one another within pyramidal and 
competitive power structures.  
One such version of student feedback is presented by Fielding 
(2004), who, writing before the implementation of the NSS, argues for 
a more dialogic orientated approach to student voice. In this dialogic 
approach, it is not so much about whether students actually get their 
“voice” across - i.e. it is not about whether students speak for them-
selves – but rather, student voice’s liberating potential lies in the act of 
speaking (particularly to those in power). 
It could be suggested, however, that this dialogic approach could 
only succeed if it was implemented beyond the current NSS model. 
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Again, this would require a re-evaluation of the power imbalances in-
herent in summative assessment practices where a (more powerful) 
person (i.e. a lecturer) judges the quality of the work of a (less power-
ful) one. In short, it could be suggested that abolishing student satis-
faction surveys, such as the NSS, whilst maintaining top-down assess-
ment practices may rightfully be considered unfair28.  
8.3 The NSS as Part of Global Issues  
This then raises questions regarding the opportunities of resisting or 
transforming the disciplinary-neo-liberal-antagonistic effects of student 
appraisals and other technologies. Whilst some authors have sug-
gested that it is still possible to resist certain developments at the in-
stitutional level (Gonzales, 2015:303) in the shape of critiquing and 
resisting strategic university decisions, the possibilities for agency 
may, indeed, be severely limited precisely due to larger scale issues, 
such as market pressures between universities. This limitation poign-
antly transpired when I, in a recent team meeting, was asked what my 
stance on the NSS results were:  
Recently, we had a meeting about the NSS scores for our course and I 
was asked to give my opinion, considering that my thesis was about the 
NSS. In retrospect, my answer really disappointed me. I mumbled 
something about that obviously the whole issue regarding the NSS is 
very complex, but that my answer would probably be twofold. I some-
what continued, “On the one hand there’s this dimension that the NSS 
does not tell us anything, it does not improve provision for students, 
may lead to grade inflation in that lecturers give better marks to receive 
better feedback and it might actually be bad for course quality because 
lecturers make it easy so students don’t struggle. It’s also actually quite 
pernicious in lots of ways: students may even give better student feed-
back to lecturers who they perceive to be good looking.” … I then went 
back and said, “On a general level, the NSS is really problematic be-
cause it’s part of a neoliberal agenda. Yet, this does not alter the fact 
that we as a department are under massive competitive pressures.” Af-
terwards, I asked myself, is this really the best I can do? … (Excerpt 57. 
My research diary)  
                                                 
28 Then yet again, there appears to be a more profound contradiction at play 
here which concerns the question of what would happen to universities’ role of qual-
ity assuring degrees which may involve high stakes (e.g. medical degrees, nursing 
degrees) 
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Despite my disappointment with my own “advice” regarding the NSS, 
this spontaneous narrative may entail a certain “truth” about the NSS. 
That is, although I felt rather unhappy about my response due to its 
lack of any positive counter-strategy at the institutional level and its 
unsatisfactory and compliant demand for “playing the game”, my 
answer perhaps touched on one important issue: that of large-scale 
competitive pressures. In short, any local response which seeks to 
resist market technologies, such as the NSS, may be severely limited 
because this localism keeps inter-university market pressures and 
wider effects of neoliberalism untouched (Srnicek & Williams, 2016). 
The following fictional scenario could be invented. University A de-
cides that it will completely ignore the NSS by, for example, ceasing to 
allocate internal resources to the attainment of high student satisfac-
tion. Consequently, no Internal Surveys would be administered and no 
lecturers would be tasked with the job of analysing, evaluating and 
drawing conclusions from NSS scores for further strategic considera-
tion. Lecturers would still meet with student representatives but en-
gage in a “democratic” dialogue with students as suggested above 
(Fielding, 2004). (The possibility that this lack of satisfaction surveys 
may unexpectedly lead to an increase in student satisfaction scores 
will, for the sake of the argument, not be considered.) For now, it shall 
be assumed that as part of this democratic dialogue it may also come 
to frictions between students and the course which, in return, result in 
a decline in NSS scores. From here, further events may unfold: the 
decline in NSS scores may lead to a decline in league tables, leading 
to fewer students choosing university A, leading to less funding 
through tuition fees.  
This also shows how the raising of tuition fees and associated 
withdrawal of government funding is fundamentally connected to the 
NSS – in Baradian (2007) terms it could be suggested they are “en-
tangled”. For example, if universities were not as dependent on stu-
dents’ tuition fees as is currently the case, this might also affect lead-
ership decisions, such as relegating the primacy of student voice to a 
lower agenda item. Since universities, however, rely on tuition fees as 
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one of their main funding sources, the pressures of recruiting enough 
students are profound. For example, Lisa remarks:  
At our university, the whole summer was spent on trying to recruit more 
students to our programs. It may have to do with the fact that we are a 
“recruiting” university and not a “choosing university”. However, the 
amount of resources allocated to securing places for further students 
was immense this summer. We continued to receive emails (weekly!) 
updating us on the current recruitment status. I am seriously wondering 
how these recruitment pressures clash with choosing excellent student 
teachers. Surely, when you are so reliant upon students’ money, you 
may sometimes allow students to become teachers who may not be the 
best teachers for the children. (Excerpt 58. Lisa’s research diary)  
Put concisely, I suggest that “inter-university competition” decreases 
“intra-university agency”.  
Hence, it could be suggested that meaningful change may only be 
effected by larger-scale reconfigurations. If, for example, tuition fees 
were abolished – i.e. if universities were again solely funded by the 
Government - this may also affect the status of the NSS. That is, the 
NSS may either (a) lose its impact on universities (it may lose its “ma-
terialising power” (Barad, 2007) or disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977)) 
if money was paid to universities regardless of their student satisfac-
tion ratings. On the other hand, in an opposite version, the Govern-
ment may (b) make university funding contingent on NSS scores. That 
is, in this “hyper neo-liberal” scenario (in Foucault’s understanding of 
the term), the state may use student feedback to decide how much 
money would be allocated to universities which, in return, would exac-
erbate (and not ease) inter-university market pressures.  
However, even the changes depicted in scenario (a) may still not 
go far enough since the NSS, of course, is part of broader international 
developments. For example, the two universities in this study are not 
only part of a "national ranking market”, but also part of an “interna-
tional” one. Lisa writes:  
It is one of our university’s distinct goals to attract more international 
students at the moment. We seem to be lacking behind other universi-
ties in this. International students also pay more money.  (Excerpt 59. 
Lisa’s research diary).  
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International rankings may attract increasing numbers of international 
students who pay higher tuition fees than domestic or EU students. 
This also appears relevant at a national level, captured in the DfB’s 
assertion that ‘graduates are central to [the UK’s] prosperity and suc-
cess as a knowledge economy, and higher education is a key export 
sector (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2016, DfB:9). 
In other words, it is of national interest to attract money into the country 
in exchange for exporting “accreditations”. This focus on export is rem-
iniscent of Foucault’s (2009) description of mercantilist politics which 
sought to attract gold in exchange for grain.  
Further analogies can be drawn. Just as universities are some-
what powerless in an artificially produced competitive market (as is the 
case through the NSS), at a larger scale, countries may also be in-
creasingly impotent in effecting any profound internal change. It could 
even be suggested that nation-states are increasingly reconfigured as 
“large-scale companies” which seek to maximise profits by attracting 
capital from other countries. This relative impotence of individual coun-
tries in an international competitive market guided by internationally 
free-roaming capital was poignantly expressed in 2015 when Greece 
decided, based on a referendum, to refuse to pay bailout money to its 
creditors (who comprised a mixture of German banks, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB)).  This 
referendum was ignored, and the imposed austerity continued. Along-
side this development, capital rapidly escaped Greece due to the fear 
of a banking collapse. In other words, in a world where capital can be 
moved freely with no effective international oversight and regulation of 
these money flows (Piketty, 2014), countries may, in effect, be consid-
ered oversized companies which operate within a global market (just 
as universities are reconfigured as companies in a “student satisfac-
tion market”).   
I suggest that it is here where my new materialist discussion 
(Chapter 6) may add some further analytical insights. For example, 
returning to DeLanda (2006), whilst assemblages may differ in size, 
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the relations between their respective component parts may be identi-
cal. For instance, the logic of competition remains the same regardless 
of whether individuals compete with other individuals, universities 
compete with other universities or, in fact, countries compete with 
other countries. Hence, the example of Greece not only demonstrated 
that the interests of German banks appear to outweigh national dem-
ocratic processes, but that - just as at a smaller scale, universities may 
be powerless against inter-university competition – nation-states may 
be somewhat powerless against “inter-national” competition and asso-
ciated capital streams.  
It becomes increasingly clear that it is only one further analytical 
step to propose that not only people, courses and universities are the 
subjects of disciplinary-neo-liberal-antagonistic governmentalities, but 
that nation-states are. More specifically, the following DeLandian 
(2006) model could be proposed: the assemblage “Earth” contains a 
myriad (natural and social) component parts, such as oceans, land-
masses and countries which interact in specific ways. First, as a result 
of neoliberal globalisation, countries (or governmental (!) organisa-
tions, such as the EU) are in “competitive relations” with other coun-
tries. Interestingly, at this global level, these competitive relations may, 
again, be systematised by rankings (e.g. World Competitiveness 
Ranking 2018, 2018) and ratings (e.g. Moody’s (Reuters, 2017)), just 
as at the national level competition is systematised by the NSS and 
the TEF. As a result of this competitive pressure, countries internally 
reconfigure (i.e. as argued in 6.1 assemblages can affect the identity 
of its components). This reconfiguration may be embodied in legisla-
tion which seeks to attract capital from other countries (e.g. “tax breaks 
for investors”, “advertising campaigns to attract more international stu-
dents”) or in the implementation of further internal governmentalities 
(e.g. the NSS). That is to say, because there are external competitive 
pressures between countries, these countries respond by “copying” 
those external competitive relations into their internal policymaking. In 
DeLanda’s terminology, due to the competitive “relations of exteriority” 
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between countries, these countries internally configure, by implement-
ing internal competitive interactions between their respective compo-
nent parts. This process could be firstly captured in a “top-down” 
causal structure. Put crudely, because the UK is governed by (exter-
nal) international competition, the UK Government governs its compo-
nent parts to compete with one another on ranked scales internally. 
For example, universities compete with other universities (in the NSS, 
REF, etc.), schools compete with other schools (e.g. in league tables 
(Richardson and Sellgren, 2018)), and hospitals with other hospitals 
(e.g. National Institute for Health Research, NIHR, 2018). These as-
semblages, yet again, force their components (e.g. university mod-
ules, school year groups, hospital departments) to compete with one 
another (e.g. in Internal Survey rankings, year group performance 
rankings, patient satisfaction rankings). In return, these assemblages 
may promote competition between their respective components (e.g. 
lecturers informally compete in Student Representative Meetings 
(SRMs), teachers may compete with one another over the progress of 
their pupils, and nurses may be competing over popularity with pa-
tients). Second, in a bottom-up fashion, it could be suggested that in-
dividuals become competitive, so that their departments become com-
petitive, so that their organisations become competitive, so that their 
countries become competitive. In short, neoliberal globalisation may 
be understood as a global, hierarchical assemblage which governs by 
creating competition at all levels of scale through normalising judge-
ment and panoptical rankings. In addition, I suggest that competition 
and antagonism work alongside one another. For instance, a school 
class may develop its identity on the basis of a rejection (an antago-
nism) towards another class. A school may develop its own identity 
through its antagonism towards another school. A country may de-
velop its own identity (in this case nationalism) based on its rejection 
of another country.  
In addition, Barad’s (2007) work is useful in showing how this cur-
rent neoliberal globalised capitalism is not only to be understood in this 
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neat nested model. Rather, it could be described as a ‘topological an-
imal’ that constantly ‘mutates through an open-ended dynamics of in-
tra-activity’ (p. 240). That is, there are distinct topological relationships 
which pierce through any nested model in that, for example, a lecturer 
in the UK may be competing with another in the US, whilst my univer-
sity may compete with another university in India, thereby traversing 
‘bodily [state] boundaries’ (Barad, 2007:155; word added to suit anal-
ysis).  
This discussion now raises a distinctly modern question. Can is-
sues at the local level be addressed without also addressing issues at 
the global level? At the danger of sounding increasingly utopian, I ask 
whether the only way to counter-act this tendency of global govern-
mentality is to establish an “international contract” which replaces 
global competition (as for example enshrined in World Bank law) with 
global cooperation. This question, in return, is connected to even 
larger “planetary” issues, which may, in fact, spell the end of our cur-
rent “civilisation”, such as global environmental degradation and rising 
inequality (Motesharrei et al., 2014).  
Whilst a more thorough exploration of these issues would clearly 
go beyond the scope for this thesis, I only schematically touch upon 
the crucial issue of “rising wealth inequality” and then suggest how this 
connects to my arguments as presented in this thesis. Thomas 
Piketty’s “Capital in the 21st century” problematises this global phe-
nomenon of increasing wealth inequality. Piketty asserts that capital, 
if left to itself and not redistributed, tends to accumulate without match-
ing gains of productivity. For example, ‘Liliane Bettencourt’, before her 
death, owned thirty billion Euros whereas ‘her declared income was 
never more than five million a year’ despite interest endowing her with 
an annual sum of roughly 500 million Euros (p. 525). This amount can-
not be easily spent in a year. Therefore, ultra-wealthy people allow  
‘the remainder of the turn on one’s capital to accumulate in a family 
trust or other ad hoc legal entity created for the sole purpose of man-
aging a fortune of this magnitude, just as university endowments are 
managed’. (p. 525) 
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This “capital accumulation without labour” produces the issue that 
economic growth increasingly lags behind “return on capital”. In other 
words, because capital is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a 
small minority (i.e. the millionaires and billionaires of this world), the 
global return on this capital (e.g. the interest this capital produces if, 
for example, simply kept on a bank account) is increasingly larger than 
the economic global growth. The fact that ‘capital reproduces itself 
faster than output increases’ (p. 571) is highly problematic not only 
because economic growth slows down, but also because the rising 
inequality may be ‘potentially threatening to democratic societies’ (p. 
571). As a remedy against this process, Piketty suggests a ‘progres-
sive annual tax on capital’ (p. 572). Importantly, consistent with my 
argument above, this capital tax ‘it is not within the reach of the nation-
states’ (p. 573), but only possible if instantiated on a global level or, if 
not possible, at least at a transnational (e.g. European) one. This 
wealth tax, in return,  
‘will make it possible to avoid an endless inegalitarean spiral while 
preserving competition and incentives for new instances of primitive 
accumulation’ (p. 572).  
I suggest that this inequality also enables governmental technolo-
gies, such as the NSS to work more effectively. That is, precarity may 
function as a pre-condition for the governmentalities suggested in this 
thesis to work in the first place. Returning to the NSS, the following 
hypothetical scenario could be used as an explication. “Lecturer A is 
rated poorly by students. This rating has a slightly negative emotional 
effect on her because she thought the course “was going really well”. 
Because of the negative rating, her manager invites her in for a per-
formance review. In this review, Lecturer A is given a warning that she 
should try to improve her teaching (i.e. raise better student feedback) 
in the future. As a result, Lecturer A tries really hard to attain better 
student feedback: she becomes docile and competitive.” The same 
scenario shall now be considered with only one minor change: more 
secure employment rights (which are increasingly hollowed out under 
252 
current neoliberal policies). In this scenario, Lecturer A still receives 
poor student feedback, still is invited in for a meeting, still may even 
be given a warning; however, this warning lost its cutting edge simply 
because Lecturer A knows that she cannot be made redundant easily. 
In fact, on the premise of stronger employment rights, it is highly doubt-
ful that superior managers may even be in a position where they could 
“invite colleagues in and make threats”. On this basis, the following 
logic could be postulated: the more precarious the situation of a lec-
turer (or employee), the more power (used in Barad’s sense of “mate-
rialising potential”) governmental technologies, such as the NSS, 
have. Put differently, threats lose their cutting edge when there is no 
perceived realistic chance of putting these threats into action.  
This also resonates with recent suggestions to strengthen the bar-
gaining power of employees through a reduction of the workweek or a 
universal basic income (Srnicek and Williams, 2016). Srnicek and Wil-
liams argue that these two demands are paramount if humanity wants 
to avoid what neoliberal capitalism appears to be currently heading 
towards: a precarious future devoid of work and increasingly suscep-
tible to fascist, racist and misogynistic tendencies. Whilst being 
broadly associated with what has come to be known under the um-
brella of “accelerationism” (Mackay and Avanessian, 2014), Srnicek 
and William’s (2016) vision of the future is a distinctly left-wing anti-
neoliberal (but not anti-globalisation) project. Interestingly, this project 
demands “full automation” (instead of rejecting it), arguing that auto-
mation cannot be stopped (Artificial Intelligence (AI) may, in fact, ‘out-
perform humans in all tasks in 45 years’ and may automate ‘all human 
jobs in 120 years …’ (Grace et al., 2017:729; emphasis added)). Cru-
cially, this automation needs to, however, be accompanied by a reduc-
tion of the workweek – which would increase employee bargaining in 
that employers would no longer be able to threaten to “employ some-
body else” (as outlined above) – and a “universal basic income”. Fun-
damental to Srnicek and Williams’s (2016) accelerationist project is the 
creation of an ecology of institutions, seeking to develop ‘utopian nar-
ratives’ (p. 136) so as to ‘wrench open a new horizon of possibility’ (p. 
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139) which in return is able to critique present conditions. In the context 
of the NSS, further research could, hence, investigate utopian ques-
tions, such as, “What would the future of higher education look like 
without the current disciplinary, neo-liberal and antagonistic govern-
mentalities embodied in various technologies, such as the NSS?” or, 
“How do broader utopian ideas (such as a post-work society) recon-
figure higher education (including the NSS)?”  
8.4 Some Final Remarks 
In conclusion, I suggest that, like much academic work, this thesis 
feels unfinished and, in many respects, limited in its enquiry regarding 
issues of student feedback and voice. Whilst it may provide a novel 
view on student voice through the utilisation of theory which had not 
been used in this context before (i.e. Foucault, Laclau, DeLanda and 
Barad), it left a range of issues unaddressed. First, the data used for 
this thesis was clearly limited. Further research could mobilise a larger 
data set from a broader mix of universities, containing a more substan-
tial proportion of Ancient and Russel Group universities. The pres-
sures faced by these types of universities may be significantly different 
(e.g. more research pressures, fewer teaching pressures) which might 
be linked to their prestige and resultant status as “choosing universi-
ties” (in comparison to post-92 universities as “recruiting universities”). 
Whilst this thesis eschewed the utilisation of quantitative methods, per-
haps this larger data set would have enabled a mixed-methods ap-
proach to data evaluation.  
In addition, some questions had to be omitted due to word-count 
restraints. For example, earlier versions of this thesis linked student 
voice to Lacanian theory, in particular his notion of the “four dis-
courses”. It was argued that student feedback systems may create 
what could be called a hysteric-docility-utility – “hysteric” (as one of 
Lacan’s discourses) because lecturers may never be quite sure what 
students actually want from them in their feedback. Secondly, it would 
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have been interesting to explore more deeply, various alternative con-
ceptions of student voice (in fact, a whole chapter could have been 
dedicated to this, instead of simply incorporating this into the conclu-
sion).  
Lastly, various other theories presented themselves as good al-
ternatives to the new materialist (and perhaps overtly “fashionable”) 
theory used in this thesis. For example, actor-network theory may have 
been a useful addition to DeLanda and Barad’s theory. In addition, 
Marxist/Vygotskian inspired CHAT theory appeared to already ad-
dress many “New Materialist” issues, including an incorporation of lan-
guage and matter. Further research could explore these connection 
points. Last, an interesting enquiry would have been to explore some 
seminal theory, such as Marx’s Capital in the context of Barad’s the-
ory. That is, at one point, I found myself reading sections of Das 
Kapital, and the agency which was attributed to machines could have 
been copied verbatim out of Barad’s (2007) Meeting the Universe Half-
way.  
In conclusion, I would like to make a few personal comments. 
First, of course, this thesis was deeply situated in my own - perhaps 
slightly naïve - investment in the hope for a better future. I believe that 
this hope, in return, is rooted in my own experiences growing up in 
neoliberal Western Europe and experiencing first-hand the pressures 
that are associated with this experience, such as the ruthless all-en-
compassing competition which was palpable at school, university and 
in part-time jobs. On the other hand, whilst studying, I witnessed vari-
ous protest movements which sought to make a difference at the local 
level, including (successful) protests against the introduction of tuition-
fees in Germany. This experience of protest was accompanied by my 
own attempts to survive on money which I solely made from playing 
music in pubs. Still, my position was privileged in that my late grand-
parents paid for renting a room in a flat-share whilst I only had to earn 
the money for food. In short, the hardships which I may have experi-
enced shrink in comparison to those in worse-off situations. 
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This returns my discussion to neoliberalism. Whilst neoliberalism 
affects each person, institution or geographic locality differently, there 
still is an over-riding commonality in that it makes the majority of peo-
ple worse-off (cf. Brown, 2015). This decline of living standards may 
be expressed differentially in rising homelessness (or bleak and haz-
ardous living conditions in the slums and favelas of this world) for the 
most vulnerable members of society, or may mean that more privi-
leged people work for ‘longer hours for less pay’ and ‘less security’ 
(Brown, 2015:29). Neoliberalism seems to only benefit a select few, 
with recent statistics estimating that a plane-full of billionaires own as 
much wealth as the rest of the world population (Elliot, 2016). This 
inequality is neither good for the economy (Piketty, 2014), nor does it 
raise everyone’s living standards. Hence, it is my deep desire that hu-
manity manages to accelerate into a better future, which, in my view, 
entails a version where wealth inequality, racism, sexism, homophobia 
and “general nastiness” are less prevalent. In this sense, I desire 
something thoroughly modern and utopian: an extension of, what 
some may consider well-worn, notions of freedom, equality and global 
solidarity. It is my hope that this thesis represents a little contribution 
towards what has been recently described as the urgent necessity of 
building an international alternative to neoliberal capitalism or, even 
more worryingly, against exacerbating tendencies on the far-right.  
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